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ABSTRACT 
RURAL WATER DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:  
A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN UGANDA AND TANZANIA 
 
by Paola de Cecco 
 
Global transnational efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goal of 
halving the world population lacking access to improved water supplies are failing to 
address sustainable development in sub-Saharan rural communities.  These efforts have 
been driven largely by water governance strategies centered on the controversial principle 
that water is an economic good, and as such, the development of water services shall be 
left to the supply-demand mechanisms regulating commodities’ markets.  Uganda and 
Tanzania have embraced these strategies to varying degrees and have made strikingly 
different progress in developing their rural water sector.  Uganda has maintained a steady 
rate of improvement in rural water coverage, while Tanzania has not.  This comparative 
study between Tanzania’s and Uganda’s water governance principles and development 
approaches combined qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews and water 
policies with participant observation of two case studies.  The results of the study suggest 
the success of Uganda’s approach to water governance stems from the government 
commitment to retaining its role of providing basic services for the poorest strata of the 
population, de facto guaranteeing the constitutional right to water for all citizens 
irrespective of their economic status.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Motivation 
Globalization, the integration of economies, societies, and cultures through a 
global network of political ideas based on communication, trade, and transportation, has 
profoundly changed the dynamics and stakeholders of environmental governance.  The 
role of each nation’s central government has shrunk significantly, while the influences of 
international consortia, market forces, civil society groups, and communities have 
steadily increased.  In an attempt to eradicate poverty, the members of the United Nations 
agreed to coordinate efforts toward the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG), a set of eight interconnected goals each defined by a specific set of time-
bound targets.  The need to “halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable 
access to safe drinking water” (United Nations Development Group 2003) is broadly 
recognized as a prerequisite to the achievement of several other targets.  The overall 
progress toward this achievement at the global level is extremely non-uniform, both 
geographically and socioeconomically.  For example, very little progress has been 
achieved in rural sub-Saharan regions despite a large influx of funds.  
At the core of the problem is the lack of water project sustainability.  Assessment 
reports of water improvement are exposing an extremely high rate of water system 
failures not followed by rehabilitation.  This questions the validity of core principles, 
accepted sustainability models, and the national water policies they have inspired.  
Tanzania and Uganda are both examples of how conditionality on the structural 
readjustment of loans required the introduction of neoliberal decentralized water policies 
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in the 1990s; as a result, both countries have qualified for international aid funds and debt 
relief (Harrison 2001).  The two countries elaborated an independent approach to water 
sector development and achieved strikingly different results (see figure 1).  Rural 
Tanzania has failed to show any progress toward the water MDG goal, while neighbor 
rural Uganda is on track toward MDG.  
 
 
Figure 1. Rural access to clean water; population with access to improved water sources 
vs. time.  
Sources: Data gathered in World Bank Database (n.d.) and The World Bank (1984, 
1999). 
 
A notable difference between the two countries is that the right to water is upheld 
in Uganda’s 1995 Constitution.  In July 2010, the UN endorsed a declaration that water is 
a human right, a statement creating tension with the 1992 Dublin principle stating water 
is an economic good.  The resolution passed with 122 votes in favor and 41 abstentions, 
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and it is expected to stir more controversy.  National governments and the international 
community will need to review the legality of their respective approaches to water 
development.  Both Tanzania and the United States abstained on the vote.  The official 
explanation of the U.S. vote by John F. Sammis, U.S. Deputy Representative to the 
Economic and Social Council, reads, “It was not drafted in a transparent, inclusive 
manner, and the legal implications of a declared right to water have not yet been carefully 
and fully considered in this body or in Geneva.  For these reasons, the United States has 
called for a vote and will abstain on this resolution” (Sammis 2010).  
Background 
Over the course of the last four decades, the experts’ debate on water policies and 
water resource management has moved out of national and local settings and transformed 
itself into a decentralized framework, referred to as Global Water Initiatives (GWI).  
GWI informs national governments and institutions about global-level principles and 
governance mechanism suggestions (Varady, Meehan, and McGovern 2009).  The size 
and scope of the GWI has significantly shifted since the 1977 Mar del Plata conference, 
and several authors have expressed concerns about the scope and effectiveness of these 
mega-conferences (Gleick and Lane 2005).  Whereas the 1977 Mar del Plata agenda 
focused on strategy to ensure an adequate, safe water supply for an expanding global 
population (Biswas 2004), the subsequent UN-sponsored meetings progressively shifted 
their attention to best methods for implementing neoliberal theories linked to the 
decentralization of water policies, water sector financing, and the introduction of water 
privatization (Biswas 2001, 2004).  This transnational expert debate dominated and 
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shaped the water policies of several developing countries that have often been forced to 
adopt these policies through pre-conditionality of World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund loans (Goldman 2007).  
At the core of neo-liberal water policies is a three-tiered approach to privatization, 
dependent upon socio-economic realities: (1) international consortia contracts to provide 
water services in urban areas, (2) commercialization of water services in smaller centers, 
and (3) contracting-out to user committees in rural areas and in neighborhoods 
connecting large urban areas to the countryside (Jaglin 2002).  In the last ten years, 
attention was dedicated to the first two of these approaches because they led to uprisings 
in Bolivia (Perreault 2006) and to cholera outbreaks correlated with water shut-offs in 
South Africa (Goldman 2007; Muller 2007).  Critics of water privatization have largely 
ignored the third approach. 
The idea of contracting out rural water supplies to a user committee is based on a 
prerequisite of community participation in all aspects of a project, from the formulation 
of the need, to planning, implementation, and operation and management.  By assuming 
control of their own water services, a community becomes financially responsible for 
“sustainable cost recovery,” i.e., recovery of all the O&M costs including replacement 
costs (Jimenez and Perez-Foguet 2010).  Community participation and sustainable cost 
recovery are the current mantra of international NGOs.  Sustainability assessments of 
rural water development abound, but they concentrate on the ability of rural communities 
to successfully comply with the development model prescription.  These assessments 
tend to avoid questioning the assumptions underneath the neo-liberal water resource 
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governance model and fail to evaluate how alien local community cultures are to some of 
the concepts embedded in it (Babb 2005).  
  6 
RELATED RESEARCH 
Environmental Governance 
Agrawal and Lemos (2006) define environmental governance as the “set of 
regulatory processes, mechanisms, and organizations through which political actors 
influence environmental actions and outcomes” (298).  A silent revolution is happening 
around environmental governance.  The role of the state, the sole financier and arbiter in 
the 1950-1980s, has shrunk significantly.  The global nature of environmental issues, 
neoliberal pressures, and budget cuts has significantly limited the state’s ability to 
regulate and finance environmental issues.  Dissatisfaction with central government 
economic and institutional regulation opened the environmental governance door to 
decentralization and reliance on market mechanisms and instruments (Agrawal and 
Lemos 2007).  Agrawal and Lemos propose a description of this new governance 
structure as a triumvirate of government, markets, and communities whose dynamic 
interactions define environmental adaptation and mitigation choices.  This structure is 
transnational in nature and manifests itself in a variety of initiatives: from international 
organizations purchasing land from communities to leave it fallow and prevent land 
overexploitation, to corporations buying and selling sulfur dioxide emission rights in a 
government-regulated market, to communities receiving funds from international NGOs 
to develop the capacity to manage their own water services.   
This new form of governance has many supporters who see environmental 
problems as global in nature, market instruments as most effective in creating sustainable 
development, and decentralization as able to bring in the voices of local communities.  It 
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also has received a large dose of criticism such as being the vehicle of “commodification 
of nature” (Liverman 2004), creating a hegemonic expert-consortium for decision making 
that overrules communities’ concerns (Ford 2003), and allowing “private governance” to 
become a high-power stakeholder in the process without due process to define its 
legitimacy in the exertion of power (Falkner 2003).  
Environmental Governance in the Water Sector 
The incarnation of this new environmental governance structure, in the water 
governance domain, is the Global Water Initiatives (GWI) the debate of which shapes all 
levels of environmental governance, including “[i]nternational accords, national policies 
and legislation, local decision-making structures, transnational institutions, and 
environmental NGOs” (as cited in Agrawal and Lemos 2006, 3.2).  The GWI involves: 
(1) professional scientific societies such as the International Association of Hydrological 
Science (IAHS) and the International Water Resource Association (IWRA), (2) 
designated time periods such as the International Hydrological Decade or the 
International Water for Life Decade, (3) organized events such as the Dublin 
International Conference on Water and the Environment and the four Water World 
Forums, and (4) issue-oriented organizations including the UN-affiliated, 
intergovernmental International Hydrological Programme, the non-governmental Global 
Water Partnership, and the Dialogue on Water and Climate.  
The formation of professional water expert organizations dates back to the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century, with the incorporation of the International Association of 
Hydrological Science (1922), and the formation of the International Association for 
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Hydraulic Research (1935).  The role of these associations was to provide an outlet for 
the scientific discussion on hydrology without any effort to influence the legislative 
efforts to regulate water management (Varady, Meehan, and McGovern 2009).  During 
the post-war years, the belief that science and technology had the potential to solve all 
issues and improve the human condition took a prominent role in the water realm.  Many 
engineering activities in the water sector took place during these years in the developed 
countries, such as the constructions of dams, large irrigation schemes to increase 
agricultural yields, and hydroelectric power stations. 
Until the 1960s, water development was strictly a national state-led effort 
informed by a positivistic model of socio-economic and environmental behavior.  Water 
policies were legislated by central governments with no effort to reach an international 
coordination.  By the end of the 1960s, the developed world began to focus on the need to 
address global poverty and develop international cooperation to aid the less developed 
nations.  This strong multinational approach to world problems led to the formation of 
organizations such as the family of UN agencies tasked with protecting the environment 
and improving the human condition, both seen as the necessary conditions to avoid future 
war (Varady, Meehan, and McGovern 2009).   
During the 1970s, the United Nations provided a forum for discussion of critical 
global themes by organizing a series of global mega-conferences at high decision-making 
levels.  The first theme was the environment (Stockholm, 1972), followed by population 
(Bucharest, 1974), food (Rome, 1974), women (Mexico City, 1975), human settlements 
(Vancouver, 1976), water (Mar del Plata, 1977), desertification (Nairobi, 1977), and new 
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and renewable sources of energy (Nairobi, 1979).  In the water domain, the years 1965-
1974 culminated in the declaration of the period as the International Water Decade, the 
foundation of the International Water Association (1972), and the Mar del Plata Water 
World Forum (1977) (Biswas 2004).   
The initial efforts experienced exponential growth since the 1980s.  Not only did 
the number of meetings and events increase significantly, but the size of the conferences 
led to costs exceeding, by a factor of two, the yearly USAID budget for international 
development of the whole African continent.  Salman (2004) retraces the GWI debate 
from the 1997 Marrakesh meeting to the 2003 Kyoto meeting.  He concludes not much 
has been accomplished by these mega-meetings partly because of competition between 
agencies and partly because “endless debates on dams, the role of the private sector, trade 
on water, and the issue of human right to water” have only issued vague and repeated 
declarations devoid of political will to act in the water sector (17).  Interestingly, despite 
the fact that water scarcity is one of the largest global environmental threats, the GWI is 
not leading the debate toward an across-boundary agreement to manage water as a global 
resource, but rather toward a more globalized water resource management model 
(Varady, Meehan, and McGovern 2009).    
Other authors criticized the dispersion of sizeable financial resources that should 
have been channeled into the aid sector instead (Biswas 2004; Gleick and Lane 2005).  
Despite all criticisms, the GWI shift of attention to the economic implication of 
developing and managing water infrastructure has had significant repercussions on the 
dynamic between water governance stakeholders.  Given the large percentage of global 
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citizens deprived of water services, the large economic opportunity represented by 
commoditization of water took the center stage of the debates and led to the formulation 
of new water management principles and aid policies.  
Decentralization and the Water Privatization Debate 
The 1992 Dublin Conference validated a newly perceived economic space by 
affirming “Principle no. 4: Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and 
should be recognized as an economic good” (International Conference on Water and the 
Environment 1992).  The fourth Dublin principle is the cornerstone of neoliberal water 
policies.  Since the early 1990s, these policies spread globally at an impressive speed, 
permeating all influential parties of the new environmental governance scene.  The 
private sector gained a seat in the decision making regarding water governance and cash-
strapped national governments demoted themselves to the role of regulators and 
facilitators, while the civil society and the NGOs operating in the sector became main 
actors in demand-responsive water markets. 
The private sector’s introduction to the water debate parallels its introduction to 
the broader international development process.  Goldman (2007) makes a compelling 
case of which mechanism led to such a rapid acceptance of the decentralization and 
privatization policies of the global water sector, centering on the transformation of the 
World Bank from a conservative lender to today’s institutionalized vehicle of modern 
imperialism.  Starting with the appointment of Robert McNamara to its lead in 1968, the 
World Bank is described as re-inventing itself from a conservative financial institution to 
the global regulator in development investments, leveraging availability to loans in order 
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to force national resource privatization policies upon borrowing countries in the name of 
an effort toward natural conservation.  “Prices paid by water consumers in developing 
countries must rise substantially to avoid life threatening shortages and environmental 
damage, according to an international report […] supported by the World Bank and the 
United Nations” (Goldman 2007b, 791). 
McNamara’s transformation of the World Bank led to three overlapping but 
distinguished economic development periods, referred to by Goldman as “green 
revolution, “structural readjustment,” and “neoliberal.”  During the “green revolution,” 
the World Bank created a market for Western world technology (dams, irrigation, 
tractors, fertilizers, pesticides, etc.) in the Southern nations of the world, financing them 
through conditional loans.  The World Bank paralleled these activities with the creation 
of a very broad infrastructure of “global expertise" on development, to provide advice to 
national governments and control investment risks.  During the “structural readjustment” 
period, the bank became the global arbiter of debt, saving itself from going bankrupt as 
borrowing nations defaulted on their loans, but stepping up the conditionality, de facto 
controlling the borrower’s national economy.  During the “neoliberal” period, the World 
Bank began to increasingly interact with the civil society of the borrower, bypassing their 
government through the actions of non-profits and the private sector. 
The World Bank sponsored the formation of the GWI and drove the international 
discourse on water.  GWI quickly lost its focus on the academic debate around true 
development and transformed into meetings of people coming from different sectors but 
all in agreement with the Bank’s push for water privatization.  To better expose the 
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objective of the debates Goldman quoted a passage from “Water for the Poor,” a report 
resulting from one Bank-sponsored event of GWI:   
Providing water services to the poor presents a business opportunity.  New pipes, 
pumps, measurement and monitoring devices, and billing and record keeping 
systems will be required to modernize and expand water infrastructure.  Industry 
not directly related to the provision of water services will be able to enter new 
markets because water for production, and to sustain a productive workforce, will 
be available.  Thus this program has the possibility of creating huge employment 
and sales opportunities for large and small businesses alike.  (World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development 2002, 9) 
 
Claiming central government inefficiently manages the water sector and 
recognizing the unsustainable role of NGOs creating para-statal water departments 
(Therkildsen 1988), proponents of this view created a new sustainability model.  In this 
model, the role of the government is to facilitate community initiatives.  The NGO 
approach to sustainable development revolves on community participation, appropriate 
technology choice, and cost recovery based on water tariffs (Budds and McGranaham 
2003; Camdessus 2003).  As Jaglin eloquently put it:  
[a]lthough based on longstanding principles, participation has followed specific 
patterns in recent scenarios.  Closely related to the process of building 
economically viable water services, participation is invoked above all to 
circumvent two major difficulties, namely assessing demand from the poor and 
managing systems intended for unprofitable customers.  (Jaglin 2002, 232) 
 
In her analysis of the claims of “democratization” of the new environmental 
governance, Ford (2003) sharply pointed out that communities and their grassroots 
organizations are not invited to sit at the negotiating table.  Much heralded community 
participation really boils down to a new form of top-down development; this is the 
expression of “entrenchment and legitimization of hegemonic global environmental 
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governance” (Ford 2003, 123).  Her views were echoed by Falkner’s (2003) concerns 
about the legitimacy of private environmental governance; decentralized water policies 
centered on community-based cost recovery for water were forced on states by loan pre-
conditionality, not by a popular referendum.  Protests outside the last two World Water 
Forums and the foundation of the GWI antagonist, the People Water Forum, are an 
expression of these legitimacy issues (Conant 2010).  Yet, the correlation between GWI 
recommendations and the last 40 years of developing countries’ water policies clearly 
indicate who the decision makers are (Biswas 2004; Mahauri and Katko 1993).  
Decentralization trends also affect the democratic process at the local level, as Muller 
(2007) established a connection between global recommendations of policies and their 
effects at the local level in South African politics.  To highlight the political challenges 
introduced by decentralization at the local level, he stated, “there continues to be a need, 
if not for parish pump politics, at least for a politics that will help communities to keep 
their parish pumps working” (44). 
Central to “keeping the pump working” is financial viability.  Achieving 
sustainable cost recovery sounds necessary and innocuous, but it has profound 
implications for those voiceless rural populations for which decentralization has removed 
the central state support and poverty has denied private sector customer rights (Budds and 
McGranaham 2003).  In the GWI model of water service development, communities 
receive support from NGOs and aid organizations within a sustainability framework 
based on community participation, local governance capacity, and tariff-generated 
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) cost recovery.  This model appropriately caters to the 
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NGOs’ need of an exit strategy from their programs.  The NGO retains responsibility for 
completing the construction of a water project, leaving the communities with the larger 
tasks necessary to guarantee a sustainable water service. 
The 1992 Dublin declaration that water is an economic good spurred arguments 
regarding the merits and drawbacks of private vs. public water provision.  While both 
models have the capability to perform well, especially when financially viable (Budds 
and McGranaham 2003; Jimenez and Perez-Foguet 2010), the introduction of the Dublin 
declaration as an inspiring principle of national water policies and NGO programs has not 
been objectively investigated as a potential contributor to the failure in creating 
sustainable rural water development.  The next section contains a review of how 
effectiveness of development is measured, based on sustainability assessment. 
Rural Water Development Progress 
According to the World Bank, within the group of fifty countries in which more 
than 30% of the rural population lacks appropriate water access, fewer than ten are 
projected to halve the proportion of people living without access to safe water in the rural 
areas.  The majority of these countries are in Africa, and thirteen of them have not 
experienced any improvement in their rural water sector over the last twenty years 
(World Bank Database, n.d.). 
This grim picture is not due to the absence of targeted international intervention 
programs funded by philanthropic citizens and taxpayers of the developed world.  
According to Ned Breslin (“Back to the River” January 27, 2011. Water For People 
Blog. http://nedbreslin.tap.waterforpeople.org/blog-archives), $3.4 billion are spent every 
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year by the water aid sector, including large international organizations such as the World 
Bank, a long list of large and small NGOs, and religious charities of every denomination.  
These sums of money are used to drill wells, install hand pumps, build piped water 
distribution systems worldwide, and mostly target the underserved rural population.  
Progress Indicators of Rural Water Development 
Often, progress toward a goal is driven by the metric used to define its success.  
Access to an improved water source is defined as “the availability of 20 liters of water 
per person per day from a source within one kilometer of the user’s dwelling,” and only 
household piped connections, public standpipes, boreholes, protected dug wells, 
protected springs, and rainwater collection systems qualify as improved water sources, 
under the assumption that these sources provide safe water.  A piped source is considered 
functional when operating for more than 50% of the time, whereas a hand pump is 
considered functional when operating for more than 70% of the time with a lag between 
breakdown and repair not exceeding two weeks.  Coverage data are estimated by water 
providers and by household surveys distributed to the regional WHO and UNICEF 
offices.  Global collection of these data requires a formidable effort and cannot be 
repeated with a frequency greater than every three years (WHO and UNICEF Joint 
Monitoring Programme 2000). 
The data provide a series of snapshots about water access, but they do not provide 
any metric on the sustainability of the improved water source.  An improved water 
scheme providing water during a survey administered in 2000 might break and be 
replaced by another scheme or rehabilitated by a second NGO intervention before the 
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next survey administered in 2003.  Hence, the metric chosen to monitor the progress 
toward the MDG, that in its current definition implies sustainability, is in question.  
Furthermore, at the NGO level, non-longitudinal indicators lead to a measure of success 
in terms of the “number of beneficiaries” reached by a project.  That in turn places more 
emphasis on new installations rather than on the longevity of a given scheme.  This is an 
old, well known, and heavily debated problem (Therkildsen 1988) that continues to stand 
unresolved (Ned Breslin, “Back to the River” January 27, 2011. Water For People Blog. 
http://nedbreslin.tap.waterforpeople.org/blog-archives) mainly because governments and 
NGOs need to justify to donors the merit of their fund’s allocation. 
Sustainability Assessments 
The symptomology of a failure to establish durable water services is a well 
researched topic, and several models have been proposed to create a metric for 
sustainability and tested on case studies (Carter and Howsom 1999; McConville and 
Mihelcic 2007; Montgomery, Bartram, and Elimelech 2009; Whittington et al. 2009).  
Montgomery, Bartram, and Elimelech (2009) suggested a sustainability frame centered 
on three factors: effective local demand, local financial viability to cover cost recovery, 
and effective operation and maintenance (O&M).  In their paper, they called on the global 
community to use a more effective metric to assess the sustainability of installed systems, 
bringing as an example the correlation found between data on rural water access from a 
WHO/UNICEF 2008 household survey and a 2006 UNDP sustainability score 
assessment based on surveyed financial and institutional capacity (see figure 2).  The 
figure illustrates a correlation between water sustainability score and the water target 
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indicator for sub-Saharan Africa.  Noting how a poor performer such as Tanzania 
receives such a high sustainability score underlines how difficult it is to assess 
sustainability.  
According to Abraham (2000), “at one level sustainability is very simple.  It is 
whether or not something continues to work over time.”  For water service to work 
without interruption, all the elements contributing to sustainability must be present: 
“there must have been money for recurring expenses and for the occasional repair, there 
must have been acceptance from the consumers of the service, the source supplying the 
service must have been adequate, the design must have been properly done, and there 
must have been sound construction.” 
 
Figure 2.  A new sustainability metric.  
Source: Data from Montgomery, Bartram, and Elimelech 2009. 
 
Stemming from Abraham’s consideration, Carter (1999) suggests a sustainability 
chain made of four interrelated elements – motivation, maintenance, cost recovery, and 
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continuing support – that has been adopted by many authors.  It is of interest to note that 
according to Carter’s analysis, these elements shall be guaranteed by the intersection of 
efforts of the three essential stakeholders in equal amounts: the community, the 
government, and the involved NGO.  Without entering the debate on who shall own cost 
recovery and who shall retain responsibility for post-construction support, he clearly 
states ,“It is essential that the supporting government or NGO maintains responsibility for 
[post constructions] follow-up.  This is a long term function, with a need to continue until 
there is such a ‘critical mass’ of good practice within a district, that there is no going 
back. […]  Short term projects fail” (Carter 1999, 10). 
McConville and Mihelcic (2007) developed a Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) tool to 
evaluate sustainability and guide project planning.  In their suggested Life Cycle 
Analysis, they identify five stages: (1) needs assessment, (2) conceptual designs and 
feasibility, (3) design and action planning, (4) implementation, and (5) operation and 
maintenance.  They associate themes to be evaluated at each stage to operationalize these 
concepts in a sustainability matrix (see table 1).  
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Table 1. Sustainability factors considered during each stage of LCA evaluation 
LCA Sustainability factors 
Socio-cultural Respect A socially acceptable project is built on an 
understanding of local traditions and core values 
Community Participation A process that fosters empowerment and ownership in 
community members through direct participation in 
development decision making affecting the community 
Political Cohesion Involves increasing the alignment of development 
projects with host country priorities and coordinating 
aid efforts at all levels (local, national and 
international) to increase ownership and efficient 
delivery of services  
Economic Sustainability Implies that sufficient local resources and capacity 
exist to continue the project in the absence of outside 
resources 
Environmental Sustainability Implies that non-renewable and other natural resources 
are not depleted nor destroyed for short term 
improvements 
Source: Data from McConville and Mihelcic (2007) 
 
Their matrix mirrors a model of full community responsibility for continued 
operation and maintenance, as opposed to shared post-construction support with 
governments or NGOs.  The Life Cycle Analysis concept provides an excellent 
theoretical framework, as it attempts to incorporate variability over the lifetime of each of 
the steps; communities are not static during the several years usually needed to complete 
the full life cycle.  Edwards quotes Gleick (Edwards 1997, 246) comparing this 
variability over time to a maze whose walls are rearranged at each step.  
Barriers to the Sustainability of Rural Water Development 
Assessments of the sustainability of rural water systems are typically carried out 
with quantitative and qualitative methods involving the operationalization of the elements 
deemed mandatory for sustainability and correlated with the actual functionality of the 
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schemes.  Overall, the problem described by most authors is that when a water system 
breaks, it is not rehabilitated (Gine 2008; Haysom 2006; Jimenez and Perz-Foguet 2010; 
Mashauri and Katko 1993; McConville and Mihelcic 2007; Montgomery, Bartram, and 
Elimelech 2009; Moon 2006; Mtinda 2006; Nkongo 2009).  The results of the 
McConville and Mihelcic Life Cycle Analysis described above, applied to a post-project 
evaluation in Mali, shows a telling trend in rural development (McConville and Mihelcic 
2007).  The overall sustainability indicator decreases throughout the project lifetime and, 
in particular, the economic sustainability indicator assessed at its highest during the 
Needs Assessment phase drops to its lowest during the last Operation and Maintenance 
phase.  The summary sustainability score indicates financial sustainability as the weakest 
component, followed by political cohesion.   
A multi-country research assessment of a large number of rural systems in Boliva, 
Peru, and Ghana, commissioned by the Netherland-World Bank, was published in 2009 
(Whittington et al. 2009).  The aim was to explore the controversial issue of the 
correlation between high rates of systems not rehabilitated after failures with community 
financial ability and willingness to pay.  Their study compared the functionality of rural 
water schemes constructed in the last three to twelve years, some of which were part of a 
designed Post Construction Support (PCS) system while others were not, but still 
received post-construction support initiated by a community request for assistance.  All 
schemes had been developed following state of the art development models, thus 
removing the possibility that poor project execution might invalidate results.  The authors 
caution that the relevance of their study is potentially tainted by the fact that all villages 
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that experienced a failure were actively pursuing PCS by whichever entity, government, 
NGO, or charity would be willing to help them.  Therefore, their study is not comparing 
projects with the PCS component to projects without the PCS component where the 
beneficiaries were self-reliant. 
The data collection was a combination of interviews with the village-based water 
management team, a focus group of women of all ages, and a small sample of household 
surveys.  No significant difference between the groups (and an overall continued 
functionality of 90%) was shown, indicating that proactive and planned PCS is not 
strictly needed.  Although most systems were under the care of effective village-based 
water committees, the majority lacked sufficient funds to carry on repairs independently, 
reaffirming the findings of other research that rural local communities cannot financially 
support their own water systems.  These findings contradicted the mainstream 
development model requirement of sustainable cost recovery. 
A 2006 WaterAid assessment analyzed the obstacles to sustainability by 
comparing thirty rural water schemes in Tanzania (Haysom 2006).  Because at the 
national level it is clear the rate of functionality depends on system age, the analysis 
compared functioning vs. non-functioning schemes grouped by age: “old” shemes (built 
prior to 2000) and “new” schemes (built after 2000).  All types of technology (hand 
pumped and gravity pumped) were taken into consideration in the study.  
Haysom’s operationalization of sustainability was based on the proven ability of 
the community to rehabilitate the scheme.  Excluding the schemes that never broke down, 
the only variable that correlated with rehabilitation was the existence of funds to carry out 
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the repair.  No correlation existed between the management option chosen and the 
existence of a water fund.  
A more targeted analysis of the effectiveness of the management options was 
carried out by WaterAid in 2009 (Nkongo 2009) on thirty schemes distributed across 
seven districts.  Nkongo’s qualitative data collection of semi-structured meetings, focus 
group discussions, and her observation analysis researched how separation of roles, 
between Provider and Purchaser, Asset Holder Authority and Provider, and Regulation 
and Participation affects sustainability.  Her analysis was based on a very obscure 
operationalization and construction of indexes, but her raw data and commentary were 
very useful in pointing the reader toward financial insolvency, due to lack of tariff 
payment/collection or misappropriation of funds as one of the major causes of 
sustainability failures. 
All assessments point out the fact that cost recovery by community contribution is 
an elusive goal, and the amount collected hardly stays within the water fund.  Even where 
communities pay for a portion of the water fees, the majority of the money disappears in 
the absence of checks and balances provided by a regulatory mechanism, either 
institutionalized as a top-down approach or as a community demand for a transparent 
bottom-up approach (Haysom 2006; Nkongo 2009).   
By far, the greatest problem in planning for sustainable cost recovery, as Haysom 
(2006) points out, is the fact that even in the ideal scenario in which a community is 
willing to pay for full-cost recovery of O&M, water tariffs are based on the average 
lifetime of the most expensive components.  But in reality, those components might break 
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before their time (i.e., before the community had a chance to collect sufficient 
replacement money).  Alternatively, the components might not break when expected, 
leaving the community operator in charge of a very large sum of money for which he sees 
no public use and instead invests it to improve his own economic condition.   
The departure from the early supply-driven approach toward a demand-responsive 
approach in service provision requires the very active participation of the community 
from the initial stage of the process, namely the choice of a technology that leads to 
O&M cost recovery appropriate to the economic structure of the beneficiaries.  Several 
authors (Cleaver and Toner 2006; Haysom 2006; Mtinda 2006) point out that true 
participation is just as elusive as cost recovery.  The decision is made externally, and 
community participation is confined to provision of labor, management, and cost 
recovery.  This reinforces a lesson learned, but ignored, in the 1980s by a World Bank 
project in the north of Tanzania.  The World Bank plan called for installation of 
demonstration wells in some communities and offered to install additional wells in 
communities that collected 25% of the cost of the hand pump.  Lack of interest from the 
communities led to the construction of more demonstration wells, but by the end of the 
program, only about 30% of communities agreed to the World Bank terms (Therkildsen 
1988).  Moreover, as pointed out quite strongly in Therkildsen’s analysis, the World 
Bank acted against the official Tanzanian policy that water is a right and shall be 
provided to all free of costs.   
Abraham (2000) drew the difference between a water construction project and the 
establishment of a sustainable water service and pointed out that the latter cannot be 
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achieved by assuming the initial existence of the right combination of factors.  If stability 
cannot be guaranteed by initial conditions, there needs to be a mechanism and an actor 
that intervenes when the water service is challenged by technical, management, social, or 
financial issues.  Furthermore, he stressed that the roles and responsibilities of all 
stakeholders are usually defined by national water policies, according to the endorsed 
principles of water governance each nation chooses to adopt as the basis of their water 
development programs.  Financial sustainability is a requirement to support water 
services, and assessments in the literature bring evidence that communities are failing to 
create it, advocating for capacity development to fix the problem.  These assessments 
operationalize sustainability as compliance to the development model parameters, 
therefore, do not provide an assessment of the effectiveness of the neo-liberal 
governance. 
Problem Statement 
In the last twenty years, national water policies, the current model for aid 
operation, and donors’ expectations have transitioned from a supply-driven to a demand-
driven development model, which transforms the government role to that of a facilitator 
and places most responsibility for planning, management, and cost recovery onto the 
recipient communities.  This is reflected in the shifts of national water policies worldwide 
during the 1990s-2000s.  Research and assessments of sustainability have focused at the 
community level, often neglecting to include an analysis of how water governance 
strategies support, or fail to support, a vulnerable community’s demand for the 
establishment of a sustainable water service.   
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In this study, I present a comparative analysis of rural water governance between 
a poor performer, Tanzania, and a good performer, Uganda, to provide insights into the 
principles and mechanisms that lead to the successful establishment of sustainable water 
services.  The performance difference between these two countries is quite surprising 
given the fact that Tanzania is one of the most politically stable countries in Africa, 
whereas Uganda has a history of regimes, political instability, and questioned legitimacy.  
This thesis work contends that the challenge to sustainability of rural water 
programs, namely the failure of cost recovery and inadequate governance, stems from the 
idea that water is a commodity to be developed by each community within a free market 
dynamic and without the leadership and financial support of the government.  
Throughout the study, I adopted Agrawal and Lemos’s (2006) broader definition of 
governance as the “set of regulatory processes, mechanisms and organizations through 
which political actors influence environmental actions and outcomes” (298). 
Objectives 
The central objective of this research is to understand similarities and differences 
in the rural water development sector between Uganda and Tanzania in relation to their 
water governance strategies.  Of particular interest is a comparison between their 
government policies, development programs, and inspiring principles, as well as aid 
organizational models of operation, and the challenges and drivers all of these introduce 
into rural water development.   
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
1. What are the differences between Uganda’s and Tanzania’s water sector funding?  
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Hypothesis 1: The difference in the funds available to the water sector is 
insufficient to explain the difference in progress. 
2. What are the major differences between Uganda’s and Tanzania’s guiding 
principles and strategies in rural water governance? 
Hypothesis 2: The major differences between the two countries’ governance 
principles resides in the government commitment to uphold the right to water, the clarity 
and stability of policy guidelines and programs, the degree of government coordination 
within the sector, the recognition of the limited financial capacity of rural communities, 
and the equity and affordability of technology solutions enforced by the policy.  
3. What are the major differences in the challenges and drivers to the 
implementation of sustainable rural water development? 
Hypothesis 3.1: Both countries face the same internal challenges at the 
community level. 
Hypothesis 3.2: The major differences are the level of national ownership of the 
development directions and resources and the interference of foreign stakeholders. 
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METHODS 
Site Selection 
For this comparative study, Tanzania and Uganda were chosen to represent 
extreme cases on the spectrum of rural water development sustainability from the 
ensemble of sub-Saharan developing countries that adopted decentralization policies in 
environmental resource management during the 1990s.  Since the 1990s, Uganda steadily 
increased the number of rural communities with improved access to water, whereas 
Tanzania failed to do so (see figure 1).  As documented in the literature review section, 
the problem is linked to sustainability of water services, not to implementation of water 
construction projects.   
Conceptual Framework 
The methods used in this investigation combine extensive primary source research 
with a series of semi-structured interviews and two case studies.  Establishing the link 
between governance and outcomes is a topic of political science research.  Comparative 
studies are typically used to gather data in situations where real experiments are not 
possible, and a limited number of cases prevent the application of statistical methods.  
Mills (1843) introduced systematic analysis based on establishing differences and 
similarities between policies and outcomes.  In cross-national comparative studies, 
similarities are used as a powerful way of reducing the number of independent variables 
contributing to an observed situation; reducing variables facilitates the identification of 
correlations between a challenge or a driver and its perceived outcome.  The combination 
of cross-case and within-case analysis allows identification of cause-effect relationships 
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and guides ranking of importance between some of the factors (Haverland 2010), leading 
to the proposal of an explanatory model. 
Data Collection 
Study System 
A significant portion of the national data and indicators used in this comparative 
analysis was gathered from the World Bank Database (http://data.worldbank.org/).  The 
database, inaugurated in 2010, put into the public domain more than 7000 indicators on 
209 countries the bank had gathered through their own independent research and from the 
accredited research of other reputable organization such as UN agencies and the World 
Health Organization (WHO).  With few exceptions, the history notes were gathered from 
publications and books written by East African nationals.   
Research Questions 
A timeline of official national policies and programs was reconstructed from 
independent water policies and legislation.  Official government policies and annual 
sector reviews for the last five to six years are available through the Ugandan and 
Tanzanian Ministries of Water.  An attempt to reconstruct programs and yearly water 
budget allocations by government and international donors was made by mining the 
World Bank Database for credit agreements in which nations must submit summaries of 
their programs. 
Thirty-one 30-45-minute interviews with stakeholders were conducted for this 
study (see table 2).  Selected stakeholders were water government officials, private 
business representatives, and aid organization and NGO workers with direct working 
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experience in the water development sector.  Snowball sampling techniques were used to 
expand an initial list of government officials met through the case study projects and 
NGO members of the Tanzanian and Ugandan National Water and Sanitation Networks 
(TAWASANET and UWASANET).  Private sector interviewees were associated with 
the work done in the projects described by the case studies.  To minimize bias and protect 
confidentiality, the interviews were stored without association to the identity of the 
person or organization; only a category (Government/Civil society/Private sector) was 
stored with the interview recording and transcript.   
 
Table 2. Number of interviews, by category 
 Number of Interviews 
Category Tanzania Uganda 
Government 6 4 
Civil Society 9 8 
Private sector 3 1 
 
All interviews were recorded with a digital recorder and conducted in English.  
The structure and lead questions of the interview are shown in table 3.  
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Table 3. Interview instrument 
 
Interview leads Subleads 
Can you describe your organization involvement in rural water development? 
What do you see as the guiding 
principles in Tanzania/Uganda water 
development? 
What are roles and responsibility of 
government, NGOs, communities, private 
sector? 
How does it work in practice in 
Uganda/Tanzania? 
What are the major challenges/drivers to 
keep a water service going? 
In your view is water a right or a commodity in Uganda/Tanzania? 
Can you suggest other experts that I contact for interviews?  
 
Additionally, in Uganda, I was invited to participate in two national government 
monitoring trips and a district-level review; one at a rural trading center, the other one at 
an extremely underdeveloped island community on Lake Victoria.  The participants of 
these trips were government staff at the district level working in the finance, water, 
environmental, and health departments, national government engineers, social 
development and health specialists from a Technical Support Unit; and representatives of 
NGOs working in that district.  In Tanzania, I was invited to observe a workshop of water 
organizations sponsored by Wind Rock International.  Recording was not appropriate for 
these events, so written notes and meeting minutes were recorded.  
The communities’ reactions to the roles and responsibilities they were assigned by 
the national governance are described in the case studies section through participant 
observations in the two water projects.  My main role in the two case studies was to 
facilitate the implementation of water projects in the communities of Kizzi, Uganda and 
Ngelenge, Tanzania.  In this role, I was an active participant of meetings between 
government officials (at the village, district, and regional levels), NGOs (both grassroots 
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and international), private contractors and operators, and community members.  During 
these meetings, I recorded handwritten notes of items discussed, action lists, and 
agreements.  While most of the community discussions occurred in their local dialect and 
I only have a basic knowledge of African languages, English speaking spokespersons 
provided an interface with the various stakeholders.  Written documents and/or 
photographic materials were also collected with permission by the various stakeholders.  
Events observed outside of arranged meetings were recorded daily in a handwritten 
journal.  The Tanzanian materials were summarized, appended, or transcribed in 
implementation of project reports submitted to the funding organization.   
Data Analysis 
Study System 
A semi-quantitative country-level analysis of socio-economic indicators and 
physical characteristics of the two countries was performed to reduce the scope of this 
study to a comparison of water governance.  Variables similar between countries were 
neglected as potential contributors to an explanation of the difference between Ugandan 
and Tanzanian progress in improving their rural populations’ access to clean water.  
Internal validity of the exclusion of many variables was tested by comparison with the 
themes emerging from the stakeholders’ semi-structured interviews or directly observed 
in the case studies.   
Research Questions 
Each country’s leadership in the water development process was analyzed by 
creating a longitudinal governance “landscape” with a method of accumulation and 
  32 
clustering of instruments (Chappin et al. 2009), grouped by macro-economic 
intervention, rural water policies and acts, and rural development programs. 
Thematic analysis of water policies, programs, and stakeholder interviews was 
performed to identify emerging categories and group them within broader categories that 
could be directly compared at the national level.  Stakeholder interviews were analyzed 
with a three-part analysis as suggested by Gibton (2000): (1) identification of recurrent 
themes and axial coding to reassemble them in arrangement of categories, using a single 
statement as the unit of analysis; (2) categorization of examples related to a particular 
theme, using one or more paragraphs as the unit of analysis; and (3) analysis of 
stakeholder’s whole description of a particular challenge or driver.  These three steps 
allowed an analysis both of recurrent themes and recurrent association of themes.  
Government reports and other official documents were used as a reference crosscheck 
when appropriate.  Annotations were used throughout the analysis to guide the process, 
identify patterns, and highlight challenges and drivers, with the final objective of creating 
a water governance landscape that includes principles, guidelines, and challenges and 
drivers to its implementation (Birks 2008; Gibton 2000).  The main features of the 
governance landscape are detailed with participant observations narrated in two case 
studies, the implementation of an eighteen water points, solar powered water distribution 
system in the villages of Ngelenge (pop. 2300, Tanzania) and a seven water points, 3.2km 
gravity system extension in the village of Kizzi (pop. 800, Uganda).  
The case study narration is organized in such a way as to provide a practical 
example of some of the mechanisms identified in the interviews and provide a test of the 
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within-case analysis validity, as observation of a single community cannot be generalized 
to a country level.  Based on personal experience working with local communities, I 
believed direct observation of these two isolated case studies was the preferred option for 
outlining the socially complex mechanisms of an African community, providing more 
value than a set of interviews of community members collected with a more rigorous 
sampling method in villages where the interviewer was perceived as a stranger.   
Only the Tanzanian project fell entirely within the governance of rural water 
development, especially highlighting the challenges of community cost recovery and 
appropriate technology.  The rural village where the Ugandan project was carried out 
belonged administratively to the peri-urban belt of the district town of Mpigi and, 
therefore, abided by urban water development regulation.  This case study lent itself to 
reflection on the implications of private management of water supplies in rural 
communities. 
Methods of network analysis are particularly relevant to a situation in which 
governance shall be designed to accommodate public, private, and aid agencies’ 
implementations, capturing the structure of the cooperation between state and societal 
actors and stakeholders (Börzel 1997; Moshitz and Stolze 2010).  In network analysis, the 
predominance of a stakeholder over the process was judged by the number of times it was 
mentioned during stakeholder interviews.  Word counts were used to “size” stakeholders 
in the policy network, which were identified during interview coding as communities, 
government, NGOs and official international development partners, such as World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund, and International Development Association member 
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states.  This was done separately on the interview transcript and on the 2010 National 
Sector Reviews publications to gather the different perspectives at the micro-level of 
people working in the field and at the macro-level of people working at high levels of the 
national administration. 
Limitations of the Study 
The biggest limitation of this study was the difficulty in reconstructing the actual 
funds all stakeholders invested in the rural water sector.  A large portion of funds came 
from the independent activities of small international NGOs and religious organizations, 
which are largely unregulated, unreported, and untracked, especially in Tanzania.  In this 
study, I made the assumption that, if a difference existed, more unreported funds had 
gone to the Tanzanian water sector than to the Ugandan one.  This assumption was based 
on the fact that in the last 5-6 years, Uganda has implemented much stricter rules 
requiring NGOs to disclose their budgets through UWASANET, the network of NGOs 
operating in Uganda, and that Tanzania's political stability has attracted many more 
foreign visitors than has Uganda.   
Another limitation was the relatively small number of interviews conducted in 
each country, which did not permit a statistical ranking of the importance of the 
challenges reported by stakeholders.  All themes emerging in the interviews have been 
reported and connected to create a broad picture of rural water development as seen by 
people directly involved in it.  Once no new themes emerged from the interviews, the 
sampling of interviewees was interrupted.  Interestingly, this stopping criteria resulted in 
the number of interviews conducted in Uganda being relatively small because no new 
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information was brought up from the interviews.  The picture painted of the principles 
and of the reality of rural development was very similar from interviewee to interviewee.  
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RESULTS 
Overview 
Study System 
Tanzania and Uganda are neighboring East African countries.  Tanzania covers a 
significantly wider territory (947,300 km
2
) than Uganda (236,040 km
2
), and it is about 
three times less densely populated than Uganda.  The total populations of the two 
countries have increased with a similar growth rate, with Tanzania reaching a population 
of 44 million, and Uganda 33 million.  Tanzania has experienced a larger urban 
population increase than did Uganda.  The rural population is about 32 million in 
Tanzania and 28 million in Uganda, representing 74% and 86% of the total populations, 
respectively. 
According to the United Nations definition of water stress (availability of 
renewable freshwater resources below 1,700 m3/capita/year) and water scarcity 
(availability of renewable freshwater resources below 1,000 m3/capita/year), water stress 
has not been a limiting factor to rural water development in Tanzania, whereas it 
represents a significant problem for Uganda (see table 4).  Global warming and 
population increases have lead to projections that Tanzania will be classified as water 
stressed by 2025 (The United Republic of Tanzania 2006).  Some regions of Uganda are 
already water stressed; 75% of the country is expected to be water stressed by 2015.    
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Figure 3. Map of East Africa.   
Source: adapted from Google Maps. 
 
Table 4. Renewable water resources.  
 2002 
water resources 
m
3
/capita/year 
2007 
water resources  
m
3
/capita/year 
2009 
water resources 
m
3
/capita/year 
WORLD 6,945.85 6,547.37 6,307.05 
Tanzania 2,344.24 2,045.38 1,929.94 
Uganda 1511.96 1,285.44 1,204.90 
Source: World Bank Database (n.d.) 
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National borders were decided by colonial powers and did not reflect the social 
and cultural boundaries between tribes; the major tribes in both countries include the 
Guinean, Nilotic, and Semitic-Hamitic (Murdock 1959).  Within these broader groups, 
marked differences between tribes exist within each country as much as across national 
borders. 
History 
Uganda and Tanzania shared a similar colonial history, mainly under British rule.  
In preparation for its departure, the colonial administration developed strong local 
government institutions with substantial responsibility for delivering service (Tideman, 
Steffensen, and Olsen 2008). 
Tanzania 
Tanganyka became independent in 1961, and in 1964 formed a union with the 
Island of Zanzibar, creating the Republic of Tanzania.  The Tanganyika African National 
Union party (TANU) led Tanzania to independence as a bottom-up rural mass movement, 
receiving the support of an overwhelming majority during the first election.  Under Julius 
K. Nyerere’s leadership, Tanzania chose a one-party democratic system, justified as a 
mass movement based on a national consensus.  This would serve to protect the nation 
from disintegrating due to political parties fueling conflicts of interest arising from tribal 
or religious differences (Schweigman 2001).  Critics contend the party became the 
supreme authority, giving the parliament only the role of “rubber stamping” its policies.  
Civil servants had to be party members and adhere to party guidelines (Aseka 2005, 291).   
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Nyerere created an African branch of socialism, termed Ujamaa that literally 
translates to “family-hood.”  In Nyerere’s words 
a society in which all members have equal rights and equal opportunities; in 
which all can live at peace with their neighbors without suffering or imposing 
injustice, being exploited, or exploiting; and in which all have gradually 
increasing basic level of material welfare before any individual lives in luxury.  
(Nyerere 1968, 234) 
 
Ujamaa was based on three principles deeply rooted in African culture: respect for each 
other, obligation to work and community property.  In the Arusha declaration, Nyerere 
clearly spelled out the dangers of private ownership as a way that allows men to exploit 
other men (Nyerere 1968).    
He pursued a policy of self-reliance, but kept Tanzanian cash crops in the global 
market.  He focused on developing the strength of an existing agricultural sector instead 
of venturing large capital in industrial development.  Through a “villagization” campaign, 
Tanzanian peasants were encouraged to concentrate in villages and form “ten-
households” cells working together to improve their living conditions.  Nyerere believed 
that if self-reliance could be achieved at all levels of the society, from the ten-households 
cells to the Regions, it would be achieved also at the national level.  Ujamaa’s 
communities were asked to mobilize and organize to support the social services 
infrastructures provided by the government – schools, health centers, and water and 
sanitation services. 
Primary school enrollment increased by a factor of three in the decade between 
1966 and 1976, and tripled again in the next four years.  Adult illiteracy was reduced 
from 90% to 20% by 1981 through adult education programs.  While only forty-two rural 
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health centers were operating in 1967, more than 8000 centers operated in the rural 
villages by the end of the 1970s.  Water gravity schemes reached 7.7 million rural 
residents by 1978 (Nugent 2004).  A large percentage of the national development budget 
was provided by non-aligned donors such as China, the Soviet Union, and Scandinavian 
social democracies supportive of this African socialist experiment.  However, the ruling 
party’s socialist ideological approach, and its consequent nationalization of private banks, 
insurance companies, and foreign corporations, together with its harsh condemnation of 
the international response to the crises in Rhodesia and Congo, led to a substantial 
freezing of aid funds received by some of the most influential Western powers, 
particularly the European Community, Britain, Germany, and the U.S. (Nugent 2004).   
In 1977, TANU merged with the Zanzibari AFRO-SHIRAZI party and changed 
its name to Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) or the Revolutionary Party.  Nyerere’s strong 
public statements that outside economic assistance was not worth the price of national 
sovereignty (Nugent 2004) belied the freedom of operation granted to external forces.  
Some historians condemn the motivations behind these external actors, describing their 
actions as the underground efforts of Western powers to economically destabilize a 
socialist country during the Cold War years (Campbell 1994).  Others talk more of a 
convergence of interest between Ujamaa and free market promoters such as the World 
Bank; both intended “to integrate the non-monetarized (or so called subsistence sector) 
within the cash economy.  Given the overall neocolonial structures of the territorial 
economy this means integrations within the world capitalistic system” (Issa Shivji as 
cited in Campbell 1994, 480-481).  
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Without entering into the motivation debates, it is undeniable that both external 
forces and internal forces participated in the demise of Tanzania socialist policies.  
Nyerere’s vision of villagization was that of a bottom-up democracy that would create the 
necessary foundation of national governing institutions.  In the early 1970s, Nyerere hired 
a U.S. management consulting firm, McKinsely Company, to design a decentralization 
strategy to transfer powers of planning and implementation of development programs at 
the district and Regional levels.  The recommendation culminated in the 1972 
Decentralization of the Government Administration Act.  District development teams, 
with authority over financial matters, planning, personnel, health, water, land 
development, communication, education, and industries, were formed and given 
responsibility to work at the village level in the pursuit of development. 
In the same years, to accelerate the villagization process, CCM intensified 
pressure on the population to comply with Ujamaa initiatives.  In 1974, taking on a more 
coercive position, millions of peasants were forced into relocation, the party filled all 
decision-making roles with its own officials, and then relegated the village-based 
organizations to a mere advising role (Nugent 2004).  This moved the emphasis from a 
bottom-up democratic participatory development to an administrative top-down 
execution of programs.   
The year 1974 also coincided with the World Bank penetration in all agricultural 
development programs in Tanzania and the launch of the Regional Integrated 
Development Programs (RIDEP).  RIDEP created a nationwide development program 
operating independently and in parallel to the efforts of the local government.  Each 
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region was assigned to an international donor agency (see table 5) that created its own 
plans and structure to administer its programs.   
Table 5. RIDEP parceling of Tanzania regions 
Region Donor Region Donor 
Arusha Sweden, USA Mbeya Norway, Denmark, FAO 
Coast Canada Morogoro Netherlands 
Dar Es Salaam Canada Mtwara Finland United Kingdom 
Dodoma Canada, UNDP Mwanza Sweden,World Bank 
Iringa UNDP/FAO Ruvuma Yugoslavia, IFAD 
Kagera Denmark, World Bank Shinyanga Netherlands, World Bank 
Kigoma World Bank Singida India, Australia 
Kilimajaro Japan Tabora World Bank 
Lindi Finland, United Kingdom Tanga West Germany 
Mara World Bank Rukwa Norway 
Source: Campbell (1994) 
Additionally, the World Bank convinced the Tanzanian government to finance 
some very large industrial ventures.  Plans were drawn by World Bank consultants, yet 
turned out to be complete failures, with high financial consequences for the national debt.  
The creation of the world’s biggest shoe factory in a country where 90% of the 
population walks barefoot is an ironic example of this.  Some historians interpret these 
fiascos as a deliberate effort on the part of the World Bank to bankrupt the Tanzanian 
republic, forcing it to drop its socialist tendencies and accept the economic policy desired 
by Western financial institutions (Campbell 1994).    
The final blows to Tanzanian socialist economics were the 1973/74 drought and 
the 1970s oil crisis.  Until the 1970s, the Tanzanian economy was mainly based on the 
export of cash crops, but within two years, the drought reversed the situation and 
Tanzania became dependent on food imports and food aid programs.  The spikes in the 
price of petroleum in 1974 and 1978 increased the import/export gap to an unsustainable 
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point for the economy of a country with large development expenditures.  Nugent points 
out (2004) how the trade imbalance:  
was, however, greatly compounded by the poor performance of cash crop 
production […] partly a consequence of renewed peasant concern with food 
security, but it is also attributable to the unattractive prices which were offered to 
producers. […] This was due to a conscious policy of taxing the crop very heavily 
to finance development, but it was also an indirect consequence of maintaining a 
vastly overvalued exchange rate.  (150) 
 
The conditions of the already indebted economy degraded further with the military costs 
of fighting the invasion of Tanzanian national territories in 1978 by Idi Amin and his 
Ugandan troops.  
By the end of the 1970s, the Tanzanian government ran out of financial capacity 
to support its development programs (Mashauri and Katko 1993).  Foreign loans, by this 
time requiring IMF approval for all international lenders, came only with conditions that 
were incompatible with the socialist policies.  Nyerere gave his resignation in 1985, but 
continued to participate in his country’s development as the leader of CCM for the next 
decade.   
The economic crises his successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, inherited peaked in 1986 
when a shortage of petrol was exacerbated by the IMF recommendations to all lending 
institutions not to extend further credit to Tanzania.  This created food shortages in urban 
centers while un-transportable food supplies piled up in villages, followed by water 
shortages, and cholera and plague outbreaks.  Mwinyi had no choice but to reopen 
negotiations with the IMF and in 1986, Tanzania embarked on a Structural Adjustment 
Program (SAP) based on market liberalization, devaluation of the currency, and 
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denationalization of state enterprises and public services.  In 1991, Mwinyi began the 
process of establishing a western style multiparty democracy, which culminated in the 
election of CCM candidate Benjamin Mkapa in 1995.  CCM remained the undisputed 
majority party for the next 15 years.  Mkapa was re-elected in 2000, and without a 
political alternative to CCM, government corruption became a serious economic issue.  
During Mkapa’s presidency, SAP austerity measures reduced the government 
budget support to public services, imposing cost-sharing measures on middle class 
citizens already heavily taxed and on working class citizens whose wages continued to 
fall.  Tanzania was eligible for High Indebted Poor Country debt relief in 2000, and in the 
same year set forth a strategy for poverty reduction to offset the SAP price on the poor, 
focused on private sector incentives in agriculture and development of secondary 
education strategy.  Portions of the funds were allocated to other sectors through yearly 
government budgets, including water development, which eventually folded into the 
sector-wide approach under development in the water sector (IDA 2003). 
In 2005, the CCM candidate Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete won the election on a 
political platform promoting sustained and shared economic growth.  He was reconfirmed 
in the 2010 election, but with a smaller margin of votes.  By that time, attempts by the 
Chama cha Maendeleo na Demokrasia (Party for Democracy and Development; 
CHADEMA) to question the operation and accountability of CCM government officials 
were beginning to gain traction with the electorate.  
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Uganda 
Uganda reached independence in 1962, following a multiparty election about 
which a Ugandan author wrote, “more accurately represented an abortion than the birth of 
multiparty democracy” (Mugaju 2000, 9).  The central issue was how to reconcile the 
federal aspiration of the large Buganda Kingdom with the rest of the constituents, which 
were more divided by religious rather than political issues.  A compromise was reached 
with the monarchy occupying the figurehead posts of presidency and vice-presidency, 
and the Ugandan Party of Congress (UPC) representative Apolo Milton Obote became 
prime minster.  The first Obote administration was market-oriented and pluralistic in 
nature, pursuing an economic policy based on increasing the production of cash crops 
with support from international investors (Nugent 2004).  In 1966, sectarian fighting 
intensified, and eventually lead to the establishment of the first non-democratic regime, 
headed by Apolo Milton Obote and backed by the military.  In an attempt to create 
cohesiveness in a very factional country, Obote adopted Nyerere’s Ujamaa brand of 
socialism in its internal policy while keeping aligned with the West in its foreign policy.  
The Ugandan economy during Obote’s first regime (1966-1971) was in the lead of the 
newly independent sub-Saharan nations (Muhumuza 2007).  Ujamaa participation 
practices failed to curb the power struggle between different regional and religious 
interests at the national level; and eventually the factions penetrated the military.   
In 1971, Idi Amin staged a military coup, dissolved the parliament, and assumed 
all executive powers.  Amin’s regimes reversed Obote’s foreign and internal policies, the 
latter socialist and the former an alignment with Western capitalism, by attempting to 
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create an indigenous capitalistic economy within Uganda, while aligning with the Soviet 
Union on its foreign policy (Mazrui 2000).  Within two years under Amin’s regime the 
official economy collapsed in favor of a “magendo” (smuggling) black market economy, 
with a consequent loss of tax revenues.  State-provided services were almost completely 
unavailable after the second half of the 1970s.  In 1972, Amin expelled the entire Asian 
community and expropriated the commercial sector, which they controlled.  Political 
adversaries were routinely murdered.  In an attempt to divert his people’s attention to the 
outside, Amin invaded Tanzania in 1978.  Tanzania pushed Amin back and marched 
toward the Ugandan capital of Kampala, supported by an army of Ugandans led by 
Ugandan exiles who had found refuge in Tanzania.  After a chaotic negotiation brokered 
by Nyerere in Moshi, the leader of the newly formed Ugandan National Liberation Front, 
Yusuf Lule took power.  After only 68 days, he was replaced by Joseph Binaida, and 
eventually Obote regained power.  Once again, Obote was unable to find a compromise 
between the various factions, which continued to fight in an escalation of violence that 
plunged the country into a civil war.  
From 1971 to 1985, Uganda was transformed from the “Pearl of Africa” to a land 
where human rights violations became the law, with an estimated 800,000 people killed, 
a devastated economy, and a nationwide failure in providing any public services such as 
health, education, or water (Aseka 2005; Mugaju 2000).  The National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) and its leader Yoseweri Museveni fought a five-year-long bush war 
before gaining power in 1985 on the firm commitment to bring fundamental change to 
Uganda.  Museveni, now President, and a scholar of Nyerere’s African Socialism at Dar 
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Es Salaam university, rejected the Western model of multiparty democracy on the basis 
that it was unfit to create unity in the fragmented regional and religious landscape of 
Uganda.  He pursued the creation of a participatory, grassroots democracy, the 
Movement, re-introducing Nyerere’s ten-households cells concept.  
The ten-households system was implemented gradually in the areas liberated by 
NRM, originally as a security committee, then as the state administrative cell at the 
village level, Revolutionary Committee 1 (RC1).  Later it was institutionalized in the 
1995 constitution as the Local Committee 1 (LC1), the lowest administrative cell, which 
is still central to the current institutional arrangement.  The NRM considered the 
formation of the RCI as its best contribution to a participatory democracy.  The RC1 
became “the main institutional vehicle for democracy” (Aseka 2005, 64) and received 
both the right and the responsibility to represent the community, protecting it from the 
abuses of power to which Ugandans had become accustomed.  Free local elections in 
1989 created RC1s in all communities of Uganda.  As political parties were not allowed 
to participate in the elections, candidates represented themselves and were elected on the 
basis of personal capacity, not affiliation with one ideology, religion, or tribe.  According 
to Aseka (2005), everyone in the country was pleased with these developments and 
regarded them as changes in a positive direction.  Still, today the LC1 is given the 
strength to defend itself against the abuses characterizing village life in the past.  For 
instance, neither the police nor the military could arrest anybody without authorization 
from the LC1.  Even today, the LC1 members can be dismissed only by the community 
members eligible to elect them, fostering accountability.  This was a major departure 
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from the previous twenty years, when people could be arrested and disappear forever at a 
whim of a local politician or warlord.   
NRM set a limit of four years for its rule and organized parliamentary elections in 
1989, after which it extended its rule for another five years to give itself time to re-build 
the administrative sector.  In 1992, election of administrative officials from the LC1 at 
the village level to the district counsels occurred in a democratic way, praised by 
international observers.  All Ugandans could nominate themselves for posts, but on an 
individual basis, not on a party platform.  The Ugandan constitution was ratified in 1995, 
containing the provision that Uganda remain a “movement” democracy unless its citizens 
decided otherwise in a referendum.  The “movement” has not been the idealistic entity 
envisioned during the bush war, but it has undeniably contributed to the construction of a 
national unity (Aseka 2005).  
Museveni’s ten-point program, elaborated during the bush war but published in 
1986, formed the basis for a nationwide coalition committed to: 1) restoration of 
democracy and security; 2) consolidation and elimination of all forms of sectarianism; 3) 
defense and consolidation of national independence, especially from officials interested 
only in self-enrichment; 4) building of an integrated and self-sustained national economy 
that does not rely only on the export of one or two cash crops but diversifies agriculture 
substituting imports with locally manufactured goods and creating a local industry; 5) 
restoration and improvement of social services; 6) rehabilitation of war-ravaged areas; 7) 
elimination of corruption and misuse of power; 8) redressing errors that have resulted in 
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some dislocation of the population; 9) cooperation with other African countries; and 10) 
an economic strategy of a mixed economy.  In President Museveni’s (2000) words:  
This strategy means that most economic activity will be carried out by private 
entrepreneurs, with the government taking part in crucial sectors, while steering 
the economy to the set goal of an independent, integrated, and self sustaining 
national economy (Point no 5.) These methods will avoid laissez-faire capitalism, 
as well as the over-nationalization that burdens the state at microeconomic level.  
A mixed economy thus combines the best of both worlds.  (261) 
 
The Ugandan economy needed an urgent influx of funds to restart, but the IMF 
and World Bank would not allow any lending outside the pre-conditionality of structural 
readjustment programs.  Initially, the NMR was against the structural readjustment 
program because it was clear from observation of other African countries that such 
measures produced relatively quick improvements of macro-economic indicators, but 
lead to a marked worsening of the peoples’ living conditions.  Tanzania, for example, 
recorded an annual GDP growth of 4% during 1986-1994, correcting the drop to a growth 
rate of 2%, which started after the oil crisis.  But this improvement came at a marked 
decline in social welfare, especially in the health sector and with particular reference to 
the condition of women and children (Muhumuza 2007).  
Uganda had always been heavily dependent on the foreign influx of funds and 
could not survive without it.  In 1987, Uganda started a structural adjustments program to 
restore macro-economic stability based on devaluation of the exchange rate, improving 
tax collection, reducing government expenses, liberalizing trade and foreign exchange, 
and passing legislation allowing privatization of all public services, including water.  
Museveni was elected for a second term in 1996 with 76% of the electoral votes, 
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undisputed by international and national observers.  Uganda was the first country eligible 
for the High Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) in 1998, which the government 
chose to devote to financing a large portion of the 1997 Poverty Eradication Action Plan 
(PEAP) – a social shock absorber designed to focus public expenditures to provide access 
to basic social services, such as primary education, health care, water and sanitation, rural 
roads and agricultural tools (WHO 2007).  In 2001 Museveni was re-elected for an 
additional five years.  In 2005, Ugandans voted on a referendum to transition the country 
to a multi-party democracy, enabling candidates from outside the Movement to run for 
offices.  Despite the presence of opposition in the following two elections (2006, 2011), 
Museveni has maintained power but not without accusations of rigging, intimidation, and 
suppression of urban demonstrations, which are outside this research context.  
Economic Considerations and Indicators 
Despite the first fifteen years since independence being significantly more 
traumatic in Uganda than in Tanzania, the two countries’ economic development has 
trended to go a similar way since the 1990s.  In the last ten years, the GNI percent 
difference has been well below 20% as can be seen in the graph displayed in figure 4.  
GNI is gross national income (GNI) converted to international dollars using purchasing 
power parity rates.  An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI as a 
U.S. dollar has in the United States. 
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Figure 4. Gross National Income per capita.  
Source: Data gathered from World Bank Database (n.d.) 
 
Despite similarities in the trends of Tanzanian and Ugandan economic 
development, 89% of Tanzanians live below the international poverty line, defined as 
$1.25 a day at purchasing-power parity existing in 2005, compared to only 57% in 
Uganda.  The relatively lower GINI index for Tanzania (35%) than Uganda (46%) 
indicates Uganda has a smaller, but richer middle class.  Post-independence political 
emphasis on agricultural production is quite apparent in the GDP/sector data shown in 
figure 5.  Tanzanian agricultural contribution to the total economy exceeds that of 
Uganda by about 20%, compensated by Uganda’s larger service provisions and industry 
development, both about 10% larger than Tanzanian ones.  Service includes government 
services in addition to wholesale and retail trade, tourism, transport, and financial, 
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professional, and personal services such as education, health care, and real estate 
services.  It is interesting to note the services category includes government services.   
 
Figure 5. GDP per sector. 
Source: World Bank Database (n.d.) 
 
Government expenditures and aid flows are shown in figure 6.  It is interesting to 
note that aid flow is about the same magnitude as government expenses for both 
countries.  Tanzania appeared to have received a significantly larger aid flow per capita 
in the years prior to the 1990s, which resulted in a significantly larger national debt (see 
figure 7). 
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Figure 6. Expenditures and aid flow.  
National government expenditures (above left) and aid flows (above right).  Source: 
World Bank Database (n.d.)  
 
Debt cancellations and rescheduling in the late 1980s have reduced the gap 
between the two countries, possibly at the cost of higher foreign dependence in decision 
making for Tanzania. 
Net bilateral aid flows from DAC donors are the net disbursements of official 
development assistance (ODA) or official aid from the members of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC).  Net disbursements are gross disbursements of grants and 
loans minus repayments of principal on earlier loans.  ODA consists of loans made on 
concessional terms (with a grant element of at least 25%, calculated at a rate of discount 
of 10%) and grants made to promote economic development and welfare in countries and 
territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients.  Official aid is provided under terms and 
conditions similar to those for ODA.  Data are in current U.S. dollars.   
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Figure 7. National debt.  
Source: Data gathered from World Bank Database (n.d.) 
 
Tanzania’s and Uganda’s figures for export and import of goods and services, 
measured in trade volume ($), differ by less than 6%.  Foreign investment flow has 
steadily increased in both countries since the 1990s to $650 million for Tanzania and 
$800 million for Uganda (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2010).  
Data on breakout of investments by infrastructure sector available from the World Bank 
database indicate a very small private investment in the Tanzania water sector ($850 
million) and none in Uganda. 
  55 
 
  
Figure 8. Private sector Investments with private participation in Uganda and Tanzania.  
(Above left) foreign direct investments’ flow (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development), (Above right) investments with private participation in public 
infrastructure by sector.   
Source: Data gathered from World Bank Database (n.d.) 
 
Government and Corruption 
The World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA) is a set of 
indices that measures how conducive a country’s policies and institutions are to 
development.  It is one of the criteria the bank uses to evaluate the risks of loaning money 
to a given country.  Uganda and Tanzania are assessed at about the same risk level for all 
12 indicators.  Tanzania performed slightly better, including in the government 
corruption index, which measures “[i]nformal payments to public officials and the 
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percentage of firms expected to make informal payments to public officials to ‘get things 
done’ with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services, and the like,” 
measuring 49.7% in Tanzania compared to 51.7% in Uganda (World Database, n.d.).  For 
reference, most Latin American and Central American countries have corruption indices 
below 20%, and the Russian Federation is at 39.6%. 
Education and Water-related Health Indicators 
Despite a significant difference in population density, both countries overall have 
very similar demographic and workforce compositions, as shown in figure 9.  The age 
dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of dependents to the working-age population, 
displayed as the proportion of dependents per one hundred working-age people.  Young 
defines the dependent as individuals younger than fifteen, old defines dependents older 
than sixty-four.  Both Young and Old dependents are combined in the unspecified Age 
Dependency Ratio.   
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Figure 9. Population by age. 
Source: Data gathered from World Bank Database (n.d.) 
 
Figure 10. Age dependency ratio. 
Source: Data gathered from World Bank Database (n.d.) 
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Literacy rate and school enrollments are almost identical for both countries (see 
table 6).  Both countries’ mortality rates of children under five years old are assessed 
around 10-15%, while Tanzania has about 10% more children suffering from diarrheal 
diseases than Uganda.  Public health expenditures are nearly twice as large in Tanzania as 
in Uganda (World Bank Database, n.d.). 
Table 6. Literacy rates disaggregated by age and gender  
 
Youth literacy rate 2002 2002 2008 2008 
Tanzania Uganda Tanzania Uganda 
Literacy rate, youth female (% 
of females ages 15-24) 
76 76 76 86 
Literacy rate, youth male (% of 
males ages 15-24) 
81 86 79 89 
Literacy rate, youth total (% of 
people ages 15-24) 
78 81 78 87 
Adult literacy rate      
Literacy rate, adult female (% 
of females ages 15 and above) 
62 59 66 67 
Literacy rate, adult male (% of 
males ages 15 and above) 
78 78 79 82 
Literacy rate, adult total (% of 
people ages 15 and above) 
69 68 73 75 
Source: Data from World Bank Database (n.d.) 
Analysis of Tanzanian and Ugandan National Water Policies 
Overview of Rural Water Policies and Development Programs 
Tanzania 
The transition of water and economic policies from the socialist conception of 
free water for all, to the neoliberal view, is shown with a graph of the progress in the 
sector in figure 10.  It illustrates how the onset of structural adjustment policies coincides 
with a decreasing rate of expanding rural services.  In Uganda, where austerity measures 
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have been associated with strong social shock absorber policies, rural water development 
progress continues; in Tanzania, where these measures have not been pursued with the 
same vigor, it came to a complete stall, despite the fact that construction of new systems 
continues.   
The evolution of water governance instruments in Tanzania since independence 
(see figure 10) precipitated a 180-degree shift in policy direction after the first twenty 
years of independence and socialist policies (Ujamaa).  After Independence in 1962, 
Tanzania’s government assumed the responsibility to provide free water for all its 
citizens (Rugumamu 1999) through the 1967 Policy of Self-Reliance and Socialism.  The 
Government of Tanzania launched the Universal Rural Water Supply Program with the 
goal of providing clean water services to all by 1991.  
A 1977 World Bank Report (Acharya 1977), deeming the effort unachievable 
given the available budget, proposed to revise plans which would achieve 49% and 47% 
coverage, respectively, and noted that not enough money for O&M was allocated (less 
than 50%) for the already implemented facilities.  The report suggested that in line with 
the self-reliance policies, villages take on responsibility for O&M.  The Government 
efforts were complemented by the independent activities of various development 
partners, such as DHV (Nederland), FINIDA (Finland), DANIDA (Denmark), SIDA 
(Sweden), and NORAD (Norway) (Therkildseen 1988).    
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Despite a sharp increase in rural water coverage from 1970 to 1990 (from 10% to 
45%), the government did not have sufficient funds or the managing capacity to continue 
expanding services while providing operation and maintenance on the existing ones.  
Already in expenditure reviews in 1989 (Stevens 1989), it is clearly stated the only way 
to reduce government expenditures in the water sector would be to have the O&M of 
facilities become a responsibility of the communities.  Additionally, with the government 
unable to take over responsibility for O&M, the donors’ agencies that had constructed 
water systems found themselves without a sustainable exit strategy.  Under the pressure 
of structural adjustment policy packages, the provision of free water for all was declared 
a poor economic and political choice, and replaced by a transitional market-based model 
in which services were provided by the government and part of the costs recovered 
though a tariff-based model.  This major shift was captured in the 1991 national water 
policy, which introduced the concept that some of the costs of construction and O&M 
should be contributed by the beneficiaries with whatever means affordable, such as in 
kind, labor, or monetary means.  It also required participation of the beneficiaries during 
all phases of development or rehabilitation of water projects through the formation of 
village water Committees and the creation of village water Funds.   
According to the Ministry of Water and Livestock Development, “the main 
shortfall in the national water policy of 1991 can be identified in the implementation 
strategies, which emphasized that the central government is the sole investor, 
implementer and manager of the projects, both in rural and urban areas” (The United 
Republic of Tanzania 2002, 4-5).  The national water policy was revised in 2002, to 
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“develop a comprehensive framework for sustainable development and management of 
the Nation’s water resources, in which an effective legal and institutional framework for 
its implementation can be put in place” (The United Republic of Tanzania 2002, 5).  In 
the rural water supply section, the policy defines a development model in which 
beneficiaries participate in the decision making process, own and manage the water 
system constructed by the private sector and co-financed by the government, donors and 
communities, and assigns full O&M cost recovery to the communities, preferably 
through private service providers.  The Tanzanian 2002 national water policy falls short 
of providing guidelines for implementing the new ideas it contains.  “A plan for action 
detailing the implementation of the policy strategies will be prepared and presented 
separately” (The United Republic of Tanzania 2002, 7). 
In 2004 and 2005 the Tanzanian Government designed a National Water Sector 
Development Strategy (2005),  
a blueprint for prioritized, timely and appropriate interventions to address the 
water sector challenges in the process of achieving all the targets narrated in the 
National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty by 2010, the Millennium 
Development Goals by 2015, and contribute toward achieving the Tanzania 
Development Vision 2025.  Furthermore, the strategy lead to reshaping and 
increasing sector financing through a smooth and manageable institutional 
arrangement. (The United Republic of Tanzania 2010, 28) 
 
The National Sector Wide Development Strategy was needed in part to 
complement, and in part to correct, omission and duplication of roles and responsibilities 
in the national water policy of 2002.  To achieve the objectives set by the National Sector 
Wide Development Strategy, a National Water Sector Strategic Implementation Plan 
(The United Republic of Tanzania 2010) was prepared, funded by doubling the 
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Tanzanian government budget resource allocations to water development initiatives, and 
by several international donors’ independent contributions to projects.    
The National Water Sector Strategic Implementation Plan was overshadowed 
(The United Republic of Tanzania 2010) in 2006 by the National Water Sector 
Development Program, a ten-year program attempting to address water resource 
development with a Sector Wide Approach, requiring a single institutional and regulatory 
framework supporting three subprogram components:  Water Resource Management, 
Urban Water Development, and Rural Water Development.  
The NWSDP was funded by a $1.2 billion budget, provided for the most part by 
development partners through a basket fund managed by the Tanzanian government 
according to a strict set of requirements overseen by the World Bank Tanzanian offices.  
The dialogue and coordination between the Ministry of Water, the Development Partners, 
the local government authorities, the local and international NGOs, community owned 
water supply organizations (COWSO), and private sectors were organized through the 
formation of four Thematic Working Groups (Finance and Planning, Performance 
Monitoring, Institutional Development and Capacity Building, Sanitation and Hygiene).  
At the 2.5-year checkpoint, the set targets were not achieved, and that triggered a 
restructuring of the program to align the four working groups to the four thematic areas 
defined in the 2002 National Water Policy: water resource management, rural water 
supply, urban water supply, and institutional capacity building.  Additionally, the 
mechanism of dialogue between the groups working in the four thematic areas was also 
restructured, creating an almost entirely new management structure and reporting 
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mechanism for the program.  According to the proceedings of the Joint Water Sector 
Review (JWSR), held annually and facilitated by an external consultant, and to various 
stakeholders interviewed, the WSDP has spent most of its resources on creating and 
sustaining its own bureaucracy and has failed to increase water access proportionally to 
the program funds expensed, in particular to the most vulnerable sector of the population. 
Uganda 
The development of Ugandan water sector strategies has followed a path similar 
to the Tanzanian one, yet it has been significantly more stable.  Since 1972, urban areas 
had water services managed, with major funding from the government, by the para-statal 
National Water and Sanitation Corporation.  The government provided free water to rural 
populations in areas not served by the NWSC (The World Bank 1984).  Since the end of 
the war that ousted the second Obote regime in 1986, the Government of Uganda has 
shown a strong commitment to poverty alleviation, formalized in the Poverty Eradication 
Action Plan of 1997.  PEAP was prepared in consultation with a broad spectrum of 
national stakeholders, and qualified Uganda for debt relief under the World Bank and 
IMF Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.  A sizeable portion of the HIPC 
funds were allocated from the Ugandan government to the water and sanitation sector and 
triggered reforms of the water sector.  The 1993-1995 Water Action Plan (WWAP 2006), 
a nation-wide assessment of the state of the sector, culminated in the formulation of the 
first national water policy (1999).  The policy complemented the Water Statute (1995), 
providing a framework for development and management of the national water resources, 
led by the Ugandan government through its existing institutional channels. 
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Recognizing the duplication and waste of resources in a project-by-project 
approach, a Sector Wide Approach to planning was adopted in 2002.  Under its 
provisions, the government and development partners began collaborating under a single 
policy and expenditure program controlled by the Ugandan government.  The 
implementation of a rural development program was ratified in the Rural Water and 
Sanitation Plan of 2002, and financed, in large part by internal resources, by a 15-year 
Strategic Investment Plan.  To close the loop between central government policy and 
actual program implementation, the Directorate of Water Development created Technical 
Support Units for each of the regions to provide support and advice to local government 
and communities, while monitoring and providing feedback for further planning and 
policymaking.  While revisions of the Strategic Action Plans have been made, the overall 
direction of water sector development has not changed over time. 
Comparisons of Expenditure in the Rural Water Sector 
As already mentioned, a limitation of this study is the lack of a satisfactory 
method to calculate the total expenditures in the rural sector.  The major problem is the 
size of the off-budget funds, which include expenses made directly by water authorities 
with locally raised funds, and donor-funded projects not registered in the government 
budget.  This is what van der Berg (2009) called “the miracle premium” that skews the 
statistic on progress of the Tanzanian rural development sector.  A calculation on the 
contribution of these miracle premiums to improved water access, assuming that each 
water point serves 250 people and conservatively normalizing to the total population of 
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these district in 2010, shows that implementation of the off-budget projects masks a 22% 
decrease in water access.  
Given the unquantifiable existence of these off-budget funds, comparable to the 
on-budget government spending in the rural sector, a comparison of the government 
expenditure in the water sector prior to the onset of the Sector Wide Approach, in 2002 
for Uganda and 2005 for Tanzania, since very large international donor contributions to 
projects are not accounted for in the national budget.  Figure 11 compares government 
expenditures; a data point for 1998 is inserted to show the magnitude of a single off-
budget contribution, proving that a direct comparison of government expenditures prior 
to the Sector Wide Approach cannot be made.  Based on these considerations, we can 
only conclude that expenditures in the water sector have been larger for Tanzania than 
they have been for Uganda since 2005.   
  67 
 
Figure 12. Government expenditures in the water sector.  
The data point in grey is a single off-budget project financed by the World Bank, which 
is not included in the government budget.  
Sources: Data gathered from Government of Uganda (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010), 
The United Republic of Tanzania (2009, 2010), Van den Berg (2009), and The World 
Bank (1997, 2004). 
 
The adoption of the Sector Wide Approach in Uganda does not coincide with 
such a large increase, showing that the Ugandan government commitment to fund the 
water sector has been consistent since the mid-1990s.  The breakout of budget 
allocations, for the last few years, between recurrent and development expenses is shown 
in table 7 for Tanzania and table 8 for Uganda.  A significant difference to be noted is 
how more funds are allocated to rehabilitation, O&M, and monitoring in Uganda than in 
Tanzania.  Additionally, a growing portion of the budget is allocated for transfer to urban 
and basin authority, which service metered paying customers and water for production 
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and to feasibility studies, justified by the need of creating a quick “pipeline” of projects 
that can be implemented as soon as funds are disbursed into the Water Sector 
Development Program recipients. 
 
Table 7. Breakout of allocations of the Tanzania Water Budget. 
TANZANIA 2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009 
Personnel Expenditure 6.1% 3.8% 5.8% 
Other Charges 9.9% 6.4% 4.1% 
Total Recurrent Expenditure 16.0% 10.2% 10% 
New Infrastructure investments 69.6% 51.2% 24.3% 
Rehabilitation 5.03% 2.69% 2.7% 
Capital transfer to Authorities (Urban and Basin) 0.0% 26.04% 40.5% 
Feasibility Studies 1.68% 6.29% 10.8% 
Maintenance 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Others 7.55% 1.8% 11.7% 
Total Development Expenditures 83.9% 89.9% 90% 
Source: Van Den Berg (2009) 
 
Table 8. Breakout of allocations of the Uganda Water Budget. 
UGANDA Guidelines 2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009 
Software Activities <12% 7% 7% 9% 
Operations and Monitoring  16% 3% 11% 
Wages and Salaries <4% 1% 1% 1% 
Rehabilitation and O&M <8% 4% 4% 6% 
Sanitation <6% 2% 2% 3% 
Water supply >70% 70% 72% 70% 
Source: Government of Uganda (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010) 
Constitutional Right to Water 
The Ugandan Constitution (1995) specifically recognizes the people's right to 
water. 
The State shall endeavour to fulfill the fundamental rights of all Ugandans to 
social justice and economic development and shall, in particular, ensure that 
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(a) all developmental efforts are directed at ensuring the maximum social 
and cultural well-being of the people; and 
(b) all Ugandans enjoy rights and opportunities and access to education, 
health services, clean and safe water, work, decent shelter, adequate 
clothing, food security and pension and retirement benefits. 
 
There is no explicit mention of the right to water in the Tanzanian Constitution 
(1977).  Additionally, Tanzania is one of the forty-one countries that abstained July 28, 
2010 from voting on the United Nations’ resolution to recognize access to clean water 
and sanitation as a basic human right.  Uganda was not represented at the session. 
National Water Policies: Principles and Objectives 
Both Ugandan and Tanzanian national water policies endorse the declarations and 
guiding principles adopted by the 1992 UN conference on Environment and 
Development held in Rio de Janeiro prescribing:  
an integrated, multi-sectoral approach in the prevailing socio-economic context, 
including (a) treating water as a social and economic good; (b) relying on markets 
and pricing to determine water allocation among various sectors and user groups; 
(c) involving the beneficiaries and the private sector in managing water at the 
lowest appropriate level; and (d) recognizing that water is a finite resource that 
contributes to economic development and supports natural ecosystems.  
(Government of Uganda 1999, 5) 
 
Despite this common endorsement, the two policies set quite a different tone in stating 
the principles inspiring the water development sector.  The Ugandan water policy 
explicitly states,  
[i]n addition to the various guiding principles adopted from the international 
experience […] a number of policy initiatives at the national level have been 
fundamental in shaping the water sector policy as presented in this document.  
The cornerstones in this process are (a) the new constitution, (b) the 
decentralization and privatization policies, and (c) the Environmental 
Management Policy and Statute. (Government of Uganda 1999, 6) 
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In particular, the policy invokes the constitutional right to clean and safe water, 
the state obligation to promote a good water management system at all levels and to 
promote sustainable development and public awareness of the need to manage land, air, 
and water resources in a balanced and sustainable manner for the present and future 
generations.  Regarding the domestic water supply, the policy adopts the principles of the 
“New Delhi Statement” under the main theme “SOME FOR ALL RATHER THAN 
MORE FOR SOME” (Government of Uganda 1999, 16).  
The six principles are: 
 (i) Protection of the environment and safe-guarding of health through the 
integrated management of water resources and liquid and solid waste. 
 (ii) Institutional reforms promoting an integrated approach, including 
changes in procedures, attitudes and behavior and the full participation of women 
at all levels in sector institutions and in institution making. 
 (iii) Community management of services, backed by measures to 
strengthen local institutions in implementing and sustaining water and sanitation 
programmes.  
 (iv) Financial viability of public utilities should be assured through sound 
financial practices, achieved through better management of existing assets, and 
widespread use of appropriate technologies. 
 (v) Provision of services through demand driven approaches in which 
users are fully involved and contribute to the cost of facilities and services to 
promote ownership and sustainability. 
 (vi) Allocation of public funds for water supply development activities 
will take into account that priority is given to those segments of the population 
who are presently inadequately served or not served at all, and who are willing to 
participate in planning, implementation and maintenance of the facilities. 
 
The policy aims at finding a compromise between promoting efforts to attract 
investments to privatize public enterprise and restructuring the public service to increase 
its efficiency.  With a pragmatic approach, the policy requires that beneficiaries 
contribute toward capital costs or the technology selected, and cover the operation and 
maintenance costs in full, but clearly states that “as an interim measure, the Government 
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will provide conditional grants for maintenance of services beyond the capacity of the 
community and local pump mechanics” (Government of Uganda 1999, 20). 
The Tanzanian policy recognizes the basic need and right to water for domestic 
consumption and emphasizes the link between water, economic development, and 
poverty alleviation.  It sets its goal to create an institutional framework to achieve best 
development and management practices.  With particular reference to water for domestic 
use, the 2002 Tanzanian water policy objectives are “to provide adequate, affordable and 
sustainable water supply services to the rural population,” and “to emphasize on 
community paying for part of the capital costs, and full costs recovery for operation and 
maintenance of services as opposed to the previous concept of cost sharing,” and “to 
promote the participation of the private sector in the delivery of goods and services” (The 
United Republic of Tanzania 2002, 30).  The “underestimation of the role that could be 
played by the private sector” (The United Republic of Tanzania 2002, 30), one of the 
shortfalls of the 1991 national water policy, is addressed by developing “economic 
instruments includ[ing] water pricing, charges, penalties and incentives to be used to 
stimulate marketing mechanisms” (The United Republic of Tanzania 2002, 7). 
Stakeholders’ Roles and Responsibilities 
Roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders are clearly outlined in the 1999 
Ugandan national water policy (see figure 12).  At the national government level, the 
Ministry, through the Directorate for Water Development, is responsible for national 
policies, guidelines, standards, and priorities for water resource management in the 
country and for monitoring all activities, in addition to formulating all international water 
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resources policy.  The district councils have responsibility for water supply services and 
for the integrated management of extension staff and sub-county level government staff.  
They work directly with communities on the provision of water, sanitation, health, 
agriculture, fisheries, livestock, and community development.  Urban water systems are 
under the responsibility of the district, but are operated by town councils.  
Community-based Water User Groups are responsible for managing and 
operating point water sources, such as wells and protected springs under the supervision 
of Local councils.  Village elders and the local government chief systems are responsible 
for arbitration and mediation.  The role of NGOs is determined by the communities in 
which they work, and their activities are harmonized by regular information exchange 
and coordinated operations.  While the policy promotes an “integrated and sustainable, 
development, management and use of national water resources,” it clearly states that “[i]n 
the present Ugandan context, it has not been found necessary – and therefore it has not 
been elaborated on further in this policy document – to create river/lake basin 
management authorities, catchment boards or similar bodies” (Government of Uganda 
1999, 14). 
The institutional framework relies on the existing district council and Water 
Department, and on the LC1-3 Local council level as it creates continuity in the line of 
responsibility while proposing new committees at the district level for communication, 
liaison, and services.  Implementation of new systems and major rehabilitations and 
repairs are tendered to the local private sector, which is also encouraged to take over 
water service management in urban centers and channel private funds in Build Own 
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Operate or Build Operate and Transfer projects.  The Tanzania national water policy 
(2002) does not contain a prescription for an institutional framework defining the roles 
and responsibilities of all stakeholders.  It contains a commitment to review “the existing 
structure in line with the new roles and responsibilities” (The United Republic of 
Tanzania 2002, 38). 
The 2005 National Water Sector Development Strategy outlines a transitional and 
final framework for water supply and sanitation, with the functions and responsibilities of 
each stakeholder defined.  However, the final legislative act containing the detailed 
institutional framework appeared only in the 2009 Water Act, possibly failing to create 
continuity in stakeholder roles and responsibilities over the last ten years.  Roles and 
responsibilities are assigned in a way very similar to the Ugandan arrangement, namely 
policy, regulation, and monitoring at the national level, program implementation at the 
local government level, and operation and maintenance at the community level, but the 
institutional arrangement in Tanzania was not created based on the existing apparatus.   
A comparison between Tanzanian and Ugandan institutional arrangements 
requires two considerations.  The first is that the Tanzanian arrangement is depicted in a 
much more complicated way relative to the straightforward Ugandan flowchart.  The 
Tanzanian chart contains eleven items in the legend, which can cause much confusion 
between colors and different types of dotted lines.  The Tanzanian chart also has twenty 
boxes in six different colors, requiring constant attention to the legend (adapted from The 
United Republic of Tanzania, 2005, 42).  There are many directions to follow to find all 
the information, which does not facilitate visual understanding.  The Ugandan flow chart 
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is much more straightforward with three horizontal levels and three distinctly labeled 
vertical levels (The Republic of Uganda, 1999, 13).  Everything is one color and the 
direction of the arrows is clear.  The second one is the fact that the use of the word 
CONSUMER implies the policymakers see water as a commodity, rather than a social 
issue.  
Additionally, the adoption of the Integrated Water Resource Management 
required an institutional structure organized by water basins instead of regional or district 
boundaries.  The National Water Sector Development Strategy (2005) outlines the 
creation of the basin and catchment level water resource management offices and 
functions.  While not directly involved in the responsibility for rural water sector 
development, it requires the involvement of resources from the Regional and district 
level.  The Tanzanian policy assigns the implementation of new systems and 
rehabilitation to the private sector and a plan to promote actively contracting out water 
schemes to service providers, including efforts to educate communities on the advantages 
of private management of water services. 
The 2009 Water Act Legal introduces registration of the rural water entities 
(COWSO) to acquire legal ownership status and disengage from reporting to the village 
government.  A total of six entities’ management structures are possibly recognized; three 
of them are based on committees elected by a village, Water User Group, Water User 
Association for multi-village schemes, and a Board of Trustees that direct a delegated 
management structure, separating the decision makers from the implementers.  The other 
  75 
three are private sector management options, namely a Company, Cooperative Society, or 
a Corporation.   
Choice of Technology 
The Ugandan national water policy (1999) is very detailed regarding the choice of 
technology.  Low-cost technologies, such as hand pumps and protected springs, are 
mandated for rural areas.  To support standardization of operation and maintenance 
networks, only U2/U3 hand pumps should be used for deep boreholes.  At the time the 
policy was written, different models of pumps were field tested and monitored to select 
the two best types for shallow wells.  Motorized pumps are to be considered only for 
urban centers.  The local government actively fosters the development of a spare part 
network by creating and training an indigenous private sector of local hand pump 
technicians who can be hired to make repairs.  Sanitation improvement and health and 
hygiene education are disseminated in conjunction with water improvement projects. 
The Tanzanian policy and strategy recognizes the need for appropriate low-cost 
technology, which can be maintained and afforded at the community level, but stops 
short of defining what this technology should be.   
Service Providers will provide [water] services using the most cost effective 
technology available which is suitable to the area and the socio-economic 
circumstances of the users. In rural areas, where communities will be responsible 
for operation and maintenance, they will be empowered and facilitated to make 
appropriate technology choices that will suit their own capabilities, particularly in 
those which require low investment costs and are operated and maintained at least 
cost.  (The Government of Tanzania 2005, 53).   
 
It is unclear who has the responsibility for empowering the community so they can make 
the right choice, which is critical in this case, as the best interest of the community might 
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not coincide with the best interest of all service providers, especially if the construction is 
handled by the private sector and paid for mainly by the government or donors.   
Basic Service Level 
Ugandan basic service levels in rural areas are set at 20-25 l/person/day, for a 
maximum of 300 persons served per water point, a maximum distance of 1.5 km, and no 
more than 100 m of elevation difference.  The policy states the level of service must be 
chosen with a demand-driven negotiation between local government and communities, 
based on consideration of the site characteristics, access to alternative sources, and 
affordability.  Communities requesting a service level higher than the basic are required 
to meet the higher cost of service.  
Tanzanian basic service levels are set to 25 liters/person/day, at less than 400m 
from the household, and serving fewer than 250 people, but higher service levels will be 
encouraged where affordable.  Both the national water policy and the National Water and 
Sanitation Strategic Plans prescribe community participation in planning, achieved by 
training communities on making appropriate technology choices and supervision of 
design, construction, and service provision contracts.  “Environmentally friendly 
technologies including gravity, solar and wind pumping will be promoted” (The United 
Republic of Tanzania 2002, 33).  Again, the stakeholder responsible for community 
capacity development is not specified.  Furthermore, the recommendation for 
environmentally friendly technology is in contrast with the appropriate technology 
recommendation, as hand pumps and protected springs are by far more affordable at the 
community level.   
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Integration of sanitation services and hygiene education within water supply 
development programs is promoted by both countries’ policies.  Both countries’ policies 
state that equity shall drive water development, with priorities set based on needs.  The 
Ugandan policy adds that areas where installation is neglected will be assigned a lower 
priority.  
Financing Water Development 
The Ugandan policy clearly states subsidies will be available to cover both capital 
costs and repairs beyond what a rural community can afford to assure the financial 
viability of water installation.  Communities are required to collect a small contribution 
toward capital costs before any implementation can begin.  Communities are responsible 
for collection of O&M and repair funds, but with a pragmatic approach, the policy 
balances communities’ financial responsibilities and local government backing of 
unaffordable repairs and rehabilitations.  Communities manage the water facilities 
through a village Water Committee.  According to the 2002 water policy, Tanzanian 
communities are expected to “establish mechanisms to pay the full costs of O&M” (The 
United Republic of Tanzania 2002, 37).  In addition, they were expected to contribute a 
small percentage of the capital costs.  The 2009 Water Act (Part VIII, sections 36-37) 
establishes financial provision of community owned water sources (COWSO).  COWSO 
sources of finances are community contributions into the water funds, augmented by 
government funds upon request.  It is unclear if the financial support offered by the Act is 
available for both capital and recurring costs of a new water point.   
  78 
Stakeholders’ Interview Analysis: Tanzania Rural Water Development 
Awareness of Governance 
The emerging picture for Tanzania is that the new policy has not been effectively 
disseminated to communities; as a result, communities expect the government to be 
responsible for the provision of water services, as it was during the post-independence 
period.  This is exacerbated by politicians who, during their electoral campaigns, 
promised water projects free of costs and responsibilities to the communities, in open 
contradiction with the current national water policy.  
Rural water development in the new policy is centered on community demanding 
services, participating in the planning, collecting a financial buy-in contribution, and 
taking on the responsibility for operating and managing water supplies through 
Community Owned Water Supply Organization (COWSO); therefore, the fact the 
community does not understand or accept the new rules of engagement represents a huge 
challenge to the practical implementation of the policy.  One obstacle reported in a few 
interviews was that the policy is too complex to be understood at the community level, 
and it is entirely written in English, which is not the national language.  Some NGOs 
created a Swahili simplified version of the policy, which is now being disseminated at the 
pace allowed by the limited resources allocated to software activities. 
Some of the stakeholders complained that even national, district, and local 
government employees and NGO personnel are not familiar with the 2002 water policy.  
This is substantiated by the analysis, not only because of the frequency of the reporting, 
but from the fact that different stakeholders provide vague and sometime contradictory 
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statements about critical parts of the policy.  One of the questions asked of all the 
interviewees was how rural water sector development worked in principle, based on roles 
and responsibilities assigned to each stakeholder by the national policies.  The responses 
to this question often mixed the governance principles with what actually happens.  All 
interviewees were able to provide a general description mirroring the national water 
policy and National Water Sector Development Strategy, but the details provided on two 
key items, the demand-driven planning and the “backstopping” mechanism available to 
the government to support rehabilitation of water services, were not as uniformly 
described, leaving some doubts about uniformity of the implementation of the policies. 
Demand-driven Approach 
In a demand-driven approach, it is fundamental that water improvements are a 
high enough priority for a community to request water services and assume all the 
responsibilities that come with it.  To assume such a responsibility, a community needs to 
arrive at a reasoned and independent choice of appropriate and affordable technology.  
Proof of the community desire for a water improvement is the financial contribution to 
the capital expenses of the project.  
In the interviewee’s descriptions of the process, it was unclear who had the 
specific responsibility to work with the community or monitor how informed the 
community selection was.  The overall impression was of an uncoordinated approach, 
with different strategies being employed by different groups.  Most local NGOs offer 
community mobilization programs to implementing agencies, but they complain funds 
are not sufficient to setup effective long-term programs.  Their exponents bitterly 
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complained of the lack of understanding of donor agencies regarding the costs associated 
with sending personnel to a remote location for an extended period of time.  Additionally, 
those testimonials point out the government is either not responsible or lacks the 
resources to carry out these “software” activities.    
Several interviewees talked about the planning being made by the “consultant,” 
and how constraints in program rules dictated implementation.  This consultant, or 
consultancy, is a figure quoted by most as a decision maker external to the local reality 
and imposed on local government from the big decision makers, either the central 
government or the World Bank and International Developing Partners.  According to 
several stakeholders, the outcome of the consultant work has been a duplication of 
efforts, such as new wells built next to existing wells, inappropriate choice of technology, 
such as motorized water schemes with costs larger than the district’s water budgets, and 
shortsighted plans, like larger schemes built without consideration of future users’ 
growth. 
An additional challenge emerging from the interviews is that of representation.  
When donors, the consultant, NGOs, or district teams go to a community, they interface 
with a small group of people, reported to be about 5-10%.  These are the people 
providing input about affordability of different technology choices, committing the 
community to the cost of the improved water services, and driving the formation of the 
managing groups.  Given the fact that this managing group controls the water funds, 
which is by far the largest pool of funds in the community, it creates a very powerful new 
social entity.  The entity is independent of the traditional power structures in the village; 
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especially once the managing groups acquire legal status by registering at the district and 
becoming quite independent from the village government.  Although this might offer 
some advantages in term of avoiding the local government’s diversion of water funds 
toward other activities, it fuels social attrition, which often requires direct outside 
intervention to be resolved, especially if the majority of the community was not involved 
in the decision making process.  Additionally, the community does not feel bound by the 
minority decision and refuses to accept the financial burden imposed by the water points 
improvements.  Difficulties in registering the community management group as a 
COWSO due to a lack of operating funds at the district and national levels is also listed 
as a challenge to implementation of the institutional arrangement prescribed by the 
national water policy.  Across the board, everybody reported the insufficient allocation of 
funds, time, and resources to carry out community mobilization and sensitization 
activities as a major challenge in the national program.   
Post-construction Support and Cost Recovery 
Several of the interviewees reported that often communities fail to assume 
ownership and contribute or that water funds are misappropriated or used toward other 
development projects that have higher priority for the community.  In some cases, the 
water user group members stop participating in the management of the water supply and 
a management vacuum forms in the community.  Water tariffs, by bucket or by monthly 
contribution are supposed to cover the O&M costs and build up a village water fund for 
replacement costs.  These tariffs are decided by the community based on affordability.  
They do not reflect the actual cost of providing a water service.  According to the pump 
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vendors interviewed, the few orders for spare parts received directly from COWSO did 
not exceed $50, which only covers very small, wearable items for hand-pumps, such as 
gaskets and bobbins.  Larger parts are affordable only on the black market generated by 
the theft of pumps.  With the exception of the WAMMA teams
1
 created in Water Aid 
sponsored programs and paid by Water Aid in the early 1990s, no government efforts 
have succeeded in creating a network for technical supports or spare parts.   
If tariffs do not reflect the costs of providing a water service, the financial 
viability of COWSO is a big challenge.  According to most interviewees, the district was 
supposed to address this challenge by providing backstopping, in the form of subsidizing 
O&M and rehabilitation costs.  None of the interviewees was able to provide a satisfying 
description of the backstopping mechanisms.  Backstopping is not explicitly mentioned in 
any of the policies or acts, but seems to be expected to support the functionality of the 
water scheme beyond the community capacity.  As a matter of fact, several interviewees 
concentrated on topics related to expansion of water services, planning, and construction 
and had to be prompted to describe how operation, maintenance, and rehabilitation was 
supposed to work, either by asking what challenges are experienced in the process or by a 
direct question such as “so far we have mainly covered the topic of implementation of 
new systems, what about operation and maintenance of existing ones?”  Eventually, all 
interviewees stated that according to the water policies, the community was responsible 
                                                        
1
 WA –WaterAid M – Maji (the Tanzanian Water Department); M –Maendeleo ya Jamii (the 
Community Development Department) and A – Afya (the Health Department) 
2
 A tap stand is water point in a distribution system, i.e., a water point that is not a dug hole or a well 
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for managing and maintaining effective water services, including regular contributions 
into a Water Funds to cover O&M and replacement costs.   
Possibly, interview responses about the mechanism governing district assistance 
to communities were confusing and contradictory because these mechanisms are not 
regulated by policy.  The districts were indicated to be responsible for subsidizing 
rehabilitation costs, which are above what is affordable by a community, but nobody was 
able to quote a specific threshold above which a community is entitled to obtain financial 
support, not even the district Water engineers who make that decision.  At minimum, the 
lack of guidelines creates an arbitrariness in the decision about which community will 
receive assistance and which will not.  It is undeniable that guidelines guaranteeing an 
equitable distribution of backstopping funds are much harder to define when each village 
uses a different technology like in Tanzania and Uganda where in the latter, the 
technology choice is standardized to protected springs and wells equipped with hand 
pumps by national policy.  
The lack of clear guidelines is also reflected in the district budgeting process.  
According to government officials, the district does not have a specific budget category 
for O&M replacement costs, only for construction of new systems and rehabilitation.  
The line between rehabilitation and replacement costs is blurred.  In a developed country, 
preventive maintenance plans the replacement of worn-out parts before they break down 
and the water service is disrupted.  Preventive maintenance cannot be done without 
available funds.  The emerging picture from the interview is that when parts break, the 
water stops flowing, the community stops paying for the service, and eventually, the 
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village becomes an entry in the lists of communities in need of water service 
rehabilitation.  Districts can request a budget during the following fiscal year to 
rehabilitate these systems, but according to one of the district Water engineers 
interviewed, only about one-tenth of the funds requested are approved each year in the 
national budget.  
The only way for a district to obtain money for replacements is to have sufficient 
funds in the district water department, non-colored budget, called Other Charges, or to 
receive a grant of funds generated at the local government level from the district council.  
But guidelines discourage utilizing government funds to bail out communities; 
consequently, receiving approval to restore water services is reported as much more 
difficult than receiving approval for new construction or major rehabilitation.  
Several interviewees mentioned the community’s lack of knowledge of the proper 
channels to demand support from the district as a challenge.  Another challenge 
mentioned about community management was the fact that community management 
fades away over time as members of the committee became less and less active or were 
unwilling to take on unpleasant roles such as going house-to-house collecting money 
instead of “be[ing] out attending their crops or carrying out some other more gainful 
work.” 
Community sensitization to create awareness is a driver.  Programs that develop 
the community’s capacity to make appropriate technology choices and financially 
manage a water point are also drivers.  These are usually referred to as “software” 
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activities, in contrast with materials, engineering, and labor costs, or “hardware” 
activities. 
Most interviewees attributed a lack of funding for software activities as a 
challenge, and blamed donors, who either directly or through basket funds disbursed by 
the national government tended to allocate money toward hardware, costs easier to track.  
These comments imply donors have a large control on the government budget allocation 
decisions.  In the interviews, this is also referred to as too much emphasis on projects 
instead of services, and counting beneficiaries reached each year instead of focusing on 
sustainability of services. 
A driver reported by several interviewees was to transform the Water Fund into a 
micro-credit revolving fund, which appears to work well in a community where strong 
leadership either existed or was developed with appropriate capacity development 
programs.  Most rural areas do not enjoy any form of bank services and are not offered 
micro-credit opportunities.  These revolving funds allow residents who contribute to the 
water fund regularly to borrow small amounts of money to initiate businesses and return 
it with a small interest.  The funds allow the Water Fund to grow much faster, both 
because it offers an incentive for regular contributions and because of the interest 
accumulated. 
Choice of Technology 
Linked both to a lack of capacity in the communities and national government and 
donor funding mechanisms is the theme of inappropriate choice of technology, which 
emerged in several interviews.  It often emerged in association with the decrease of 
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surface water due to climatic changes.  In principle, gravity schemes are the option that 
can serve the largest population with the smallest operating costs and low maintenance 
skills, but they require high capital investments.  Motorized pumping schemes service 
smaller populations and require higher maintenance skills, including procurement of 
spare parts and significant capital costs, especially if solar technology is employed, or 
very high operation costs if generators are used to power the pump.  Hand-dug shallow 
wells equipped with hand pumps are significantly cheaper, especially if rope pumps, 
which can be manufactured locally, are used.  Few small local NGO working 
independently from large national programs are actively promoting these low-cost 
solutions by providing communities with small capital grants and comprehensive 
capacity developing programs.  
Most stakeholders agree a rural community is not in the position to make an 
informed choice unless sufficient time is spent being educated about each technology's 
pro-and cons, especially the costs associated with it.  According to most people 
interviewed, the final decision is top-down, not only because of the decision-making 
capacity of the community, but because the bearer of the capital costs are either the 
government or the donors, and not only are they constrained by the available budget, but 
by annual budgeting rules forcing a quick cycle of project planning and implementation.  
The timing is further exacerbated by the fact the government role is that of facilitator, not 
implementer.  Time needs to be allocated for design and implementation, usually 
contracted out after a lengthy tendering process.  Since funds not utilized within the fiscal 
year for which they were released are returned to the central government, contractors 
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must work fast if they want to receive full payment; they cannot wait for the community 
to organize and participate in the construction by contributing labor.   
Monitoring 
Both TAWASANET (2010) and the districts compile reports of water 
development progress to provide feedback to the national government.  Yet monitoring 
activities both from NGOs belonging to the network and from government officials 
emerged in the interviews only in the context of not having sufficient funds to carry it 
out.  The regional government, in its role of the link between central government and 
local government should be “explaining the central government policies to the local 
government […is] there to interpret and provide guidance on the policies,” monitor the 
districts and provide guidance through written reports.  It was unclear from the interviews 
if there were any mechanisms to ensure districts comply with the regional 
recommendation.  
Ownership in the National Water Development Process 
By far, the most disturbing finding that emerged from the interviews conducted in 
Tanzania was the lack of ownership stakeholders had in the Water Sector Development 
Program (WDSP).  Half the interviewees referred to the WDSP as the World Bank 
program; most comments about the program were negative, as stakeholders complained 
the rules dictated by the programs were inadequate, either in terms of selection of 
intervention, technology emphasis, budget release mechanisms, duplications of efforts, or 
squandering of existing successful programs.  The failure of the first phase of the ten-year 
plan was substantiated by the findings of a 2.5-year WDSP review and by the Joint 
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Supervision Mission carried out in April 2010 by the World Bank and the Development 
Partners.  In the word of one interviewee working closely with the program, “last year” 
after the first five-year phase of the $1.2 billion program,  
during the Water Sector Review […], the Minister of Water and Environment 
announced that the biggest achievements have been that all district council have 
been equipped with their own cars, with computers and their offices have been 
refurbished. And more than half of the money had been spent, but no single drop 
of water has been flowing yet. (TZ-NGO 1) 
 
Some interviewees complained about corruption in the government ranks, but some of 
the expenses were justified by the bureaucratic requirements of the program, including 
payments of international consultants responsible for planning. 
During Phase 1, rural intervention focused on the Quick Wins program in which 
each district was supposed to select ten villages based on need and proceed with the 
implementation of low budget projects, which would result in an immediate impact.  The 
district role was to identify ten of the poorest communities in need of water improvement, 
and tendered the planning stage to external consultants, following the World Bank 
regulations.  As quoted in an interview “it seems these consultancies, they went to the 
village communities and told them what do you want, a water pump or a piped scheme… 
do you like a bicycle or a Mercedes Benz?  So the unit costs exploded.  And actually [the 
district] could not afford” to implement the plan within the program budget (TZ-NGO 1).   
Some districts that had already developed district-wide plans, working directly 
with development partners, were forced to abandon them, as the development partners 
joined the Sector Wide Approach and decided to contribute through the WSDP basket 
funds.  The WSDP regulations required planning to be repeated through the external 
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consultant; new rules of implementation required all work be contracted to the private 
sector, which was required to finish the work within the specified timelines under 
contract.  Therefore, employed laborers did the work instead of required community 
participators providing free labor.  This created attrition between neighboring 
communities, as villages included in the Quick Wins were paid for the labor and others, 
part of previous district-led development had not been paid.  Districts officials were 
accused of “eating the money” supposed to go to those village laborers.  The local 
stakeholders’ lack of ownership and frustration with the WSDP was best expressed with 
their words directly quoted from the interview transcripts. 
Question: What do you see as the biggest challenge you face to bring water to 
communities? 
Of course for the time being the major challenge is the Water Sector Development 
Program.  Instead of funding our projects according to the phases which have 
already been established…. it is a challenge. Furthermore if you construct these 
small Quick Win projects the impact will not be seen. You take a huge area, like 
one with 30 villages, than the impact will be seen, but if you work in these small 
area then you skip a bunch of villages and do a project in this other not connected 
area… It is very difficult even to have a common understanding of the people 
about how to pay for water bills. Because for instance now some projects are 
metered [previous implementations] and some projects are not metered [WSDP]. 
So why one village pay less money as they pay a flat rate and some other villages 
pay more with a metered rate?  That is why we asked if we could use the WSDP 
to continue our plan. In an area with about 13 villages, [there] is a registered 
private entity [that] manages the main water sources in […] the district council 
and their main pipeline goes by those villages and feeds our communities there. 
Now there is a crisis because most of the neighboring villages are not metered. So 
why those ones managed by [the water entity] are metered? 
Another challenge of this Quick Wins program is that there might be 2-3 
villages upstream and the water source is in the forest so the pipe goes to the 
downstream villages which have been selected to get water, but does not provide 
any water to the village upstream which see the pipe going through the village. 
The way they have instructed us is to revise the design period and make sure we 
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use the cheapest material to construct the system. There goes sustainability. Many 
of the rules of WSDP makes no sense.  Like for these water source which skip 
villages we are supposed to design using a small pipe diameter as we do not need 
a large quantity of water for these villages. Yet if you later try to branch off to 
reach some of the villages which have been left out you have to replace entire 
sections of pipes because the one used originally are too small. Very poor 
planning. They say design according to the population that you have right now. 
(TZ-Government 1) 
 
With these Quick Wins project we did not have any element of 
management. Now, this is where the problems come from.  Funds are there for 
infrastructure. No funds to train. No fund to create Water User Entities. And no 
funds are allocated to do O&M. this is a big problem.  (TZ-Government 2) 
 
 
Is it not possible for districts to request funds for O&M?  
This was just a special program, no district had anything to say. The program was 
decided at the national level. The ministry decided we provide money for 
infrastucture; and whenever we come to request money for management or 
capacity building the ministry reply that decisions have been made and they are 
not able to change the plans. So there is nowhere to get money. That was the first 
of the problem. We implemented a lot of projects in the region; especially for 
[this region] we went for about 110 projects which were rehabilitation and few 
which were new construction. But no capacity building, no management 
strenghtening. As I am talking now, we already have some of those projects 
which are not functioning. Last year we were trying to pass in the community and 
in the villages to see how the projects are doing, but there are such serious 
problem, because communities are not contributing, they are not even aware that 
they are the owners of the projects. When we asked the district why is it like that, 
they respond we have no funds. We do know we need to sensitize the 
communities to at least register the user entities, but we do not have funds. This is 
a very serious issue. (TZ-Government 2) 
 
The World Bank project is crazy and indeed I expect the project will be 
abandoned. The flow of cash from the World Bank is not coming. the plan called 
for 10 villages/district in the first 3 years. But the money was not available, so 
only 2-3 villages every district. (TZ-NGO 3) 
 
We had a problem with shortage of funds For example the World Bank promised 
to assist, the project started in 2006, but it is not going forward Last year we were 
approved for 1 billion Tsh, but we received only 200 million only. (TZ-
Government 3) 
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The problem with the non-release of funds lies with the fact that the World Bank 
and the Developing Partners were not satisfied with the reporting procedure used by the 
Tanzanian government.  They requested the government adopt a different reporting 
method for which the local government is not set up.  The freezing of the funds after the 
government had signed contracts with consultants and contractors created an impasse in 
which every stakeholder blamed the other.  The WSDP is also criticized for the choice of 
technology “they are emphasizing the construction of new infrastructure, forgetting about 
reviving the functionality of existing systems, they are going for high tech.  I have seen a 
paper saying NO HAND PUMPS.  Motorized pumps and piped scheme projects” (TZ-
NGO 2). 
It is important to remember that the failure of the WSDP can only be responsible 
for the lack of improvement since 2005, while lack of progress in starting rural water 
development has been a problem since 1990 when privatization and decentralization 
pressure began to change the status quo.  Still, the picture emerging from the interviews 
is that the national government and the International Developing Partners decided to 
adopt a new approach not based on the local existing resources, creating new bureaucracy 
and forcing external rules on the district government. 
Stakeholder Interview Analysis: Uganda Rural Water Development 
Awareness of Governance 
Community awareness of their role is recognized as a challenge in Uganda as 
well, particularly in the Northern districts where the war forced most of the population 
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into refugee camps and everything was provided to them free of cost and responsibility.  
Although it is recognized as a challenge, more often it is mentioned in the context of 
describing the sensitization activities recognized in all the stakeholder interviews as an 
important driver for rural water development.  None of the interviewees complained 
about the complexity of the policy, described by all interviewees in identical and clear 
terms. 
Demand-driven Approach 
According to the interviewees, sensitization and mobilization campaigns were the 
bulk of the activity at all government levels.  Sub-county health officers and community 
development officers are the first level interfacing with a community; they organize 
meetings in the villages where the priorities of the community are discussed.  If water is a 
high priority, the community is educated on the requirements for obtaining a water 
improvement project.  There are six critical requirements to which a community needs to 
commit to receive services.  The first requirement is that the community compile an 
application expressing their demand for assistance and accompany the application with a 
contribution toward capital expenses, regulated by guidelines on different technology 
options; the community contribution for a protected spring is about 45,000 Ugx (20 
USD), for a shallow well is 90,000 Ugx (40 USD), and for a deep borehole is 200,000 
Ugx (87 USD).  The above contributions are about 0.02% of the implementation costs, 
and they just represent a sense of ownership without representing an unaffordable 
financial burden.   
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The implementation work is tendered to the private sector, which is responsible 
for O&M of the facilities for the first six months of operation.  The second requirement is 
that all land disputes are settled by the community on the land where the facility is going 
to be installed.  The third and fourth requirements are the formation of a village Water 
Committee composed by at least 50% women who must be elected in positions of 
responsibility, such as the chairperson, the treasurer, or the secretary.  A sanitation 
improvement is the fifth requirement; 100% of the community leaders must build a 
latrine and the rest of the community must increase the number of existing latrines by 
30%.  The sixth requirement is that the community develops a three-year action plan for 
operation and maintenance of the facility.  
The districts actively monitor the sub-county work and cover the expenses of 
community mobilization.  Central government guidelines require that 8% of the water 
department budget is spent on these software activities.  The sensitization activities 
carried out by the local government is also complemented by the work of local NGOs 
that follow the same training method recommended by government guidelines because 
“there is no reason to reinvent the wheel” (UG-NGO 1).  This implementation of the 
demand-driven prescription is hindered by interference of politicians who use their 
influence to have water coverage in certain areas in exchange for votes, creating 
communities that will receive water without a firm commitment to owing the O&M of 
the water points. 
Some local NGOs try to capitalize on this challenge, by training the community in 
exploiting electoral time leverage, “no water, no vote,” through lobbying and advocacy 
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techniques.  The core of these initiatives is to sensitize the community “about [the fact 
that] water as a right to them,[…] and who has the duty to provide, whom they have to go 
to demand these services,[who] is the budget holder, who control this, who makes the 
decisions, this one decision is more binding than the decision of this other one” (UG-
NGO 2), sometimes even organizing peaceful demonstrations to receive water services, 
as access to water is felt as a right.   
Post-construction and Cost Recovery 
Despite much more emphasis on and funds poured into community mobilization, 
Ugandan stakeholders also reported community willingness and the capacity to manage 
their facilities as one of the biggest challenges.  After a short time, only two or three of 
the water committee members were active; some stakeholders mentioned the fact that it 
was unrealistic to ask a few household members to carry such a responsibility unpaid.  
Just as in Tanzania, villagers were hesitant to pay into the water O&M fund, as they did 
not trust the people managing the funds.  A recent approach under experimentation is to 
involve the village government level in arbitrating and regulating the by-laws and 
Memorandum of Understanding between the various members; the involvement of the 
lower government level allows the establishment of small fines for members of the 
committee who fail to attend to their responsibilities. 
The government encourages monthly payments instead of per buckets fees, as the 
human resource required for this latter option makes the price of water much higher.  But 
most stakeholders report that sooner or later, the water funds are insufficient to care for 
O&M replacement costs, and further involvement by government and NGO are required 
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to make the system work.  Government guidelines set a monetary threshold of 300,000 
Ugx (130 USD) for a community of fewer than one hundred households; the district is 
responsible for replacement costs above the thresholds with funds coming from the 11% 
of the yearly budget dedicated to O&M expenses.  Repairs below 300,000 Ugx are the 
responsibility of the community and assistance requests are handled by sending staff to 
meet with the community, repeating some of the sensitization and mobilization steps until 
the community manages to re-organize and collect the money for the repairs.  Proactive 
field monitoring at the sub-country, district, and national levels provides a mechanism to 
educate the community on the available channels to request assistance.  Some NGOs 
stressed the importance of creating relationships between a community and their local 
government and slowing down the execution speed of the program going through the 
government channels, allowing sub-county and district representatives for the area to be 
the faces of the project. 
To facilitate the communities in carrying on the repair and acquiring spare parts, 
the government, with the collaboration of local NGO, set up a network of hand pump 
technicians, whose work was monitored by the borehole maintenance units from the 
districts’ water departments.  The hand pump mechanics were trained to provide regular 
maintenance and troubleshoot problems with hand pumps.  They received payments 
directly from the communities and were supposed to report to the borehole units if a 
repair was above their level of competence or the financial status of the community water 
funds.  The hand pump mechanics do not have enough work to make a living just 
servicing hand pumps; a problem often reported is that they overcharge the community, 
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or even vandalize a pump to sell parts or simply to charge the community for work not 
needed.  Districts recognize the challenge and try to monitor the hand pump mechanics’ 
trustworthiness through their borehole support units, with an uneven rate of success; 
recently, some districts tried to address the problem by creating guilds and associations of 
hand pump mechanics. 
Unlike in the Tanzanian case, in Uganda, there were no discrepancies in any of 
the interviewee descriptions of the guidelines regulating roles and responsibilities of the 
various stakeholders for operation and maintenance of water points.  It must be noted that 
the fact that the choice of technologies is restricted to protected springs, boreholes, and 
shallow wells with standardized hand pumps contributes to significantly simplifying the 
interaction between stakeholders. 
Also in Uganda, revolving funds have been set up to encourage community 
contributions; loans from the water funds have different interest rates depending on the 
borrower contributions into the water fund.  Even more communities are encouraged to 
pool their water funds together and borrow from one another when repairs are needed, 
almost creating sinking funds for multiple water points.    
Choice of Technology 
Choice of technology for rural development is dictated by the 1999 water policy 
to the detail level of the brand of hand pumps.  The only mention of technology choice 
during the Ugandan interviews was related to the ongoing efforts to integrate multiple 
technologies to face the challenges posed by climate change.  Several districts in Uganda 
are already water stressed.  Rainfall patterns have become very unpredictable, and over 
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pumping without allowing for well recharging times require a more creative policy 
approach.  In particular, rainwater harvesting is not well integrated in the policy; small 
households’ rainwater harvesting tanks, 150-3000 L, are much diffused as they are more 
affordable than larger ones and might be sufficient to satisfy a household’s water 
demands.  Yet water tanks below 6000 L are not recognized by the policy as a water 
source.  This exacerbates the reported problem of water re-selling in urban and peri-urban 
areas.  The Ugandan government regulates water prices by source and district, imposing a 
maximum price that can be charged per unit to recover the costs of operating and 
maintaining water systems.  These smaller water harvesting systems fall below the radar 
of government control. 
Monitoring 
Eight Technical Support Units (TSU) (Government of Uganda 2000) composed of 
engineers, health officers, and development specialists monitor the districts activities in 
addition to providing advice and compiling reports for the Ministry.  The TSU staff spend 
four days a week traveling to the field and are able to monitor each of the districts 
assigned to each staff member multiple times every quarter.  The TSU were introduced in 
2002 to monitor the district utilization of the large conditional grants they were receiving 
for water improvements.  
Ownership in the National Water Development Process 
Unlike Tanzania, the Ugandan interviewees clearly expressed the feelings of 
national responsibility to guarantee the right to water to all citizens.  The central 
government is holding the responsibility for allocating the water budget.  Foreign 
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interference was not mentioned during interviews.  The World Bank was hardly 
mentioned by any of the stakeholders, even if a portion of the national water budget is 
provided by International Developing Partners, including the World Bank.  
Harmonization of the NGO activities is strongly felt and strong attempts are made to 
regulate it.  NGOs operating in the water sector are required to disclose their plans and 
budgets to the districts in which they operate to allow optimized planning of the 
combined budget and minimize duplication.  Although international NGOs’ failure to 
comply with these requirements is tolerated, almost all national NGOs are abiding by it.  
UWASANET is responsible for reporting on the activities of all NGOs operating in the 
water sector, including their budgets. 
Case Study, Tanzania: The Ngelenge Water Distribution System 
Ngelenge is a village of about 2,200 residents (about 350 households) located in 
southwestern Tanzania, very close to the shore of Lake Nyassa, in the Ruhuhu ward, 
Ludewa district (see figure 13).  The village is a composed of four adjacent sub-villages 
(Kivukoni, CCM, Maguland, and Shuleni) and an agricultural area (Faulkland) about a 
forty-minute walk away from the main village.  The residents’ livelihoods are mainly 
based on subsistence agriculture and fishing.  According to a socio-economic household 
survey carried out in 2010, the average monetary income in households of four to five 
members is $30/month.  The Ngelenge Development Association (NGEDEA), started by 
a group of village residents in 2001 with the goal of improving the living condition of 
Ngelenge residents, formed a partnership with Engineers Without Borders (EWB), San 
Francisco Professional Chapter in 2005.   
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Figure 13. The village of CCM, with the Ruhuhu river delta and lake Nyassa. 
The EWB mission is to support community-driven development programs 
worldwide by collaborating with local partners to design and implement sustainable 
engineering projects while creating transformative experiences and responsible leaders.  
During the initial site visit (2005-2006), an economic assessment of the community and 
development priorities were established with participatory workshops.  The main priority 
identified by the villagers and NGEDEA during this time was the need for a health 
dispensary; seed funding was provided by EWB and TASAF (Tanzanian Social Action 
Funds) for construction of a health dispensary, which was completed and staffed in 2009.  
The second priority was identified as improvement to their clean water access.  The 2,200 
residents in Ngelenge fetched water from three wells equipped with hand pumps.  Most 
households were further away than the 400 m defining the basic service level in the 
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national water policy, but not exceeding the 1.5 km distance, which qualifies water 
services in Uganda.  The wells were constructed by Concern International in 1997.  At 
the time of the first EWB assessment, village residents claimed only one of them had a 
consistent supply of clean water.   
 
Figure 14. Bucket lined up at the CCM well. 
 
To improve the community's access to water, EWB proposed the construction of a 
water distribution system designed to provide a maximum of 20 L per person per day of 
potable water to the residents of Ngelenge.  Water is distributed through a piped network 
with eighteen water access points distributed across a 5 km
2
 area, fed by gravity from a 
15,000-gallon tank filled with water pumped from a deep borehole.  Power to the system 
is provided by a 1.2 kW solar array, as the village is about 100 km away from the closest 
electrical grid.   
The system was very similar, albeit much larger, to a system installed in the 
neighboring village of Nsungu by a German NGO, designed to bring water to a division 
health center, elementary school, the Ward Police Station, and the Manda Catholic 
Mission.  Technical work on the system began in 2005 with a hydrogeological survey 
that identified potential locations for a well with sufficient yield to satisfy a minimal 
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requirement of 20 L/household/day.  Between the 2006 trip and the 2008 trip, EWB 
initiated several discussions with villagers regarding planning, design, construction, and 
long-term operations and maintenance needs for a sustainable, pumped water distribution 
system.  The district government was informed of the plans but did not participated in the 
discussion and did not provided advice nor requirement for coordination.   
Topics discussed with NGEDEA, village leaders, and community members 
covered village roles prior to and during construction; ownership, management, 
maintenance, and funds.  Specifically, residents were asked to contribute to capital 
expenses by raising 3,000,000 Tsh ($6.5/household), provide free labor for excavation 
and other unskilled work, form a Water User Committee and agree on a Water 
Constitution to regulate O&M of the system, and take full responsibility for O&M, 
including the financial costs with a monthly contribution of 6000 Tsh/year 
($4.5/household).  The cost for O&M was a rough estimate at this point as the design of 
the system had not been completed. 
Upon village approval of the plans, the implementation started in 2006 when three 
wells were drilled, as the first two locations did not yield sufficient water for the water 
distribution system.  One well was identified as suitable for installation of a powered 
pump, the other two were equipped with hand pumps.  The community formed two new 
water committees to take care of the new wells.  During the 2006 trip, an elevation survey 
was performed to identify appropriate locations for storage tank, water lines, and the 
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location of the distribution system tap stands
2
; terms were decided in consultation with 
members of the village government.  The final design and budget of the water 
distribution system was completed in 2007 and sent to the community for approval in 
early 2008, with a letter reminding the community of their commitment to raise 
1,000,000 Tsh before construction began, and the remaining 3,000,000 Tsh during the 
implementation, to contribute labor and locally available materials and to establish a 
water management structure responsible for O&M of the system according to a water 
constitution approved by the whole community.  Communication with the village was 
handled by a representative of NGEDEA, which reported that the contribution had been 
collected and the community was looking forward to beginning the construction of the 
system and the preparation of the management structure.  EWB began construction in the 
summer of 2008; the system was completed in 2009. 
Excessive sand infiltration in the well caused an excessive load onto the pump.  
By February 2010, the pump had stopped working.  It was under warranty; therefore, the 
vendor sent the village a replacement pump in late spring 2010.  Since the village 
technician did not have a controller to reset the shutoff pressure thresholds, the pump 
could not be set up until EWB arrived in the village in June 2010.  The pump vendor 
informed us that since the cause of the pump failure was excessive sand infiltration in the 
wells, it was not included in the warranty; therefore, they would not provide any other 
replacement. 
                                                        
2
 A tap stand is water point in a distribution system, i.e., a water point that is not a dug hole or a well 
with a pump.  Basically it is a faucet to open and water flows out. 
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Working with the village water technicians, EWB attempted to redevelop the well 
in 2010, but could not reduce the sand infiltration, and after a few months of operation, 
the pump failed again.  In June 2011, EWB dug a new well with an improved filter pack 
and purchased a new pump.  The system has been functioning without major technical 
issues since August 2011. 
Demand-driven Approach, Awareness of Policies, and Representation 
The first team of EWB volunteers reached the village in early July 2008 with the 
belief that the community had a strong desire for and was committed to the 
implementation of a water distribution system such as the one in the neighboring 
community of Nsungu.  The 2008 implementation trip plan consisted both of hardware 
and software activities.  EWB prepared a construction work plan, purchased materials to 
build the system water tank, and created the distribution network to the first two water 
points.  Guidelines from the Tanzanian Ministry of Water and the Environment were 
brought to the village to establish a managing committee and prepare a Water 
Constitution and a Rules and Regulation management plan for the operation of the water 
system.    
The events of the summer of 2008 lead to questioning the community’s desire and 
commitment and exposed the challenge faced by an external agency such as EWB to 
translate in practice the principles of demand-driven development.  Additionally, it 
revealed the lag between the 2002 water policy and its actual diffusion.  Upon EWB 
arrival in the village, a first meeting with the village government officials and members 
of NGEDEA was organized to discuss plans moving forward.  EWB presented the 
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construction work plan for the summer, highlighting the village contributions of labor 
and local materials; presented the government guidelines to ratify a village-based 
governance model; and requested a report on the 1,000,000 Tsh community buy-in 
contribution.  Based on communication with NGEDEA representatives, EWB was 
operating under the assumptions the community wanted and was supportive of the 
project.  While the people attending the meeting reiterated the village desire and 
commitment, by the end of the meeting, it was clear the situation on the ground did not 
coincide with the communication received in the previous months by EWB.  The village 
government reported that not all the 1,000,000 Tsh was available as the collection was 
still under way, and they could not provide specific information on the amount collected. 
They did promise to mobilize the community to begin the work and quickly 
elected a committee to work on the formulation of a Water Constitution and a Rules and 
Regulation attachment.  The committee election was a great glimpse into how decisions 
were made by the village government.  The people assembled at the meeting began to 
nominate candidates who were then either affirmed or denied by majority vote.  Within 
15 minutes, the committee was formed.  Several of the people nominated for the task 
were not present at the meeting.  Interestingly, the appointment of the committee came 
much easier than many others, including what would seem to be much simpler decisions 
such as where to store bags of concrete.  Such a nomination process raised doubts that the 
elected members felt invested in the work in which they were required to participate, 
without even knowing the time commitment they needed to dedicate to the task. 
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Obtaining a report on the status of the financial contribution was extremely 
challenging.  During the first few weeks in Ngelenge, EWB made a number of 
unsuccessful requests for a progress report on the collection of the village contribution to 
capital costs.  The funds had been collected independently by each of the sub-village 
leaders and by the NGEDEA treasurer, and receipts had been kept, but the location and 
exact quantity collected was unclear.  Attempts to call a meeting with all the people 
involved in the collection were unsuccessful. 
The first report on fund generation was made in early August, almost a full month 
after EWB’s initial request and more than two months past the initial deadline.  The total 
amount reported was 338,000 Tsh.  During the initial report, there was some mistrust and 
confusion expressed in relation to the forms created by NGEDEA to assist in money 
collection.  It appears people believed the money was going to NGEDEA instead of the 
water project, motivating their refusal to contribute.   
EWB, with ten volunteers traveling from the U.S. and $450,000 of materials 
already in the village had to make a decision between proceeding and abandoning the 
project.  We convinced ourselves that part of the problem was the capacity of the village 
to sensitize and organize the community and decided to proceed with the planned first 
phase of the implementation, constructing the water tank and trenching for the 
distribution lines.  But we made it clear to the village leadership we would not proceed 
with the purchase of solar panels and pump until the full amount was collected.  
Another report on the fund generation was given at the end of August in a signed 
letter by the village executive officer, the only paid government official in the village. 
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The total contribution reported was 864,000 TSH.  It was found out later that this report 
included goods such as hens, beans, and cassava that had been promised to the project but 
needed to be sold in order for the money to be available.  In a final report on fund 
generation given in early September at a whole village meeting, it was reported that a 
total of 525,000 Tsh had been raised.  The report only included the funds that had been 
physically collected for the project.   
The mobilization of the community labor proved to be just as challenging. 
Despite EWB specific requests to organize labor teams, mostly communicated to 
NGEDEA, few volunteers reported to work.  The question of whether the community’s 
failure to collect the buy-in contribution or participate in the construction work was due 
to a lack of interest in the project was clouded by the constant reaffirmation that 
Ngelenge wanted the water system by the people EWB trusted to be the voice of the 
community.  When EWB began discussing the project with village residents, it became 
clear that most did not really understand the scope of the project or what services it would 
provide.  It was clear that neither NGEDEA, nor the village leaders, had effectively 
communicated the project to the village as a whole.  Construction activities were delayed 
due to a lack of volunteer laborers.  EWB relied on NGEDEA as an interface to the 
community, but clearly NGEDEA did not represent the view of the whole community. 
To bring the average resident up to speed, EWB requested a whole village 
meeting be held to explain the projects and motivate the community.  Unfortunately, 
attendance was not as high as we hoped at these meetings.  Participants arrived at 
different times; at the time of top attendance, the first whole village meeting did have 
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about 170 adults, possibly representing less than 20% of the community. Some of the 
participants reiterated their need for a better water delivery system, but they did not 
appear to be particularly enthusiastic about having to contribute or about the request of 
free labor.  Somehow, by the end of the meeting, the participants agreed to participate in 
the next few months of construction work.   
As worked progressed, it became clear that one of the problems was the lack of a 
leading group mobilizing the community; nobody seemed to have the mandate to 
represent the community.  EWB did not understand which mechanism should be adopted 
to communicate to the residents.  NGEDEA had no authority to ask people to come out 
and provide the labor required for construction, and the village sub-leaders required 
active pressure from the village executive officer to organize groups of laborers.  Work 
proceeded extremely slowly and required that EWB volunteers constantly exert pressure 
to mobilize labor.  By the end of the three-month implementation trip, only the water tank 
had been constructed, with most of the work done by the same few village volunteers.  
Materials for plastering the water tank were left in the village and a village mason was 
paid to complete the work. 
The lack of participation and financial contribution could be interpreted in several 
ways.  The first and most critical was the absence of a need for water improvement.  
Originally the village had three wells equipped with hand pumps, and in 2006, EWB had 
added two more wells, providing water points to the households of the communities 
living further away from the older wells.  Water quality data indicated that four out of the 
five wells’ water was within the WHO standard for safe water of less than 1 E. Coli 
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colony in 10 ml.  Certainly the water distribution system was going to provide better 
coverage, satisfying the National Policy requirement of water access within 400 m of 
each household and serving fewer than 250 people, but perhaps not to the level that 
would motivate households to commit free labor and an additional financial burden.   
In retrospect, I believe the EWB failed to correctly interpret the fact that by 
having added two wells providing a better service to the villages’ outskirts in 2006, water 
was no longer a priority for the community.  All indications pointed to the community 
commitments not supporting statements that water was a priority for the village.  Worst 
of all, these declarations were made by the few village members who spoke English and 
could communicate with the “msungu” (white people), not necessarily by a solid project 
counterpart that had the mandate from the community to negotiate the steps moving 
forward.  Clearly, NGEDEA opinion did not reflect the point of view of the community.  
Furthermore, the community had never been in the position of choosing the technology, 
only EWB was. 
It is easy to talk about what a community needs or thinks as a theoretical concept; 
in reality, a community is a collection of individuals, and each one of them has different 
priorities and views of development.  The effort to understand the compromised solution 
that would benefit the majority of people in a community is not easy for an outsider, 
especially if a community has not elected a person or a group of people to represent it.  
This was the issue EWB decided to confront during the 2009 implementation trip, as it is 
described later. 
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The development of a water constitution and management plan for the distribution 
system was just as important as the technical portion of the project.  The structure and 
content for the constitution and management plan were adapted from a set of documents 
available from the Tanzania Ministry of Water website, prepared in the context of the 
Water Sector Development Program, and included different water source management 
schemes, sample constitutions, and management plans (The United Republic of Tanzania 
2006, Annex 7, 10).  These documents give guidelines for facilitating community 
planning and explain many of the existing structures for water system management in 
Tanzania.  It is worth reporting the comment of one EWB volunteer, who worked two 
years in Mozambique with the Peace Corp and participated to the 2006 assessment trip, 
“it looks like some white bureaucrat who never lived in a village wrote those.” 
EWB had met with the Ludewa district officers every year since the beginning of 
the project in an attempt to coordinate our activities, which practically resulted in a mere 
exchange of information about the status of the project.  During the first week in 
Ngelenge, EWB volunteers traveled to the Ludewa district office to meet with the district 
executive director and the district water engineer to inform them of the summer plans.  
During that meeting, EWB showed them the documents from the Ministry and asked the 
district for guidance facilitating the village committee in the task of organizing an 
effective management structure.  Nobody had ever seen any of the documents from the 
Ministry; they asked to borrow them from EWB to make copies.  
The goal of the constitution was to define the organizational structure that would 
operate and maintain the distribution system along with roles and responsibilities, term 
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limits, election and voting rules, quantity of meetings, etc.  The management plan is a 
separate document defining the expected maintenance costs, money collection, persons 
responsible for maintenance, and rules and regulations.  Despite the existence of five 
village water committees managing the existing water sources, the level of generality of 
the constitution and management plan templates made it difficult for the committee to 
relate.  The majority of the first meeting was spent explaining the purpose of the 
constitution.  During the following meetings, the Swahili sample constitution from the 
Ministry of Water was read, article-by-article, and committee members were prompted to 
discuss whether anything was missing.  As this was the first document like this any of the 
committee members had ever seen, there were very few unprompted comments.  
However, when prompted with a situation the constitution did not do a good job of 
covering, they quickly understood and thought of alternatives to fix the omission.  Also, 
the committee was not familiar with the type of language and structure used in the water 
constitution; for instance the practice of defining the parties, such as “Users,” at the 
beginning of the document and then referring back to them later in the document was 
difficult for them to understand. 
The two topics that created the most animated debates were that of corruption and 
the possible breakdown of the committee.  These were significant concerns, but it was not 
clear what could be written in the constitution to prevent them from happening.  In 
retrospect, the community members involved had foreseen some of the difficulty the 
project was going to face in the years to come.  The final version of the constitution was 
almost identical to the Ministry template; it was subsequently submitted to the village 
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government and the whole village assembly for approval and was approved by both.  
After approval, a conflict arose in which NGEDEA felt that they should have 
representation on the committee.  EWB did not support NGEDEA’s request and 
suggested NGEDEA members candidate themselves for elections according to what was 
stated in the constitutions.  Despite the fact that eventually NGEDEA members were 
elected in the key positions of treasurer and secretary, this created a long-lasting fracture 
between EWB and NGEDEA. 
According to the approved constitution, each of the tap stands providing access to 
water had to be managed by a Water User Group (WUG) composed by six members 
elected from the 10-25 beneficiaries’ households, responsible for operating and collecting 
water tariffs.  An Executive Water Committee (EWC), elected from the members of the 
WUG, was to provide oversight and manage the village water fund created to collect all 
water points’ contributions; none of the entities created by the constitution had a history 
in the village.  While the functions of the WUG were practically identical to that of the 
existing water committees, the fact they were named differently introduced confusion.  
By the time the last EWB volunteer left the village in September 2008, the election of 
these committees had not been carried out.  In summary, the WSDP guidelines were 
ineffective. 
They did not build from the village experience with their water committee and 
were very theoretical, to the point that nobody, neither EWB volunteers nor the 
committee members who reviewed the template, realized that in a village such as 
Ngelenge, to organize a general meeting of 18*6+2 =110 people twice a year was totally 
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unrealistic.  Additionally, the Ministry documents assumed that from day one, all 
involved would carry out their functions without flaws, since there was no mechanism to 
fine tune such a complex and new organization outside of a general meeting.  
The other consideration to be made is that it should not have been EWB's duty, a 
foreign organization with no cultural tie to Tanzanian rural village, to facilitate the 
creation of governance of the water scheme, especially without any support from the 
local and district government.  Yet, it was quite obvious nobody at the district level was 
either knowledgeable enough or responsible enough for such a task, even six years after 
the publication of the national water policy and two years after the publication of the 
WSDP documents. 
The events of 2008 lead EWB to elaborate a new strategy consisting of 
transferring full responsibility for completing the water distribution system to the 
community, offering only funds, technical advice, and training to them but no leadership.  
In early 2009, EWB sent a letter to the village government detailing a proposal aimed at 
having the village take leadership of the project through the Executive Water Committee 
(EWC) that, according to the Water Constitution, was going to hold responsibility for the 
system upon completion.  EWB would return to the village in the summer of 2009 and, 
with the support of NGEDEA, organize a series of trainings to help the EWC understand 
construction, operation, and management tasks required for a successful and sustainable 
project implementation.  Aside from the trainings, EWB volunteers would only act as 
technical consultants.  
  113 
The letter explained how EWB would not set any timeframe for the continuation 
of the project.  It could only move at the pace at which the community was willing to 
move it forward.  EWB also required that the portion of the piping network purchased in 
2008 and stored in the village be installed and the 1,000,000 Tsh contribution be 
collected before purchasing the solar array and the pump and the remaining piping 
network.  For technical reasons, EWB volunteers had to be in the village at least one 
month after installation of the solar pump to provide technical assistance and monitor the 
performance of the system, which challenged the village to complete the requirements by 
July 2009 if the implementation had to be completed before the end of the summer.  
Otherwise, the installation would be scheduled at a later time, most likely after the 2009-
2010 rainy season. 
EWB created the training course based upon the Guide for the Training of Water 
and Sanitation Committees and Water User Entities published by the Tanzanian Ministry 
of Water (The United Republic of Tanzania 2006, Annex 11).  The guide was designed to 
train a facilitator leading a multiple week-long participatory based course to create the 
capacity needed in a community to plan, implement, operate, and maintain a water 
scheme.  EWB recruited as trainer a former Peace Corp volunteer who spent three years 
as a secondary school teacher in a village 50 km away from Ngelenge and asked 
NGEDEA to provide a second facilitator for the training sessions.  With this strategy, 
EWB hoped to address the lack of community participation while fostering the formation 
of the leadership group, which would continue to operate the system upon completion. 
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The proposal was approved by NGEDEA and the village government.  During the 
first meeting between EWB and the village government in 2009, a report was made that 
the collection of the capital contribution had not progress past the 500,000 Tsh; during 
the spring of 2009, the village formed a water user group for each of the water points, and 
they were ready to proceed with the election of the executive water committee. During 
the meeting, it was clear the proposal of transferring responsibility for the system 
construction was met in a positive manner by the village government.  They expressed 
the need for close coordination between the executive committee plans and the village 
political leadership.  The village government stated that each step in the construction 
planning had to be cleared by the village government.  A concern expressed by the 
village government members was that they wanted the executive committee to be 
composed by a villager with a track record of hard work for the community, not people 
just wanting the post to gain public recognition.  A discussion on the topic had already 
being initiated by NGEDEA.  The village had decided to ask the people interested in 
serving in the executive committee to write formal letters of candidacy addressed to the 
village executive officer.  Those letters would serve as a guarantee that candidates 
understood what they were committing to and their statements were binding to their 
commitment.  
A whole village meeting with ninety-seven participants (less than 10% of the 
adult residents) was held on short notice; the meeting was largely conducted by the 
village authority and NGEDEA.  The first argument to be addressed was the need to 
restart the collection of the village capital contribution to the construction of the water 
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system.  Although the total amount already collected was not explicitly mentioned, the 
villagers were reminded that each sub-village chairman had a list of names, amounts, and 
collection dates.  People from the audience complained that records were not kept 
properly; they were reminded that making sure contribution records were well kept was 
the people’s responsibility as much as the collector's, since signed receipts were given to 
both parties with the amount and date and everybody's signatures.  After a brief debate, it 
was decided collection should be restarted as soon as possible because people just 
finished harvesting so they had money (or rice) available to pay.  People from the 
audience had very strong opinions on how to enforce collection – analogies were made 
between people not contributing and kids skipping school, and how the latter gets beaten.  
Villagers suggested the village government set harsh consequences for people delinquent 
on their contribution and there was strong agreement in the audience.  
NGEDEA explained the EWB proposal of having a village elected executive 
water committee (EWC) managing the construction of the water distribution system.  The 
village authority stressed the importance of electing committed community members and 
therefore, encouraged everybody to participate in the selection process so the whole 
village was involved and everybody’s opinion was heard.  The village leaders declared 
the elected members of the committee would be held accountable for their commitment 
by the village authority.  A member of the audience asked if EWC members could be 
picked outside of the members of the WUG.  An NGEDEA representative who 
participated the year before on the preparation of the constitution – holding a copy in his 
hands – reminded the audience that the constitution clearly stated only water point 
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committee members could be considered for a post in the EWC.  He added, the 
constitution was read in front of the whole village and approved by the whole village.  He 
also pointed out he had warned everybody to pick active people for their tap stand 
committee as the EWC was going to be elected from those. 
The leadership also requested voluntary labor to restart construction at the tank 
the next day.  Specifically, he requested every villager take three buckets of sand and 
each woman take three buckets of water to the tank so the masons could begin plastering 
to speed up construction while the election and training of the committee was completed.  
This work was left for the community to complete and paid for in full at the end of the 
previous summer's implementation trip. 
EWB’s disappointment at the realization that none of the work left for the 
community to complete was mitigated by the realization the community had discussed 
and elected the various tap stand WUGs, and they seemed excited by the new course of 
events.  Ten percent of the village residents who participated in the meeting seemed to 
really look forward to continued construction.   
By the time the meeting to elect the EWC was held, about eighteen letters of 
candidacy had been received by the village authority.  About forty people were present at 
the meeting, with about 30% of the water point committee members with voting rights 
present; at least one representative from each water point was there.  The election was 
carried out in a very structured and fair manner with two exceptions.  The elected 
chairman of the EWC was not entitled to assume that role by the constitution, which 
clearly stated no member of the village government could be elected.  His appointment 
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was well seen by many people, including EWB, since he had been active in all 
development projects carried out in the community.  A decision was made that he would 
resign the other post.  The man elected as treasurer was not present at the meeting, neither 
was he informed of what was going on in the village as he was in Dar Es Salaam for 
some family issue.  There was no doubt that most people wanted him to be the treasurer 
because of his track record for honesty as a village ward and NGEDEA treasurer.  
Another member of NGEDEA acted as the missing man throughout the meeting, 
including mimicking his posture and his personality to the amusement of the whole 
assembly.    
The first training meeting, which lasted over eight hours, started relatively on time 
and was attended by all the elected EWC members plus about five community leaders.  
The training was a shortened version of the Ministry guide and covered objectives, roles, 
and responsibilities of the committee members, discussed in depth and related to events 
from past community projects analyzed thoroughly in terms of obstacles and solutions.  
Mobilization of the community created a lively discussion when EWB volunteers were 
asked to describe mobilization tools used in United States.  Additionally, a breakout of all 
remaining construction steps and technical details of the water systems were discussed.  
The project's full budget was reviewed at the end of the meeting and the astronomical 
costs of over 110,000,000 Tsh was pointed out to all the members to make them aware of 
the big responsibility they had accepted. 
The series of meetings following the first one departed from the Ministry script, 
as it was realized there was limited value in the theoretical streamlining of ideal 
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situations.  It seemed to make more sense to point out concepts in the context of the work 
being done in the village.  Only about two-thirds of the EWC members were ever present, 
but two villagers who had been appointed as water technicians started attending 
regularly, and occasionally masons and other active villagers would join.  The meetings 
were led by the EWC chairman, and opened with a review of the last action plan made 
and a discussion on obstacles and opportunities.  During the second meeting, all O&M 
costs were detailed and reviewed, and the committee was asked to set the water tariffs.  
They decided that 600 Tsh/household/month was a reasonable compromise between 
affordability and cost recovery.  The water tariff chosen corresponded to about one-third 
of the estimated full-recovery costs.  The path to make the decision on the tariffs was 
interesting.  Africans have the capacity of coming to a common agreement by 
compromising.  The other interesting note was that everybody sitting at a meeting would 
have the same weight on the decision as the appointed decision makers.  
Construction work proceeded at a moderate rate.  The EWC did its best to 
organize laborers for trenching the main inlet line and the path leading to the first two 
water points; they mobilized the community through the sub-village leaders, with an 
alternate outcome.  About eight to nine people would trench a few hours every day.  
Some villagers chose to pay the members of the EWC to trench for them.  After the 
trenching was completed, the EWC requested the VEO send letters to the whole village 
to come out for a work day to lay the pipe, specifically requesting men to lay the pipes, 
women to back-fill the trenches, and elders to bring food for the laborers.  About 200 
laborers turned out the next day; the EWC and EWB volunteers struggled to coordinate 
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the crowd, but somehow the whole piping network was laid in a single day.  At the end of 
the day, the village celebrated with copious amounts of locally brewed beer.  
 
Figure 15. Laying PE pipes in Ngelenge. 
The change compared to the previous year was profound.  It was clear to the 
EWB volunteers that somehow the community had found the right formula to mobilize, 
based on a new leadership group, the EWC, working in coordination with the existing 
power structure, the village executive officers and the sub-village leaders.  Despite few 
setbacks, the project continued to move forward much faster than EWB volunteers had 
expected.  
The same success in organizing construction was observed in completing the 
collection of the buy-in contribution, despite the latter turning out to be a labor intensive 
and frustrating job.  The first step consisted of transferring the cash, records, and receipts 
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collected by the sub-village leaders to the EWC treasurer, which also had collected some 
of the contribution by villagers who did not trust the sub-villager leaders.  When the 
process started, the NGEDEA treasurer was still out of town.  Several attempts to 
schedule a meeting with all sub-village leaders were unsuccessful.  In all honesty, 
without the pressure exerted by the EWB presence in the village, I do not believe the 
EWC would have been successful in taking control of the water fund.   
The main reason the sub-village leaders delayed the meeting was they had not 
been given enough time to prepare for the meeting; the reality was they had invested part 
or all the money into some personal business and needed time to disinvest.  Eventually, it 
was decided to hold a separate meeting.  At each of the meetings the EWC added up each 
of the sub-village receipts presented by the leader and requested the full sum to be 
transferred.  At that point, the sub-village leaders presented a list of expenditures related 
to the previous year's project which had been paid without anybody's approval, and a 
discussion ensued on the validity of each item, which included things like a pen or a meal 
during a workday.  Once consensus was reached over acceptable expenses, the money 
was transferred and recorded in the EWC ledger book.   
Within a few weeks’ time, most of the money collected by the sub-village leaders 
and most of the receipt forms had been transferred; some funds and receipts continued to 
surface throughout the whole summer, considerably complicating EWB’s efforts to verify 
the total sum collected.  A list of all households supposed to contribute had never been 
compiled, although the two members of the village government had made a decision 
about which households were too poor to participate to the contribution.  With the 
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collection receipts on hand, the EWC proceeded to go house-to-house requesting 
contributions.  At each stop, the forms were searched for the name of the household head, 
and a balance payment was requested.  Few households declared to have already 
contributed, but receipts were not available; all those claims were verified without 
discussion with the sub-village leaders who supposedly had collected the sum.  Some of 
the missing receipt forms surfaced at a later time.  It was quite a confusing process and 
despite multiple attempts to total the contributions, the amount kept changing in both 
directions.  Most payments were done with rice, maize, hens, or ducks, which made the 
accounting very complicated.  Some of the households refused to contribute stating they 
were too poor to afford such a high payment.  I accompanied the EWC during this task 
filling in the treasurer’s role, who had not yet returned from Dar Es Salaam to collect the 
6000 Tsh ($5) contribution, about the price of a plastic bucket.  It felt like stealing from 
those who had nothing. 
Once the NGEDEA treasurer returned, EWB asked him several times to confirm 
that he had all the cash that had been recorded in the receipt forms, as the fact that receipt 
forms arriving at different times kept the total changing.  Each time, he would reply, 
“yes, that is the amount I have.”  Eventually, it became clear he had not kept a separate 
record of NGEDEA funds, EWC funds, and his family money.  
Eventually, EWB asked him to bring out all the money he should have had 
according to the receipts and count them to prove that the 1,000,000 Tsh had been 
collected.  Thanks to a personal donation from the district executive director and the 
district council Chairman of about 200,000 Tsh, which made up the difference between 
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money the sub-village leaders or the NGEDEA treasurer already spent for the project and 
the one in possession of the treasurer, he proved the first tranche of the collection was 
completed.  
   
Figure 16. The 1,000,000Tsh village contribution to capital costs. 
 
Once the 1,000,000 Tsh was collected, the EWC declared it was going to continue 
the collection until the full 3,000,000 Tsh was collected.  EWB decided to pull back from 
policing the collection of the additional 2,000,000 Tsh.  By mid-August, the pump and 
solar array were installed and water flowed to the first two tap stands; excitement was 
high in the village.  
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Figure 17. Installation of the solar array. 
 
Usually EWB implementation trips did not extend to the fall, but we agreed to the 
EWC request to complete the piping network and remaining tap stands.  EWB extended 
the implementation trip to the end of October, purchased the additional materials, and 
provided assistance to the community as it completed the system.  The full system was 
completed and operational by November 2009.   
Cost Recovery and Management of O&M 
The difficulties observed in the collection of the village contribution, in terms of 
willingness to contribute, capacity to handle financial records, and ability to avoid 
misappropriation, gave EWB a small glimpse of the challenges the village would face 
managing the post construction phase.  How labor intensive it had been to collect 6000 
Tsh/household over more than a three-year period raised doubts about the ability of EWC 
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to collect the 600 Tsh/household/month to contribute to the O&M funds necessary to 
guarantee the long-term sustainability of the system.  Collecting money for the 
maintenance and operation of a water point was not new to the community, which 
organized to manage the five wells.   
In 2009, EWB conducted a survey of the five wells to assess contamination risks, 
such as the condition of the hand pumps, proximity to latrines, cracks in a well’s apron, 
and livestock passing nearby.  The survey was conducted by EWB, and each well 
committee was composed of six members: chairman, treasurer, secretary, technician, and 
two additional members.  None of the wells had fences during the inspection; EWB was 
told that originally the three wells concerned had wooden fences, but after several years, 
termites had eaten through the wood and the fences were destroyed; they were never 
rebuilt.  Without the fences, livestock was free to get close to the wells, and that 
introduced the risk of fecal contamination.  Worse yet, at several wells, the drainage 
ditches had been purposefully widened for cattle to drink from.  
During the survey, EWB interviewed the well committee to understand how it 
managed the wells.  We were told that in theory, the well committees collect funds for 
each of the wells’ maintenance.  The yearly contribution per family is about 500 Tsh.  
The treasurer of each committee should deposit the collected amount in a bank account 
opened at the closest bank in the district town of Ludewa, a four-hour, 8000 Tsh, bus ride 
from the village.  The committees reported they had 260,000 Tsh in the bank account, 
which had not been touched in many years, mainly because of how difficult and 
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expensive it is to access those funds.  In practice, the committee mobilizes only when one 
of the pumps breaks; at that point, it collects funds for repairs. 
The community is unable to purchase original replacement parts for the wells; 
original parts are quite expensive and a distribution chain for spare parts is nonexistent.  
Parts need to be purchased in Dar Es Salaam and somehow shipped by bus.  The bus trip 
to the closest bus stop takes two full days and is managed by two different bus 
companies, so somebody in the town of Songea needs to pick up the part from one 
company and take it to the other one.  A local black market for parts is also available; the 
parts are mainly salvaged from pumps that are not functional or worse, are purposely 
vandalized for the parts.  Inspection of each of the hand pumps revealed missing or 
modified part, typically sleeve bearings and one or two of four bolts or nuts that attach 
the base, clamping the sanitary seal.  The hand pump in the worst condition, on the 
Maguland well, had a hole in its body plugged by a piece of cloth fixed by strips of 
rubber.  The water of that well was found unsafe to drink, containing more than 1 E. coli 
colony/10 ml, but villagers usually do not collect drinking water from that well because 
the water is dark and oily.  Water quality tests conducted on the other wells, with a 10 ml 
presence/absence test kit, proved that despite missing seals and potentially open 
contamination channels, four out of five wells provide water considered safe, according 
to the WHO guidelines for water quality.  Despite the flaws noted above, EWB was 
generally pleased with how the community cared for its wells.  All the aprons were 
regularly washed, people removed shoes before stepping on the aprons, and the well 
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technicians cleaned the pump column from the built-up iron bacteria once every three or 
four months.   
For this low-tech water source, the community reactive maintenance model 
proved to be a good compromise for an affordable maintenance model.  The same model 
can hardly be applied to higher technology solutions that have fixed operation costs that 
need to be covered every month and elevated replacement costs that cannot be raised in a 
short time by community contributions.  A comparison between the O&M costs to the 
community of the wells and of the water distribution system is shown in table 9.  
 
Table 9. Ngelenge O&M cost per technology and level of cost recovery  
Variables 
Current 
O&M  
Only Wells 
Minimum O&M 
level Water 
Distribution 
System 
Medium O&M level 
Water Distribution 
System 
Full O&M level 
Water 
Distribution 
System 
Quantity 
of water Unlimited 20L/person/day 20L/person/day 20L/person/day 
Price of 
water    
500Tsh/year 
5.5 Tsh/bucket 8 Tsh/bucket 12 Tsh/bucket 
 800Tsh/month 1,200Tsh/month;  1,800 Tsh/month 
9600 Tsh/year 14,400 Tsh/year 21,600 Tsh/year 
O&M 
level NA 
The system 
lifetime will not 
be extended past 
major component 
lifetime 
The system lifetime 
will be guaranteed 
even if the pump will 
need replacement and 
for most piping 
replacement 
The system 
lifetime will be 
guaranteed as long 
as the community 
continue to pay 
the fees 
Water 
source 
Well+hand 
pumps Tap stand Tap stand Tap stand 
 
If sustainability is the goal, the full O&M level shall be used; yet the cost of water 
from a distribution system can be as high as forty times the cost of the wells.  The 
difference between the three O&M levels for the water distribution system depends on 
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how many replacement costs are included.  Annual O&M cost estimates are based on a 
standard percentage of the system component costs.  System components include the 
well, solar panels and tracker, pump, two water storage tanks, distribution piping and 
fittings, and eighteen tap stands.  The annual repair and replacement costs are based on a 
pro-rated life expectancy of the component; this implies that, if any of the components 
fails before its projected lifetime funds are not available for replacement, not even if the 
community chooses the full O&M level.    
Monthly payments are not the only choice for water tariffs; another popular 
alternative is a per bucket payment.  It is important to realize that different payment 
systems require different infrastructures and each different infrastructure dictates the 
price of water.  Water fee collection is probably easiest by buckets as long as a tap stand 
attendant is in place.  However, paying salaries to tap stand attendants would almost 
double the cost of water to the system’s users.  In our case, the tariffs of a monthly 600 
Tsh/household chosen by the EWC and based on the consideration of affordability are 
insufficient even to cover the minimum O&M level.   
This is the core problem with rural water development, which brings up the need 
for government backstopping discussed in the interview analysis section.  When 
something breaks in the system, the community does not have the financial capacity to 
make the repairs.  Realizing this challenge, EWB designed a two-pronged tactic – to 
increase our understanding of the typical household economy and the residents’ 
understanding of why they had to pay these high water fees while stepping up efforts to 
connect the EWC to the district officials and create paths to obtain district support.    
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Throughout the project, members of the district of Ludewa were informed of what 
was going on, provided the few resources available to it, such as trucks to ferry sand, and 
occasionally visited the village and talked to the community.  The village executive 
coordinator maintained communication with the district water department members and 
coordinated the contact.  In 2009, EWB traveled to the district office with the chairman 
and secretary of the EWC, the village leadership, and NGEDEA representatives to meet 
with the district executive director and the district water department members.  During 
the meeting, we discussed our concerns that the village could not afford full-cost 
recovery and asked that the district provide support.  The district executive director 
replied he was supportive of the project but could not agree to support the system O&M 
costs.  His argument was the people of the community would not pay a single shilling if it 
knew he was going to help them, and, by policy, the responsibility for the system resided 
in its beneficiaries.   
After a long negotiation, EWB convinced the district director to match the 
contribution from the village by depositing the same amount collected by the village into 
the EWC bank account.  The following year, during another meeting at the district, the 
agreement was formalized and signed.  As long as the EWC treasurer would present 
properly written financial records and come to Ludewa to deposit part of the 
contributions in the EWC bank account, the district director would match the funds.  The 
agreement lacked a well organized plan for execution.  Despite good intentions, the plan 
was never put into place, mostly because the village contributions were never sufficient 
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to grant a trip to Ludewa to show the records to the district auditor and partly because 
none of the residents had faith in the government support. 
In 2010, EWB carried out a sensitization campaign through a willingness-to-pay 
questionnaire attached to a comprehensive socio-economic survey designed to gain a 
deeper understanding of the priorities and financial abilities of the village households.  
The survey enumerator randomly sampled 60% of the households in the sub-villages of 
Kivukoni, CCM, Maguland, and Shuleni, which are part of Ngelenge and served by the 
water distribution system.  To test for validity, the enumerator interviewed about 30% of 
the residents of the next two villages, Ilela, which has two water wells equipped with 
hand-pumps, and Kipingu, which has no improved water sources.  The enumerator 
collected data on family composition, education, health, income, water usage, wealth, and 
spending priorities.  Additionally, she was trained, only for the residents of Ngelenge, to 
explain the need for preventive maintenance for the new water system, to explain the 
costs of O&M, and to ask what the household head was willing to contribute. 
The result of the survey was that the median monetary monthly income in the 
community is less than 20,000 Tsh (~$15), and the income of more than 75% of the 
population is less than 60,000 Tsh (~$50).  This income supports families of four or five 
members on average.  The monetary income does not capture the wealth of a family, as 
the village economy is largely based on bartering fish, livestock, and agricultural product.  
About 75% of the households raise pigs, goats, and poultry, but only 33% have cows; 
100% of the population grows cassava, but only 35% produce enough rice to sell it, and 
20% produce enough maize to sell.  Only 28% of the population fish, with 13% selling 
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fish.  Eighty percent of the population report having difficulty providing food for the 
family.  Clearly 1800 Tsh/month for a water tariff is not a negligible expense for the 
average household; therefore, priorities dictate the willingness to pay it. To get a sense of 
household priorities, the survey asked the question of how households would utilize an 
additional 20,000 Tsh, 75,000 Tsh, 200,000 Tsh a year.  Seven categories were 
suggested: food, clean water, school expenses, healthcare, travel, entertainment, and other 
uses.  The results are summarized in table 10. 
Table 10. Household priorities 
Having additional 20,000 
Tsh/year 
75,000 
Tsh/year 
200,000 
Tsh/year 
 Frequency % 
Food 53 48 21 
School Supplies 40 25 22 
House 
Improvement 
14 22 29 
Health Care 34 42 59 
Clean water 51 55 56 
Travel 3 2 4 
Entertainment 0 1 0 
Other 7 7 10 
TOTAL 
RESPONSES 
202 202 201 
Source: Data from 2010 household survey 
Out of the 203 people who responded to the question, 25% indicated they would 
use extra money to pay for water if they had an extra 20,000 Tsh/year, or about three 
times the water fee amount; an additional 26% would use the extra money to pay for 
water if they had an extra 75,000 Tsh/year, and another 26% would pay for water if they 
had an extra 200,000 Tsh/year, about 30 times the yearly water fees.  Overall this 
indicates that about 78% of the residents do not consider water fees such a priority that 
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they would be willing to pay for it with their current household economy.  The average 
amount the respondents declared to be willing to pay was 1,413 Tsh, but even if most 
respondents of the survey declared they understood why they were paying water fees and 
found the fees to be appropriate, that was not paralleled by payments. 
During the first three months in which the system was providing water in 2009, 
the EWC did not attempt to collect water fees.  After that, the system started having 
problems, and regular service did not restart until the well redevelopment of June 2010.  
EWB covered part of the 2010 operating expenses, mainly the salary for the guard and 
compensation for the water technicians who spent a significant amount of time 
troubleshooting the pump.  In July and August of 2010, while EWB was in the village, 
the EWC attempted to begin collecting water tariffs.  This proved a very difficult task, as 
residents were not forthcoming with payments.   
In principle, each WUG was responsible for collecting the water fees and 
transferring them to the EWC treasurer.  Despite multiple attempts by EWC, supported 
by the village government, to set a deadline for the July 2010 payments collection, each 
deadline slid.  A variety of reasons were brought up, none of which justified the lack of 
compliance according to a Western point of view.  One of the biggest challenges in 
managing a communal water point is to decide what to do if the payments are not 
collected in full.  About 15-25 households fetch water at a water point; maybe only a 
portion of them pay water fees.  The WUG is, therefore, unable to deliver the full amount 
to the EWC.  EWC has two possible lines of actions: shut the tap stand off until 
everybody has paid or forbid the non-paying household from fetching at the tap stand.  
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The latter requires that a tap stand is policed by an attendant, or the beneficiaries as a 
group organize to gate access to the water.  During a meeting, the options were discussed; 
in the end, nobody seemed interested in such an ingrate job as refusing water to their non-
paying neighbor.  The former option punishes the households who paid, and who might 
decide not to pay the next month if water is not available to them, but it could also lead 
the paying beneficiaries to pressure the non-paying ones.   
At a meeting where all WUG were represented, EWB suggested shutting off the 
tap stands that failed to bring funds to the EWC by the deadline.  EWB stressed the 
importance of paying for a town crier to make sure all residents were aware of the 
deadline and of the consequences and explained how over time, people would grow 
accustomed to the idea of paying fees to collect water.  EWC set a new payment receipt 
deadline of the day before the arrival of the bishop for the yearly confirmations.  Since, 
according to the water constitution approved in 2008, operation and maintenance of the 
wells was transferred to the Executive Water Committee, and the same water fees 
covered access to both the wells and the tap stands, they decided it was necessary to 
shutoff the tap stands and use locks to prevent people from pumping water from the 
wells.    
The deadline arrived, and funds for water did not materialize.  Not a single tap 
stand was paid the full amount, most of the community did not even show up.  
Additionally, the full amount was yet another number that kept changing and was hard to 
track as it was unclear how many families were associated with a tap stand.  EWC shutoff 
the water and locked the wells.  As expected, that upset a lot of people.  The sub-village 
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leader of Maguland cut the chain to his sub-village well; angry people who had paid 
water fees confronted the EWC.  The women who usually take care of fetching water for 
EWB volunteers in the village left EWB totally out of drinking water. 
It was never EWB’s intention to create a situation where the only available water 
to the village was the far and unsafe Ruhuhu river water, denying access to the water 
point preceding the water distribution system.  EWB tried to suggest EWC create two 
levels of water association membership: a cheaper option for people opting to only fetch 
at the well and a more expensive one that would allow fetching at both wells and tap 
stands.  At a meeting, several members of the community replied that if people are 
allowed to fetch at a well they would never consider paying for tap stand usage.  Such 
responses made EWB deeply question the value of building an expensive water 
distribution system for a village that felt it could be served adequately (even if not within 
400 m from each household as specified by the Tanzania water policy of 2002) by five 
wells equipped with hand pumps in the village. 
In August 2010, after two months of constant pressure on the community to 
obtain payments, and during the post-harvest months when people had most of the money 
for the year in their hands, EWC succeeded in collecting only 65% of the payments.  In 
addition to all the challenges convincing the community to contribute to the water O&M 
fund, EWB spent a significant amount of time ensuring the funds collected were not 
misappropriated.  Over the years, EWB has spent a significant amount of time in the 
village attempting to train the committee on how to manage the water fund in a 
transparent manner, making sure the budget is balanced, and making sure financial 
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records are kept and adequately communicated to the community.  Part of the challenge 
is related to the amount of bureaucracy required that creates a non-negligible amount of 
work for a small group of unpaid village volunteers who have received limited training 
based on the assumption of ideal cooperation from the community.  Reconstructing 
financial records has been a daunting task, partly because of disorganization and partly 
due to a constant small misappropriation by several of the people involved.  A good 
example of most of the issues involved is provided by what EWB refers to as “the cement 
and construction labor saga.”  
When the last volunteer was due to leave the village in Ngelenge in November 
2009, a number of small construction tasks remained to be completed.  A meeting was 
held in which the EWC members listed all the tasks.  Several required a skilled mason, so 
EWB tasked the EWC with negotiating a price for completion of this job.  After a few 
negotiations, the masons agreed to a fixed bid contract covering twenty-six days of work 
at 3,000 Tsh per day for work yet to be done.  EWB communicated that if it took longer, 
there would be no additional payment as it was a fixed bid.  A formal grant was written 
and EWB left the money for the payment with the EWC and fifty-five bags of cement to 
complete the construction work.   
When EWB returned to Ngelenge in 2010, the majority of this construction work 
had not happened.  When EWB discussed the issue with the EWC and the mason, they 
were told the money for labor granted was for past work, not for completing the 
construction.  This represents a stark disagreement between EWB, the EWC, and the 
mason regarding what was negotiated in 2009.  There are numerous possible explanations 
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for the simple miscommunication, from a cultural difference on how to form contracts to 
actual collusion to defraud EWB.  Unfortunately, the written EWC grant request 
approved by EWB in 2009 did not contain enough details to officially settle the 
disagreement.  Because of the confusion, EWC requested and obtained a new grant to pay 
the mason to finish construction work in June 2010.  Unfortunately, even once additional 
funds were made available, the mason could not begin working because no cement was 
available.  During EWB’s absence, the EWC leadership had decided to sell the cement to 
a contractor working on the construction of a district project, a cattle dip to disinfect them 
from parasites by immersing the animals in a pool with treated water.  The contractor 
used the cement and promptly paid the EWC.  The EWC used about half of this cash to 
pay the man guarding the solar array and other outstanding debts that had been incurred 
during the winter of 2009-2010 while the system was not operating and water fees were 
not collected.  
In addition, the EWC leadership group (chairman, secretary, and treasurer), 
without consulting all the EWC members, agreed to lend the other half of the funds to the 
village government, which needed it as an initial deposit to open a bank account in 
Ludewa.  The village government promised to repay the money within four days as a 
district check made to the village government cleared.  Unfortunately, four months later, 
the village government had not repaid the loan.  It took EWB volunteers approximately 
two months to gather an understanding of all the financial transactions related to these 
events, as the EWC was not forthcoming with this information in an attempt to receive 
additional money from EWB to recover the operating costs for the winter months.  There 
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were no written records of any of these transactions, so it was impossible to audit the 
books, consequently understand the correct series of events, and assign individual 
responsibilities for the missing material, funds, and labor.  EWB was asked by several 
members of the community to right this wrong.  After waiting for over one month for the 
village government to return the loan either in cash or in cement bags needed to complete 
construction before the end of the implementation trip, EWB requested government 
assistance by asking the village executive officer to personally oversee the transaction 
and threatening to file a formal complain to the Manda Police Department, which would 
have been the equivalent of stating he was unable or unwilling to perform his duties in 
the village.  As a result, three days later, the village government repaid the loan with 
cement bags.  It was clear at that point that without EWB intervention, these funds would 
not have been recovered.  The community does not appear to have the ability or to be 
willing to require transparent financial management, despite the constitution clearly 
giving everybody the right to request an audit of the books.  It is important to realize the 
amount of money left with the EWC is very large compared to the amount of money the 
village government handles and is available for other community projects.  During the 
many meetings held in the village during the events recalled above, it became obvious the 
disagreements between stakeholders needed to be addressed. 
The EWC chairman, secretary, and treasurer, and two other members were not 
happy with the level of participation of the other members.  The chairman expressed the 
desire to amend the constitution to expel the non-participating members and asked for 
EWB assistance in this matter.  Incidentally, it is worth noting the constitution actually 
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had such provisions already, but the chairman was not familiar with or did not understand 
the constitution.  
The remaining three members of the EWC complained about not being informed 
of important decisions regarding finances, not being shown financial records during the 
bi-yearly association meeting, and generally not being informed of association activities 
such as meetings.  The water technicians clearly complained about “wars” revolving 
around the water system.  They also complained about being harassed during the months 
the system was nonoperational and not receiving payments and about the lack of financial 
transparency.  On this last item, they insisted EWB intervene to avoid making corruption 
a standard practice.   
We did try to call a few meetings to discuss these issues, but it was very hard to 
get the key members involved, the accused and/or accusing of wrongdoing in the same 
place at the same time.  The issues had divided the community profoundly.  EWB had to 
use all its leverage to bring stakeholders to a table to discuss issues and resolutions.  That 
led to some, less than satisfactory, increases in participation; while many statements 
made went in the right direction, actions were much slower to follow.  During these 
weeks, the shortcomings of the Water Constitution became evident.  Most decisions 
required convening a General Assembly comprising all tap stand committees (18x6), 108 
people in addition to the seven EWC members and representatives of the village 
government and social service committee.  Even if only half were required to reach a 
quorum, that number was still hard to reach and maintain for the full duration of 
important discussions such as financial management, funds misallocation, and water fee 
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payment enforcement.  The 2008 Water Constitution and Rules and Regulation 
Document mainly contained a general governance system description, but it was fairly 
vague in terms of who had the actual responsibility for executing the group decisions, and 
who was entitled to take smaller day-to-day executive decisions.  As an example of it, the 
constitution stated water fees had to be collected by the WUG, but once they failed to do 
so, nobody knew exactly how to proceed.   
On August 2010, the acting Ludewa district water engineer, the Iringa Regional 
water engineer and a water management expert from a local NGO, visited Ngelenge, 
during a monitoring trip.  They asked the EWC chairman to give them an update about 
the performance of the water system, the management organization and the community 
support.  Nothing of what they heard was new to them.  After a quick review of the 2008 
Water Constitution, they pointed out that the committee-driven management scheme, 
formerly recommended by the Tanzanian Water Ministry had proven to be unsuccessful 
in many places.  The major problem was attributed to the fact that there was no 
separation between decision makers and implementers.  Committee sizes tended to 
become very large, and since one-half of the people were required as a quorum for 
decisions, it was very expensive (people typically received food or a stipend at these 
meetings) and almost impossible to get everybody together.  Also, they pointed out how 
the constitution statement that a committee is responsible for financial and technical 
operations is not specific enough in terms of who is actually doing the work, or has the 
ability to instruct others to do work.   
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They recommended revising the constitution to adopt a more successful approach, 
which was the management model where the elected committee acts as a board of 
directors and hires paid staff, a manager, treasurer, and technicians to run the day-to-day 
operations.  They also stressed that once the community approved it, the constitution had 
to be registered at the district to make the water association a legal entity, which can sue 
and be sued, independent from the village government in its power to regulate water 
matters.  EWB took the opportunity to ask if it was possible to have the district or the 
region provide training, advice, and support in this endeavor.  There were no resources 
available to do so, but on a personal level, they agreed to provide help in drafting a new 
constitution and rules and regulations starting with examples from registered successful 
schemes in the region as long as EWB could organize and cover the expenses to take the 
EWC leadership to Iringa (1.5 days away).  This was an expensive trip that could not 
have been afforded with village funds; EWB paid for it.  One EWB volunteer traveled to 
Iringa with the Ludewa district water engineer and the chairman and secretary of EWC.    
They suggested a new constitution calling for a smaller water users association, 
with two representatives for each tap stand (water user group) and six executive water 
committee members (chairman, secretary, and four ordinary members), augmented by the 
village executive officer, the village chairman, and the Health and Education Committee 
officers.  The Water User Association general meeting convenes twice a year and makes 
top-level decisions about the system management, including hiring and/or reappointing 
the water system manager.  The EWC meets monthly to supervise the manager and 
treasurer work, and receives a detailed account of the association finances.  The chairman 
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and the secretary were given examples of the Water Constitution and Rules and 
Regulations of a village in the Iringa district and were tasked with creating equivalent 
documents for Ngelenge.    
The final version was an almost identical to the example, including rules which 
made no sense in Ngelenge’s case.  One more time, the institutional requirements of the 
national water policy and acts were above the capacity of the village, and resources to 
train and help the villagers were not available.  The new documents were presented to the 
community at a whole village meeting, during which representatives of the district read 
parts of the 2002 national water policy to stress the fact that ownership and responsibility 
for the system belong to the community and not to the government.  The new constitution 
was approved quickly, possibly with about 3% of the population present, and new 
elections were held without following the exact procedure proposed by the constitution.  
The old EWC denounced election irregularities and refused to step down, leading to an 
impasse, which had to be resolved by EWB in summer 2011.  Basically, the old 
committee refused to transfer the available water fund to the new committee; 
additionally, they refused to transfer signatures on the water association’s bank account 
in Ludewa.  One more time, EWB had to use its leverage to force all involved to sit at a 
negotiating table and resolve differences.  Additionally, despite the level of involvement 
of district and regional officials in the preparation of the new water governance 
documents, registration of the board of directors as a COWSO was never achieved, 
entirely due to the fact that the district could not provide instructions on the procedure to 
register. 
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The new institutional model adopted in 2010 did not improve the fundamental 
problem of a lack of community contribution toward the O&M of the system.  Since the 
system was rehabilitated in July 2011, and after the migration to the new more effective 
management model, contributions dropped from 65% in August 2010 to 55% in August 
2011 (with no contribution in between and EWB taking responsibility for most of the 
O&M costs while the system was not operating).  Both high percentages were collected 
while EWB was in the village.  After EWB left the village, contributions dropped to 6% 
in September 2011; in October, replacement of some of the faucets (10,000 Tsh/faucet) 
was needed.  The EWC reported that after some pressure, 23% of the expected 
contributions were collected.   
Since then nobody has contributed any other funds.  In January 2012, the treasurer 
ran out of money to pay the guard and requested that EWB ask the district to retrain the 
water committee on their responsibilities, as participation at meetings and activities are 
low.  The district water engineer, contacted by email, offered to go to Ngelenge in person 
and pay the guard.  In summary, it seems quite obvious the Ngelenge water distribution 
system is far from being financially sustainable.  Now that EWB transferred the O&M 
responsibility to the village, as soon as the first large component fails, the community 
will not have enough funds to repair the system; therefore, there will be no future for the 
system without backstopping from the district government. 
Appropriate Technology 
Most of the discussion between EWB and the community on the choice of 
technology was done during the 2006 implementation trip.  At that time, the ideas 
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proposed included installing another shallow hand-pump well, installing a deep well with 
a hand pump, and installing a deep well with a powered pump.  Due to the fact that some 
of the shallow hand-dug wells were dry toward the end of the dry season, the village had 
a strong preference for a project, which included a deep well.  The initial plan was to dig 
a deep borehole with sufficient water yield to serve the whole community, install 6” 
casing to be able to accommodate a motorized pump in future development, but for the 
time being only install a hand pump on it. 
During the same time, a solar water project was undertaken in Nsungu, a village 
forty minutes walking from Ngelenge, was completed.  The project was a partnership 
between the Ludewa district government, villagers of Manda Ward, and a German 
philanthropic organization known as the German African Assistance (GAA), headed by 
Dr. Ludwig Gernhardt.  The initial success of the Nsungu project steered EWB toward 
suggesting the implementation of a similar system, which on paper appeared to have a 
low cost of ownership for a motorized pumping scheme.  The small percentage of 
residents participating in the choice of technology applauded the idea, possibly not based 
on careful considerations of long-term costs/benefits to the community, but as a gut 
reaction to a choice between traveling long distance in a Mercedes Benz instead of 
pedaling on a bike. 
Usually motorized pumping systems are powered by generators, which leads to 
very elevated operating costs.  Solar technology reduces those costs to zero at a price of a 
large capital investment.  Once energy is available, a choice needs to be made between a 
DC pump, supplied directly by the panels, and an AC pump requiring the panel voltage 
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output to be transformed with an inverter.  Inverters are considered the least reliable 
component of a solar power system.  Despite their reliability being improved greatly over 
the years in the west, there were doubts about the quality of the ones distributed in 
Tanzania.  This consideration led to a decision to purchase a DC pump, almost twice as 
expensive in relation to an AC pump and an inverter. 
This way of thinking favors a technological choice of high-tech components that 
might be sold in Tanzania, but are not manufactured locally.  Usually those are more 
expensive and have a small market so vendors do not stockpile replacement parts.  AC 
pumps and inverters might be a cheaper and less reliable technical solution, but they can 
be purchased everywhere in Tanzania.  In our case, everything was manufactured by 
Mono Pumps and shipped from their manufacturing plant in Australia, with two to three 
months’ lead time for most items.  Basically, the system was designed choosing 
expensive technology, which is advertised as requiring minimal service costs and 
required knowledge and a long replacement life. 
Local technical knowledge has never presented itself as a challenge in the EWB 
project, as training had been a carefully designed component.  The trained technicians 
have been able to independently carry out all maintenance tasks required as long as funds 
were made available.  The biggest challenge they encountered was to be taken seriously 
from the Tanzanian vendors they had to deal with when the problems with the pump 
started.  For instance, the vendor would not acknowledge their requests unless EWB 
stepped in.  The most blatant example happened in the spring of 2009, when the original 
pump was replaced under warranty, yet could not be put in operation for more than two 
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months because the technician did not have a $15 controller to reset the pressure shutoff 
thresholds.  The problem was diagnosed by the village technicians on the same day they 
installed the pump and communicated to the vendor who claimed they were wrong and 
refused to listen to their reasons.  Frustrated, they called EWB, who tried to reason with 
the vendor and convince him to temporarily send the controller to the village, but the 
vendor would not agree and kept repeating that the technicians were ignorant village 
people who did not know what they were talking about.  Yet the local technician’s 
argument made perfect sense.  Eventually, EWB sent a controller from the U.S. to the 
village, and in about five minutes, the technicians restarted the system proving their 
assessment was absolutely correct.  Despite the many frustrating incidents such as the one 
described, the Ngelenge system technicians have always exceeded expectations and 
shown unparalleled dedication to the project.  
Obviously the larger challenge is that the O&M costs of the system greatly exceed 
the O&M costs for basic technologies such as a protected spring or well (see table 9) to 
the point of making the system unaffordable for the community, as already described.  
One question is who should have the responsibility for the final decision between the 
community, the implementing organization, and the government?  In our experience, the 
small percentage of the community who participated in the decision did not have the 
technical capacity to make this choice and the largest percentage was not even 
sufficiently mobilized to participate.  EWB, as most foreign implementing organizations, 
overestimated the need for water improvements and underestimated the capacity required 
to sustain it; it is this author’s opinion that guidance to both the community and the 
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outside organization should come from the national government employee, which 
through his monitoring efforts, is in the best position to know what is best for his people.  
The central government guidelines in Tanzania promote adoption of high-tech 
solutions vs. low-tech ones.  In 2008, EWB attempted to convince the Ludewa district to 
contribute to the capital expenses of the Ngelenge system.  One of the arguments to 
convince them was that, according to the formula-based allocation published by the 
Ministry of Water to facilitate budget preparations within the WSDP, they were going to 
receive a larger budget.  The block grant formula-based allocation was the tool provided 
to districts to estimate the percentage of the national budget they are able to access 
through block grants; the allocation each district receives is based on technology, 
population, and poverty for recurrent budgets and technology and underserved population 
for development budgets.  The WSDP’s available recurring budget is larger the higher the 
technology available in the area, so a district government has all interest in promoting 
higher technology solutions.  
The weird way in which the WSDP budget allocation works became clear in 
2011.  The district water engineer disclosed he had independently requested funds to 
rehabilitate the Ngelenge water distribution system and obtained them in the 2011 
budget, as a Quick Win project funded by the WSDP.  Basically, it had been easier for 
the district to receive WSDP funding to rehabilitate our high tech system, implemented in 
a community that already had basic access to water, instead of receiving funds to provide 
clean water sources to one of the many communities in the district that had no improved 
water source from which to drink.  
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Appropriate technology is one of those broad terms requiring a definition to be 
meaningful.  Adopting Betz’s definition (as cited in Akubue 2000),  
appropriate technology equate[..] with providing technical solutions that are 
appropriate to the economic structure of those influenced: to their ability to 
finance the activity, to their ability to operate and maintain the facility, to the 
environmental conditions involved, and to the management capabilities of the 
population.  (p. 38) 
 
This author believes in the case of rural Tanzania, only protected spring and hand pumps 
falls in the category of appropriate technology.    
Case Study, Uganda: The Kizzi Pipeline Extension 
Kizzi is a small village in the southern central region of Uganda, in the Mpigi 
district, about one hour from Kampala.  This village is home to approximately one 
hundred households, whose residents support themselves with agriculture and livestock.  
The majority of children suffer from malnutrition. 
Due to its vicinity to Mpigi town, this rural village administratively depends on 
the town council; therefore, it is classified as peri-urban.  Mpigi Town is about a thirty-
minute walk from the village.  The village is spread on hills sloping down to a swampy 
valley; at the bottom of the valley the government built four protected springs in the 
1990s.  Due to the steepness of the terrain, only young people can reach the springs (see 
figure 18).  An informal survey carried out in 2010 found that it takes between twenty 
and forty minutes for most households to fetch water.  
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Figure 18. Kizzi children on their way to the protected spring. 
The project was started in 2009 by a small group of Santa Clara University 
students who learned of the village needs from a Kizzi resident who spent two years in 
the U.S. as a seminar student.  The students connected with the traditional head of the 
village, a relative of the seminar students, and planned an assessment trip in February 
2010.  During the assessment trip, the students evaluated the possibility of designing a 
solar pumping system delivering water to a tank and by gravity to few tap stands, but 
after consultation with the town council water engineer, it was decided a gravity 
extension of the pipeline serving Mpigi town was a better solution.  The pipeline, which 
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delivered water to approximately 79% of the 11,400 residents through a 1028-yard tap 
connection and 1000 house connections, is managed by Trand Int, the private operator 
contracted by the Mpigi Town water authority.  Both yard and household connections are 
granted as a private contract between a single family unit and Trand Int (see figure 19).  
 
Figure 19. Mpigi Town metered yard connection. 
Trand Int is responsible for maintaining the service up to the water meter and 
charges the government set price of 1,556 Ugx/1000 L +15% VAT + a flat service fee of 
1,500 Ugx/month, which translates to about 40 Ugx (2 cents U.S.) for a 20 L jerry can.  
Prior to leaving the village, the students hired a local engineer to carry out an elevation 
survey from the main pipeline to the village and provide plans to Trand Int to design and 
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quote the pipeline extension.  Additionally, a group of thirty women in the village was 
paid to make jewelry that could be used to fundraise for the project in the U.S.  Once the 
funds were raised, the students planned an implementation trip in July 2011 to supervise 
the construction and work with the community to create the infrastructure necessary for 
an equitable distribution of water.  I was asked to participate in the trip as an advisor.   
Within a few days from the team's arrival to Mpigi a few issues were discovered.  
The first one was that half the planned extension had been built in 2008.  The 2008 plan 
was supposed to cover the entire village, but the town council ran out of money and the 
implementation stopped short of its goals.  Several of the village households already had 
yard connections, and they were reselling water to their neighbor at 100-200 Ugx/20 L 
jerry can.  Basically, the plans sent by the engineer had already been prepared.  The 
second issue was that the cost of materials in the quote had been highly overestimated, 
inflating the cost by a factor of about 1.5.  Eventually, all issues were worked out and 
construction began in late July.  The 3.2 km extension was completed by the end of 
August 2011 and it has been functional since.   
Representation and Equity 
During the initial stage of the project, the traditional village leader and another 
family relative had written a report to explain the condition and need of the village of 
Kizzi (2009 report).  In the report, they detailed how the community fetches about 10 
L/person/day of water at the government protected springs and needed improved access 
to water for household use, to feed the livestock, and to irrigate.  The report continued 
explaining how the Mpigi town council had developed a new water project pipeline 
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through the National Water and Sewage Corporation, but the program was slow reaching 
the peri-urban areas and too expensive to be affordable for the people of Kizzi since they 
had to contribute toward the construction cost, and it would not be suitable for irrigation.  
They welcomed the idea of a water supply system, especially geared toward 
irrigation, but “they foresaw a conflict with the government in case such program came to 
the village.”  The rationale provided was that despite no funds for water programs at 
affordable prices to its people, the government of Uganda maintains control over water 
project implementation, and in order to navigate through the bureaucracy, it would take a 
very long time to implement such a program.  Therefore, they requested help building 
household rainwater tanks.  
This report was disregarded when the students arrived in the village for the 
assessment trips.  I was not present and was not able to satisfactorily reconstruct the 
reasons why the project direction moved away from the rainwater jugs, but possibly it 
was due to a combination between conversation with the seminar students in the U.S. and 
a fair dose of miscommunication during the assessment trip.  Eventually, the students 
compared the costs of O&M of an independent solar pumped water system and the cost 
of paying for water from the Mpigi pipeline and decided they were equivalent.  They met 
with the town council water engineer who also recommended the extension of the Mpigi 
pipeline and set the engineer up for the surveying.  Nobody mentioned the fact that half 
the pipeline already existed and the first half of the village already had tap stands.  The 
traditional village leader took the students to meet several of the villagers, giving them a 
chance to ask their opinions on the extension and inquire about the affordability of paying 
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the water bills.  None of the villagers spoke English, so all communication was gated by 
the traditional village leader.  By the end of the assessment trip, everybody involved 
appeared satisfied with the solution.   
Once the plans were received, a quote for the extension was requested from Trand 
Int.  The quote included labor for trenching and clearing bushes.  Since no financial 
contribution was asked of the community, it was decided to request labor be provided for 
free, as typical in most water projects.  Since the taps are installed as a private contract, 
only one household is responsible to pay the water bills to the private operator.  If 
multiple families share a tap stand, there needs to be an agreement to ensure the group of 
households agrees on how they are going to share the water bill, especially since the cost 
of one jerry can is about 35 Ugx and the smallest coin is 50 Ugx.  In preparation for the 
implementation trip, the team discussed at length with the seminar students the need to 
organize the community in such a way to avoid creating an unfair situation.  A tentative 
plan to organize meetings with the community to sort out the issue was put together.  
Additionally, there was a concern that not all the households could afford to pay 50 Ugx 
per jerry can.  It was, therefore, decided they would offer the difference between the 
money raised and the estimate to the community in the form of some micro-cooperative 
grants, which would augment the income of the households to cover the cost of water.    
Once the team arrived in Mpigi in July 2010, first attempts were made to organize 
meetings with the community and with the community leadership.  Despite the specific 
requests made to the traditional village leader, only the women who had made the jewelry 
were present, apparently to thank the students for the previous trip employment 
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opportunity.  The traditional village leader communicated to the team that all able men 
had been employed by a contractor out of the village; therefore, it was unlikely free labor 
could be provided by the community. 
The team also met with Trand Int to finalize the contract.  During the meeting, 
Trand Int explained how the process to increase the coverage of the pipeline to the Mpigi 
Town worked.  A village requests an improvement of their water source by writing to the 
water authority of the town council and to the private operator who has the contract to 
operate the water services.  Once the extent of the project and the costs are assessed, the 
size of the community contribution is decided.  If the community is unable to collect the 
funds, they can ask the town council to help them reach the full amount.  The village is 
informed of the decision through their leaders in a meeting where Trand Int and a 
community development officer from the town council are present to explain all the 
details of the project.   
Funds for the expansion of the Mpigi water systems were provided by the African 
Development Bank.  Trand Int manages the O&M of the system with the revenue from 
customer payments; 85% of the revenue covers the salaries for Trand Int employees.  The 
operation costs are quite high as water pumped from the swamps needs to be treated at a 
treatment facility; 5% goes to the overseeing water authority and 10% is usually 
dedicated to maintenance.  If repairs are too large for Trand Int to cover, it can request 
assistance from the district, which allocates funds based on population.  The community 
is responsible for the security of the valves, meters, and tap stands and for paying the 
water bills on the water consumed.  They explained how the interaction between the 
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water authority, Trand Int, and the community is regulated by the Water Act of 1995, of 
which they showed us a copy.   
Extensions of the main line are entirely managed by Trand Int, but beneficiaries 
can install a private connection upon requesting a permit and are responsible to cover all 
expenses for the connection except the first 10 m of connection line. The work can be 
done by Trand Int or independently.  Labor for the construction is usually provided by the 
community, but they receive payments from Trand Int.  Community sensitization to 
establish demand and disseminate information on the process, the roles, and the 
responsibilities is organized by the local government (LC1 – local council at the village 
level, LC2 – local council at the sub-ward level, and LC3 – Local council at the division 
level).  Trand Int showed us all the forms to be filled out explaining how if a donor is 
involved in providing funds, a MOU needs to be signed by Trand Int, the donors, and the 
village leaders as they act as representatives, negotiate all land disputes, and organize the 
community.  During the sensitization meetings, the cost of services and responsibilities of 
all parties are explained to the community.   
So far, only private connections have been established in Mpigi, which is a 
problem as only the wealthiest people are able to afford the capital contribution for a yard 
tap connection, which is 50,000 Ugx ($25) plus the cost of pipe in excess of the first 10 
m.  Average total cost to the household is 150,000 Ugx ($75).  Trand Int explained that 
most households invest in a yard tap as a business, re-selling the water at two to five 
times the government price; this was confirmed by people informally interviewed when 
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fetching water at the public springs who bitterly complained about how high the price of 
water at yard taps was.  
Trand Int claimed that usually customers pay only about 75% of the bills.  The 
unpaid portion accumulates and once it is deemed too large on a per case basis according 
to payment history and balance due, a warning letter about disconnection is sent out.  
Trand Int tries to discourage letting the balance grow too high by charging a large 
reconnection fee, 50,000 Ugx ($25).  They explained that Kizzi had already submitted a 
request for assistance; therefore, plans were made, but nobody remembered or wanted to 
inform us of the outcome.  We showed them the plans the engineer suggested, and that 
created some confusion about where the pipes were supposed to run.   
Trand Int offered to create a pilot project in Kizzi where instead of establishing 
private connections, they would establish a communal tap stand selling water at 100 Ugx 
per jerry can; this would require they hire a tap stand operator from the community who 
is a local resident living nearby. 
After the conversation with Trand Int, we decided to take a transect walk to clear 
the confusion about the plans.  Much to our surprise, we discovered that half the 
suggested pipeline had been implemented in 2008; one of the tap stands in the plan had 
even been connected in 2008.  Several households had their private connection and were 
reselling water at 150-300 Ugx per jerry can.  The project had been implemented only 
partially because they ran out of funds to complete it.  At that point, it became clear the 
plan, which had been submitted by the engineer, and paid for ($2000), was an old plan 
prepared in 2007-2008.  Since half the planned project was already there, the size of the 
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extension was much shorter than anticipated and the original quote provided by Trand Int 
had to be revised. 
The team was determined to find a way to extend the pipeline to the areas not yet 
served and to find a way to avoid creating a resale water market.  We developed three 
options for managing the tap stand.  The first option was to establish a private connection 
and form a village committee to manage it in such a way that the price for water 
remained at the government price of about 35 Ugx per jerry can.  The second option was 
the communal tap stand suggested by Trand Int at 100 Ugx per jerry can, and the third 
option was to form a committee to manage the tap stand at 50 Ugx per jerry can and 
establish a revolving fund with the extra 15 Ugx per jerry can, which would allow 
households to borrow money one at a time returning the loan with a small interest.  We 
tried to schedule another meeting in the village asking that the local government 
leadership be present.   
The meeting was poorly attended; in particular the LC1 representative and the 
village council members were absent. Eventually, the village political counselor of the 
town council came to the meeting, invited by the district youth counselor, whom we had 
met at a bar the night before.  It became clear the traditional village leaders had not 
informed the local government leaders and possibly had not disseminated the notice 
about a meeting to decide on the water project.  While we were waiting for attendance to 
improve, we tried to explain the three options to him and to the political counselors so he 
could explain them to the crowd.  None of the three seemed enthusiastic about any of the 
three choices.  Every one of them insisted that once we left, the ones with taps at their 
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houses would resell the water at a high price, as that was the way.  The traditional village 
leaders, who were going to get a yard tap according to the plan, insisted that people 
reselling water were in the right to do so as they were attending the tap.   
The village political counselor felt that maybe the community is unable to a see 
any advantage of the pipeline extension until they actually see it extended; therefore, it 
was recommended to start working anyway.  The youth political counselor explained that 
there were three groups of people in the community: the rich ones who want to benefit 
from a free installation of yard taps and will be able to pay their water bill at the 
government price, those of the middle class who would consider sharing a tap and 
making it work as a group, and the poor who will simply continue to fetch water at the 
swamp.  There seemed to be a dividing line in the conversation; the politicians saw the 
pipeline extension as infrastructure improvement, and they did not care about equity of 
water distribution while the traditional village leader saw the tap as a convenient business 
capital investment, especially if we were to install one for him. 
As the meeting began, our attempt to communicate the three options to the few 
residents who were present failed because the traditional village leader was not 
translating or worse yet, was presenting some of our views in a derogatory way.  The 
only questions from the small audience were those such as, “I was promised a yard tap, 
am I going to get it?”  We realized we needed another avenue through which to 
communicate with the community. 
In the next few days, I began contacting organizations and government officials to 
gather interviews for this research.  Through this activity, we had the opportunity to ask 
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for assistance from one of the NGOs interviewed who worked in the area doing 
community mobilization and constructing wells and rainwater harvesting tanks from the 
Kyakulumbye Development Foundation (KDF).  Contact was also made with the district 
water department and with the technical support unit, the national monitoring team. 
We invited the founder of KDF to the next meeting, asking him to assist us with 
connecting with the community so we could explain the concern about equity and 
affordability of water through the extension project, as well as propose they reconsider 
the construction of households’ rainwater harvesting tanks.  Our efforts were thwarted 
again.  Before we were given a chance to explain our concerns or discuss options with the 
participants, there were a series of cheerleading-style speeches about starting the 
construction work and the presentation of a committee that would lead the trenching.  
Few in the audience inquired about payments for trenching and were told that we 
expected free labor from the community.  No discussion was made about who would get 
yard taps and how they would be regulated.    
The next day, we hired three recent university graduates as translators and, with 
our cook, divided the village into four zones.  Each of us visited all households in their 
assigned zone.  There was a lot of confusion about the project, and most residents who 
did not live close to the traditional leader's house did not really know what was going on, 
nor had they been informed of the meetings.  As we explained the project, we made sure 
to explain that we could only bring a pipeline, but they had to pay Trand Int for the water.  
We asked if people felt they could afford the water payment and if they would prefer 
household rainwater harvesting tanks instead.  Most of the households that knew about 
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the project expected to receive a yard connection so they could resell water and make 
money.  One of the households claimed they had to pay 10,000 Ugx to the village 
traditional leader in order to be part of the project.  The translators’ comments at the end 
of the day were that there was a great need for training and sensitization within the 
community if an equitable solution was to be found.  At the end of the day we briefed 
each other and a picture began to emerge.  The people we had trusted to bridge us to the 
needs of the community felt entitled to decide for the community whether a pipeline 
extension and a few private connections at households that could resell the water at a 
profit was the best way to utilize the free money coming from the wasungu (white 
people).   
As we were complaining about the situation with our cook and the two Mpigi 
youth village health team (VHT) members who lived in the hostel inside the Mpigi 
hospital, where we lodged as well, one of the two VHT members told us we had to talk to 
Amelia Kyambadde, the Ministry of Parliament elected from the Mpigi district.  Much to 
our surprise, the Ugandan Ministry for Trade and Industry was on the phone with me 
within five minutes.  We asked the VHT member what his connection was with her, and 
we were told none, but Madame Kyambadde is a true supporter of the people and she 
made herself available to all of us.  We had a meeting with her the next day, and she 
offered us her support.   
Before meeting with the Ministry, we met with the district water engineer and 
explained the situation.  We were scolded for not following the proper channels and were 
instructed to write a letter to the town council explaining the scope of the project and 
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requesting the support of a community developer officer.  We were also informed that the 
town council does not support the development of additional water sources, such as wells 
and springs, in the peri-urban area that can be reached by extension of the gravity system, 
as water fees are needed to support the system's existence and expansion.  The Mpigi 
district’s peri-urban rural areas already have a 95% improved water access coverage, with 
an 80% functionality rate, assessed in 2010.  Areas that have not yet been reached by the 
pipeline are already provided with basic water services by springs and wells constructed 
in the 1990s.  Digging new wells is also forbidden because the water table is getting 
lower every year and wells are drying up.     
The district water engineer helped us write a letter officially requesting help, and 
we hand delivered it to the town council.  The next morning, the town council community 
developer officer had already contacted the Kizzi LC1 leader, the village local 
government official, and scheduled a whole village meeting for the afternoon.  This was 
worrisome, as we had yet to express to the community our concern and the proposal we 
wanted to make.  With the assistance of the district water engineer, we succeeded in 
organizing a meeting at the Town Council office with the community developer officer, 
the district water engineer, the head of the Mpigi water authority, the Mayor of Mpigi 
Town, and Trand Int representatives.  At the meeting, a short negotiation between Trand 
Int and the Mpigi water authority set the price of water for the communal tap stand pilot 
to 50 Ugx/ jerry can, with the excess costs to be used as a salary for the tap attendant.  
Trand Int also requested the communal taps be positioned at residences at the center of 
clusters of households to be able to efficiently service the largest number of families.    
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The whole village meeting was well attended, with at least fifty-five households 
represented and many youth.  We found out Kizzi as a village was about twice as large as 
we thought and composed of two communities, Kizzi and Masujju.  We decided to revise 
the plan and extend the pipeline to the entire area for a total length of 3.2 km.  Our plan 
was explained, although with little emphasis on the rainwater harvesting tanks, as it was 
perceived by the town council as a competing threat to the pipeline revenue, which the 
community felt was needed to continue to fund extensions. 
It was decided that work to dig the main pipeline extension would start the next 
day along with a mapping of the village with the location of households, including the 
preference of the household to receive a household rainwater harvesting tank.  Location 
of the communal tap stands was going to be chosen by the community, but based on the 
most effective location for communal service as documented by the map.  The 
community developer officer explained to us that the lack of participation in the project 
by a part of the community was due to the fact that they did not understand this project 
was separate from the 2008 town council attempt to extend the pipeline.  Four or five 
families had paid 50,000 Ugx in 2008 to receive a water connection, so they felt entitled 
to receive it for free.  Trand Int explained that the 50,000 Ugx was the connection fee for 
a private tap stand; they would honor the connection fees, but those residences still had to 
pay the cost of the service pipe in excess of the first 10 m, which in most cases amounted 
to roughly additional 100,000 Ugx.  Additionally, people had been paid to trench in 2008, 
which is why they did not want to provide free labor.  Once the community understood 
that this was not a town council project, they agreed to the terms and a decision was made 
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to start digging the trenches the next day.  We were asked to provide pick axes and 
shovels.  As an incentive to participate, we announced the intention of funding micro-
cooperative grants for business development to the people who participated.  
The next day, expecting participation on the trenching work similar to that 
experienced in the Tanzania project, this author brought to the village four pick axes and 
five shovels.  By 10:00 in the morning, forty workers reported for work.  We spent the 
morning going back and forth to the hardware store in Mpigi Town to purchase more 
pick axes and shovels.  Work attendance did not decrease over time.   
The excavation of 3.2 km of main pipeline was completed in four weeks.  During 
that time, the community agreed on the location of the communal tap stands and three 
village masons were contracted to build concrete stands for the seven communal taps (see 
figure 20).    
 
Figure 20. A completed tap stand in Kizzi. 
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The relationship between our team and Trand Int seriously deteriorated when the 
district water engineer discovered they had overcharged us by 40% of the cost of the 
project.  The Mpigi Town Major, informed of the situation, forced Trand Int to 
renegotiate the quote.  During a six hour-long meeting, a new contract was renegotiated 
and an MOU reflecting all the agreements for the communal tap stand was sent out for 
signatures to all the relevant authorities.  Copies of the MOU were distributed to the 
community and everybody was made aware that if any problem arose with the price of 
water or the management of taps, the MOU would give them legal grounds for a formal 
complaint with the water authority.  Few villagers negotiated a private connection with 
Trand Int.  The entire project was completed by the day before our return to the United 
States.  None of the residents elected to have a rainwater tank. 
I returned to Uganda again in December 2011 to monitor the progress on the 
micro-cooperative efforts and evaluate the outcome of the pipeline extension.  The 
biggest problem reported was the fact that water service was intermittent, as the treatment 
facility and the pumping stops whenever there is a power outage, which in the area is a 
daily event, at times extending for more than 24 hours.  At a meeting organized by the 
Kizzi Youth Association, a report was made that households were now purchasing water 
at the communal tap stands and the price of water at the communal tap stands had been 
maintained at 50 Ugx/jerry can.  A few problems that had developed at tap stands had 
been fixed by Trand Int within one or two weeks from their reporting.  To a direct 
question as to whether there were still families fetching at the spring, the response was 
“Yes, the poorest families still do.  But maybe fewer people than before.  The ground 
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around the spring is not maintained as clean as before.”  Piped water seems to be a 
commodity available only with due economic development.  Until then, low technology 
solutions such as protected springs and hand dug wells are what guaranteed the right to 
clean water for all. 
Considerations on Country-level Similarities and Differences 
Tanzania and Uganda are countries with markedly different identities, yet many 
of these differences are not significant enough to justify the marked difference in their 
rural development of water resources.  Table 11 shows a list of these variables; validation 
for their prior exclusion comes also from the fact that they have not been mentioned 
during any of the stakeholder interviews nor observed during my participation at the two 
projects described in the case studies.  Corruption is the only exception, as it has been 
mentioned and observed in both countries, but it is assessed at a similar level in both 
countries by the international assessment that periodically evaluates it (World Bank 
Database, n.d.). 
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Table 11. List of variables excluded from the analysis. 
Variables Excluded by First 
Pass Analysis 
Comments 
Cultural and tribal differences Multiple ethnicities present in both countries 
Economic policy  Market-oriented since 1985-1986 
Economy/GNI/GDP Tanzania fares slightly better, but distribution of 
wealth more asymmetric in Uganda 
Government expenditure pro 
capita 
Tanzania larger in the last few years 
International donors Supported by the same group of countries 
Export/import levels Within 6% 
Investment with private 
participation 
Similar, compounded over the last 10 years 
Corruption Similar, according to World Bank assessment 
Education No difference 
Workforce composition No difference 
 
Governance cannot be separated from the political history that shapes policy 
direction and controls the flow of funds that finance it.  In the water contest, a recurrent 
challenge reported during the Tanzanian set of interviews is the fact that the rural 
population still believes in the idea that water is a free good, as it was during Nyerere’s 
socialist policies.  The significance of these statements must be considered carefully.  
Ujamaa, the mobilization of villages into the ten-households cells’ strategy, and socialist 
principles in general, have been a part of both countries’ histories.  Water was free in 
rural areas prior to 1984 in Uganda, during the leadership of the socialist Obote, the 
fascist Amin, and at least for the first ten years of the Museveni administration until the 
1990s.  Ugandan political instabilities rendering government services unavailable did not 
eradicate the idea that water is a free good from people minds.  This is demonstrated by 
the fact that, according to Ugandan stakeholders, large amounts of funds and activities in 
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the water sector are devoted to sensitizing communities to their responsibility of 
operating and maintaining water supplies, as community members expect this to be 
government work just as much as their Tanzanian counterparts.  The belief among the 
rural population that water is free is, therefore, to be considered as a similarity between 
the two countries, and will not be considered as critical in the rest of this analysis.  In 
summary, socio-economic and historical diversity are insufficient to justify the difference 
in the success of rural water development. 
Physical differences between infrastructure and freshwater resources cannot be 
ignored in relation to the development of rural water access points.  The fact that the rural 
population is more sparsely distributed in Tanzania and roads to these isolated locations 
are in worse condition affects the cost of the rural development process in a manner 
proportional to the technology employed.  The difference in costs between constructing a 
hand-dug well or protecting a spring in an isolated location vs. a central location can be 
hundreds of dollars; more elaborate gravity schemes or deep boreholes for motorized 
pumping have larger costs associated when connectivity of a village is poor.  The total 
costs of the Ngelenge case study project, carried out in an extremely remote location, 
equaled about $150,000, with about $15,000 spent solely on the transport of materials.  It 
must, therefore, be noted that this is an economic challenge that is larger in Tanzania than 
in Uganda and yet the Tanzanian governance failed to address it in several ways.  The 
government primarily ignored the added costs of promoting high-tech solutions (The 
United Republic of Uganda 2002) and software, which, as mentioned by several 
stakeholders, include the expense of transporting personnel.   
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The amount of available water resources is a very important factor in the ability of 
a country to develop appropriate and sustainable access to clean water for the 
underserved population.  Uganda water stress is a more urgent issue than it is in 
Tanzania, which provides an incentive to improve the quality of the development process.  
Given this circumstance, the fact that Uganda is performing better than Tanzania is an 
indication that Uganda has adopted a better model of rural water governance, including 
some measures specifically addressing this challenge, such as the adoption of mixed 
technology.  It must be noted that water stress is a parameter of this problem and not a 
variable, as it is not under the full control of a national government.  The true variable 
associated with it would be the difference that water scarcity creates as a motivation. 
Within-country assessments published by various authors acknowledge water 
stress and poor infrastructure as a challenge to sustainability, but they focus on larger and 
more common challenges that occur independently from the accessibility of the water 
resources in the area (Gine 2008; Haysom 2006; Jimenez and Perz-Foguet 2010; Mahauri 
and Katko 1993; McConville and Mihelcic 2007; Montgomery, Bartram, and Elimelech 
2009; Moon 2006; Mtinda 2006; Nkongo 2009).  Following Haverland (2010).  If factors 
are not considered critical in within-country analysis, they shall not be considered critical 
in a cross-country comparison.  Table 12 shows the list of variables retained in the 
comparison between the two countries, some of which will be discussed in the following 
sections. 
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Table 12. List of variables retained in the analysis 
Variable Included Comments 
Policies Different approach to service the rural population 
Funding Difference in utilization of funds 
Government Leadership Uganda government own the development process, 
international donors own Tanzania development process  
Aid Flow Tanzania received more 
Debt Tanzania more debt, but also more 
cancellation/rescheduling  
Population Density and 
Road Conditions 
Tanzania sparser population, large distances and worse 
road infrastructure makes public work harder than Uganda 
Water Stress Uganda is water stressed, Tanzania not yet 
 
Research Question Number One 
What are the differences between Uganda’s and Tanzania’s water sector funding?  
Despite the limitation in estimating off-budget funds devoted to the water sector, 
the difference in the funds available to the water sector is insufficient to explain the stark 
difference in progress achieved.  The main difference identified is in the decision about 
how to use funds and who controls the flow of funds rather than the availability of it.  
Uganda’s commitment of funds to the provision of basic water services, including long-
term support, is not paralleled in Tanzania, where an increasing amount of funds are 
devoted to the Urban and Basin Authority, managing the private water sector, regulating 
water for production, and to pay consultants for elaborate plans, whose value is deeply 
questioned by stakeholders.  By not considering long-term support, Tanzania poorly 
protects its investments in the rural water sector. 
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Research Question Number Two 
What are the major differences between Tanzania’s and Uganda’s guiding principles and 
strategies in rural water governance? 
Tanzanian and Ugandan water policies equally recognize that clean water has an 
economic value and that it comes at a cost, which would be best if covered by 
communities.  Ugandan policy, upholding its peoples’ constitutional right to water, 
acknowledges that the rural population has limited financial and management resources.  
Therefore, it creates a realistic network of support to the community to develop these 
capacities, based on a combination of sensitization and mobilization activities, subsidies, 
backstopping, and incentives to private sector support.  The Tanzanian policy 
acknowledges the same challenges in various introductory statements, but in practice it 
creates an institutional apparatus to support a market-based mechanism requiring the 
existence of such financial and management capacities.  Moreover, it fails to assign 
responsibility for creating capacity; a statement such as ”[c]ommunities will be facilitated 
in acquiring technical and management skills” is not backed up by the specific 
identification of the owner of this task and by the allocation of funds for such activities.  
Thus, it is just an empty statement.  This lack of assignment of responsibility was 
observed in Tanzania during the course of the Ngelenge project very often, as most 
requests for government assistance resulted in an offer of personal help by a government 
employee, or impromptu solutions that underlined the lack of a structured community 
assistance plan.  
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The Ugandan water policy set the cost of its rural development by a top-down 
decision regarding the technologies to be used.  This allowed it to set clear guidelines for 
community contributions to capital expenses, water pricing, and the development of a 
private technical support network – the hand-pump mechanics.  Tanzania’s policy 
promotion of environmentally friendly technologies relies on the assumption that 
communities will have the capacity to make informed decisions on the affordability of 
the costs of ownership.  As detailed by the Ngelenge case study, that is an unrealistic 
expectation.  Despite the district officers being informed of the plans, no one suggested 
the choice of technology was not appropriate. 
The Ugandan policy accepts the fact that the community is responsible for setting 
water tariffs that are not required to fully cover the O&M of these systems and provides a 
budget and guidelines to the district on how to fill the financial gap.  Despite having read 
the several documents published by the Tanzanian Ministry of Water multiple times, I do 
not feel confident I understood how tariff setting, cost recovery, and district backstopping 
thresholds are supposed to work.  Criticism on both the clarity and the diffusion of the 
national water policy is a recurrent theme that emerged in the analysis of the Tanzanian 
stakeholders’ interviews, not only at the community level, but also at the local and 
national government level and with NGOs. 
The lack of community funds for regular maintenance eventually leads to systems 
that break down and need to be repaired through government programs.  In both 
countries, the government response is slow, and both countries delay their intervention in 
the hope that communities will organize and address the problem independently.  But the 
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delay in government support is longer in Tanzania, where funds are not preventively 
allocated in the budget, and new implementation and extensions take priority relative to 
rehabilitation.  
The Ugandan policy relies on the existing administrative apparatus for its 
implementation.  The Tanzanian policy created a major overhaul of the administrative 
sector, which relies on resources not available to its local government offices.  The 
Ugandan policy requires communities to organize in a water committee to manage their 
water points.  The Tanzanian policy creates multiple options for management at the 
village level, which are fully defined over the course of a seven-year period from the 
2002 national water policy to the 2009 Water Act.  These options allow a move toward 
private management of water at the village level, neglecting the fact that private 
management requires revenue, which further increases the costs of water to the already 
insolvent beneficiary. 
This becomes an issue of equity; if full cost recovery is above the average 
community economic capacity, only the rich communities have the right to sustainable 
water services.  While Uganda’s government understands the need to balance the cost of 
water with the right to it, controlling the costs by dictating low-technology solutions and 
setting a requirement that the community pays what it can with the rest coming from the 
government, the Tanzanian government settles for a consumer market solution where 
everyone has the right to buy water, as long as they can afford to pay for it.   
Large differences also exist in the ways the two countries’ policies are written.  
While the Ugandan national water policy is a detailed prescription of the technology, 
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implementation, financing, and management of sustainable water delivery to rural 
communities, the Tanzanian national water policy is more of an outline of principles that 
should be considered when developing an actual policy.  The Tanzanian policy 
documents mainly create an enabling environment for development, while the Ugandan 
policies outline and streamline each of the steps of the development process.  As an 
example, the two policy positions with regard to choices of technology are quoted 
directly.  
The Ugandan water policy (1999) states: 
(ii) Technology – water supply 
Appropriate low cost technologies should be selected, offering goof possibilities 
for community participation in decision making and in physical implementation, 
inclusive of operation and maintenance of completed facilities, without 
compromising the role of water as a vital infrastructure for socio-economic 
development.  
For rural and sparsely populated peri-urban communities preference 
should be given to point sources such as protected springs, handpump equipped 
shallow wells or boreholes, and gravity fed piped schemes. 
Motor or engine driven pumps should normally be used for water supply in urban 
areas where availability of regular power grid and trained operation and 
maintenance staff are ensured. 
Only well-known and tested technologies and hardware, preferably locally 
made/available, should be used.  Standardization of equipment, e.g. handpumps, 
will be applied only as a means of safeguarding the community-based 
maintenance system through easy access to spare parts, repairs, etc. on the open 
(private) market.  Therefore, the types of pumps should be limited, and the 
technical specifications should be available in the “public domain” to avoid 
monopoly situation and over-dependence on donor preferences.  
In accordance with the Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS) the 
U2/U3 handpump (Uganda version of the India Mark II and III pumps) is the 
standard equipment to be used in deep groundwater settings (borehole deeper than 
20 m). In shallow groundwater settings three types, the U3 light handle pump, the 
TARA direct action pump and the NIRA AF 85 are to be field-tested and 
monitored in order to select at most two models to be the standard equipment. 
  
The Tanzania (2002) water policy states: 
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Choice of technology.  
Goal: A mechanism enabling communities to make appropriate choices of 
technology  
Failure of some of the rural water supply schemes has been attributed to 
inappropriate technology and location of facilities, and lack of social acceptability 
and affordability. In order to put in place a mechanism which will allow 
communities to make informed choices of technology the following will be 
undertaken:  
(i) Communities will be empowered and facilitated to make appropriate 
technology choices that suite them, particularly which require low investment 
costs and are least costly in operation and maintenance,  
(ii) Use of environmentally friendly technologies including gravity, solar 
and wind power for pumping will be promoted.  
 
The operationalization of Tanzania’s 2002 national water policy was postponed until the 
2005 National Water Development Strategy, which describes in more detail the 
institutional apparatus, but fails to provide clear and practical execution guidelines.  
4.11.2  Problem Statement 
The lack of attention to selecting the most appropriate technology in providing 
water supply and 
sanitation services has led to: 
- higher capital and operation and maintenance costs; 
- higher charges to consumers; 
- limited sustainability; and 
- lack of consumer or community acceptability. 
4.11.3 Policy Direction 
Service Providers will provide WSS services using the most cost effective 
technology available which is suitable to the area and the socio-economic 
circumstances of the users. In rural areas, where communities will be responsible 
for operation and maintenance, they will be empowered and facilitated to make 
appropriate technology choices that will suit their own capabilities, particularly in 
those which require low investment costs and are operated and maintained at least 
cost. 
4.11.4 Goal 
Provision of WSS services is based on technologies best suited to the technical, 
social and economic circumstances of each scheme, and users will participate in 
the selection of the technologies to be used. 
4.11.5 Strategy 
The strategy for adopting appropriate technology will be to: 
- identify alternative technologies during the planning process; 
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- evaluate the consequences of alternative technologies in terms of service levels 
and costs to consumers, and overall sustainability; and 
- involve consumers and communities in the planning and selection process.  (The 
United Republic of Tanzania. 2005) 
 
Further confusion is potentially created by the publication of the 2005 National 
Water Sector Strategic Implementation Plan, followed by its replacement in 2006 by the 
Water Sector Development Program (The United Republic of Tanzania 2010).  Until the 
2009 Water Act, the final version of the institutional apparatus was not steadily defined 
(The United Republic of Tanzania 2009).  The effect of the lack of clarity and stability in 
the Tanzanian policies and guidelines is clear, both in the complaints of stakeholders 
about the lack of diffusion of the policy prescriptions and in my direct observations 
working with district officials and the community of Ngelenge.  This is very different 
from the Ugandan situation, where the policies and guidelines set in the late 1990s never 
changed. 
Figure 10 schematically depicts how the policies were rolled out relative to a 
more broad economic history and also shows how all those actions relate to increases, 
decreases, and stalling of rural water coverage.  Quite obvious in the graph is the 
correlation between the timing of a slowdown in the expansion of coverage with the onset 
of structural adjustment, which marks the beginning of the period at which the 
government role transitioned from being fully responsible for development and its costs 
to sharing responsibility for development with the private sector and civil society.  It is 
also interesting to note how Uganda created stronger macro-economic instruments to 
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support its program than Tanzania, and less bureaucracy, as well as fewer rewrites of 
policies and programs directly impacting the rural water sector.   
Research Question Number Three 
What are the major differences in challenges and drivers with regard to the 
implementation of sustainable rural water development? 
The same core challenges are present in both countries.  Water costs are not high 
on the priority lists of more economically vulnerable populations.  Given the limited 
economic and management capacities of communities, water funds are easily 
misappropriated.  In neither country does the concept of preventive maintenance appear 
to be accepted by communities.  Water sources are repaired only after they break if the 
replacement costs do not exceed $50-60 and if the community has a functional water 
management structure.    
Uganda has created several drivers that help protect investments in rural water 
resources, none of which have been paralleled in Tanzania.  The process of development 
and maintenance of rural water points is clearly defined and known to everyone involved, 
including the choice of low-cost of ownership technology.  Ugandan districts have 
budgets to implement a series of activities lacking or uncoordinated in Tanzania, as funds 
to train workers and to deploy them are not available.  Additionally, the fact that Uganda 
dictates each aspect of the development process minimizes the training requirement, and 
the Tanzanian lack of funds and resources is exacerbated by the level of competence 
required to educate a community to conduct a useful cost-benefit analysis of available 
technologies. 
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Another advantage spawning from the top-down choice of low-cost technologies 
in Uganda is the effective organization of technical support at the district and sub-county 
level.  Moreover, limiting technology choices allows the Ugandan district to set clear 
guidelines on triggering backstopping based on a measure of equitable affordability.  
Ugandan districts can reserve up to 11% of the conditional grants for rehabilitation, 
operation, and maintenance, while Tanzanian districts find it difficult to have 
rehabilitation budgets approved.  In Tanzania, if guidelines for providing support to 
communities for unaffordable replacement costs exist, they are not known to 
stakeholders.  Standardization, however, creates some challenges at a systemic level in 
Uganda which are not as critical in Tanzania since a system is not in place.  Challenges 
include dishonesty in the network of hand-pump technicians and systematic theft of hand 
pumps to feed a spare parts black market.  
Coordination within the sector is also quite different between the two countries.  
Since the onset of the Sector Wide Approach both governments attempted to channel all 
donors’ funds through the basket funds and asked donors working independently to 
coordinate their work at the district level.  The two water NGO networks, UWASANET 
and TAWASANET, are stakeholders in this coordination effort, but they are in two 
different states of development.  As pointed out by several interviewees working within 
the network, TAWASANET is only a few years old and is working to find its place and 
identity with the development process, while UWASANET’s increased maturity in 
coordination and reporting is proven by the increasing number of NGOs who disclose 
their budgets and their plans for it (Government of Uganda 2011; Tanzania Water and 
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Sanitation Network 2010; Uganda Water and Sanitation Network 2010).  Lastly, the 
Ugandan Technical Support Unit (TSU) efforts monitoring the relationship of 
communities with district, sub-county officials, and NGOs, as well as reporting back to 
the national level, is unparalleled in Tanzania.  Ugandan TSU officers are traveling in the 
field four days every week, covering the entire territory every quarter. 
The sense of ownership and responsibility the Ugandan government and national 
civil society have in the development programs is replaced with a sense of 
disenfranchement in Tanzania.  The Ugandan government is responsible, both by policy 
and in reality, for development, and all stakeholders, civil society, private sector, and 
government officials are aware of this responsibility.  Water services cost money, and in 
that sense, most interviewees admit it is a commodity, as people who can afford it will 
have an easier time accessing the services.  But it is a government responsibility to enact 
the right for people to have access to water by creating an environment of cooperation 
and participation in which all members of society do their part to cover these costs. 
A very different picture emerges from the Tanzanian interviews.  In theory, the 
government is responsible for water services, but in practice, the decision makers are the 
international development partners who control the funds and make the rules.  
Stakeholders feel disempowered and without the means to influence the process.  Figure 
21 illustrates the results of the policy network analysis.  The graphs compare the relative 
frequency of each listed category, normalized by the frequency of the word water in the 
interview transcripts (right), in the 2010 national sector review (center), and in the two 
combined.  The lower three categories compare the ratio between the frequency of 
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references to international, national, and local stakeholders relative to the frequency of 
the mention of government (which is inclusive of ministry and districts). 
 
 
Figure 21. Comparison of policy networks. 
Ugandan stakeholders, both at the national level (sector review) and at the local 
level (interviews) center the discourse on water development at the local level, districts, 
and communities, more than their Tanzanian counterparts, which is in line with the 
grassroots participatory process informing the Ugandan political discourse.  At the local 
level, Tanzanians perceive the International Development Association and World Bank 
as more influential than Ugandans do; the latter seem more concerned with control 
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exerted at the national level than the former do.  Interestingly, the situation reverses at the 
official national stakeholders level; the international developing partners are not as much 
at the center stage during the National Sector Review.    
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DISCUSSION 
From a Comparison to Explanatory Model 
The results of the Tanzanian and Ugandan rural water governance comparison 
discussed in the previous sections, augmented by within-country observations, allow the 
proposal of an explanatory model establishing a connection between policies’ principles 
and outcomes, explaining the Tanzania rural water development failure.  Tanzanian 
governance fails because it centers on the faulty assumption that full-cost recovery is a 
realistic expectation, as long as capital costs are subsidized.  All the body of evidence in 
this work and in the work of others shows that rural communities, whose monetary 
expenditures are close to the poverty level, do not consider clean water a priority in their 
struggle to survive.  This conclusion is not based on an economic assessment of the target 
population, which is very complicated in non-monetary economies, but on the fact that all 
data from the last twenty years points to communities lacking internally generated funds 
for repair.  Arguing the idea that they should prioritize water, or that water costs are 
within their means, is just an expression of our Western point of view.  They are clearly 
expressing their views with their financial commitment or lack thereof.   
Although misappropriation of funds is compounded by the refusal to pay fees, it is 
hardly the source of the problem, as it does not justify the lack of participation in labor or 
in committee work, which are also indicators of the priority level.  The misappropriation 
of funds often reported stems from the same economic problems.  The community leader 
who misappropriates the money for personal gain is just as poor, and sees better 
investment opportunities in small business than in water services.  The community 
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leaders who devote the water funds toward other community projects see a primary 
school or a health center as a higher priority than water.  The relative success of the 
transformation of water funds into revolving micro-loans supports this explanation – 
economic development needs to come first.   
The Ugandan experience proves sensitization and mobilization can only create a 
culture of caring for water facilities with basic affordable maintenance, which mainly 
involves labor (i.e., keeping the ground around a water point clean, greasing a water 
pump regularly, protecting equipment from theft and vandalism and contacting the right 
resource when a problem occurs).  It cannot create the customer base required for full-
cost recovery unless the economic structure of a community has reached a level of 
financial security that elevates clean, accessible water to a higher priority. 
Uganda’s success lies in the government decision to take over the financial 
burden to sustain basic water services until a community is economically ready to pay for 
them.  This decision requires the existence of funds to cover the expenses, which Uganda 
created with macro-economic measures, such as the dedication of a sizeable amount of 
the HIPC debt relief funds and a deliberate effort to control costs through the government 
imposition of basic technologies.  Naturally these technologies offer only the most basic 
level of service.  But for rural communities, a very basic level of service is satisfactory, 
as demonstrated by the Ngelenge experience.  Shutting down the water distribution tap 
stands to receive payment was not effective, as people would rather fetch water from the 
wells, even if they had to walk 1.5 km, than pay the 600 Tsh of water fees.  Locking the 
well on the other side created outright hostility and rebellion.   
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Tanzanian policy attempts to establish a full privatization of the sector.  The 
regional experts who helped Ngelenge transition from a committee-based model to a 
board of directors supervising the activity of a hired manager and treasurer, advised the 
community that the committee-based management model was proven ineffective 
compared to one in which managers are paid through the profits made on tariffs.  The 
new management model was just as ineffective as the previous one.  The words used by 
one of the same advisors one year later, during the interview for this work, were “now 
they are preaching this thing about private operators,” implying that the advice did not 
come as much from their direct experience as it did from pressure from above. 
Uganda is pursuing an expansion of the private sector.  The concept of the hand-
pump mechanics network spawned from a desire to create an indigenous private sector, 
and the government did not support developing new water sources in peri-urban villages 
like Kizzi because they could be reached by the Mpigi Town water distribution network 
managed by a private operator.  Large complex systems benefit from a professional 
utility management but in turn make water less affordable to all.  Not everyone, not even 
in the urban center of Mpigi Town, can afford the upfront cost of a water connection.  
The ones who could afford it created such an unfair water reselling business that even the 
private operator actively tried to find more equitable solutions, such as suggesting a pilot 
project of a communal tap stand for Kizzi.  Uganda creates space for the private sector, 
but does not pull back from its role in creating sustainable development.  The government 
still maintains the basic level of service that provides water to the poorest strata of the 
population (see figure 22).  When this author asked people at the Mpigi Town’s protected 
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spring why they were fetching water there, she was told that water from the distribution 
system was not within their means.  Ironically, this author tested the water from the 
protected spring and from the Mpigi water distribution system and found that while the 
spring water was within the WHO criteria for safe water, the distribution system water 
was not.  Most Ugandans boil that water before drinking it. 
 
Figure 22. A protected spring in Mpigi Town. 
Women doing laundry (left) and children fetching water (right) 
The government of Uganda’s concern about affordability is also seen in the 
recommendation that village water committees collect water fees on a monthly basis, as it 
significantly reduces the price of water.  In Tanzania, tariffs by the bucket are 
recommended as it is a stronger method of enforcing payment: no coin, no filling your 
bucket. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
The trends toward privatization of the water sector observed in Tanzania and 
Uganda, and the influence exerted by debt, characterizes the policy trajectories of most 
developing countries.  The cause-effect relationships suggested by this comparative study 
could be tested by repeating this analysis work in other countries.  Researching a larger 
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number of countries would allow an in-depth analysis of the correlation between aid-
generated debt and ownership of the development effort, which is not meaningful with a 
sample of only two countries.  Additionally, it would be interesting to study the 
correlation between the concept that water is a right with a government’s commitment to 
accept responsibilities for water services, including provision of funds for capital 
implementation, backstopping, and capacity development.   
Neo-liberalism and the Millennium Development Goals 
Neo-liberal policies, pushing the government to a facilitator role, leads things in 
the opposite direction than the Millennium Development Goals are trying to achieve.  
Market based policies fail to establish sustainable development to the poor, and in the 
case of Tanzania, lead to inefficiency, poor investment protections, and duplication of 
efforts, which is the traditional argument in favor of privatization of public services.  In 
this work, I provided several examples of how neo-liberal policies succeed to create 
business in the water sector by constructing water infrastructure, as pointed out by 
Goldman (2007) in his criticism toward the hegemony of the World Bank in creating 
development.  The economic opportunity created by unsustainable infrastructure only 
provides an improvement to macro-indicators of the economy at the expense of the poor 
who are asked to invest in water infrastructure without a future.  This is the same 
mechanism observed in the year post-structural adjustment.  Macro-economic indicators 
such as GDP quickly improved, while the number of people living below the poverty line 
quickly increased.  Poverty is not only cash poverty; it is compounded by privatizing 
access to social services such as water, health, and education.  All countries, developing 
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or developed, are currently facing this dichotomy: optimizing economic growth, the rich 
are getting richer, and the poor are getting poorer.  Quoting from Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
remarks at The World Water Forum in Marseille (2012): 
Ladies and gentlemen, 
As someone who has more than fifty years of experience in politics, I am 
convinced that the water crisis is closely related to the flaws of contemporary 
economics and politics. Let me make two points in this regard. 
We have met at a time when the world is still reeling from the 
consequences of a severe, global economic crisis. 
The emerging signs of recovery in the world economy should not deceive us. 
The crisis has shown that the currently dominant model of economic growth is 
unsustainable. This model engenders crises, social injustice and the danger of 
environmental catastrophe. 
There is a clear need for an evolutionary but sufficiently rapid transition to 
a different model. It should be based on a combination of markets and private 
initiative with the principles of social and environmental responsibility of 
business and effective government regulation. 
We therefore need to rethink the goals of economic development. 
Consumption must not remain the only or the principal driver of growth. The 
economy needs to be reoriented to goals that include public goods such as a 
sustainable environment, people’s health in the broadest sense of the word, 
education, culture and social cohesion, including absence of glaring gaps between 
the rich and the poor. 
Major water projects, both national and international, could become one of 
the engines in a qualitatively new stage of the development of global economy. 
My second point: the world needs a new political architecture, a new architecture 
of security, global governance and sustainable development. 
It should be based on the rejection of confrontational thinking or any attempts to 
dominate international relations and on demilitarization of international politics. 
It is only on such a basis that we will be able to respond to the main challenges of 
this century – the challenge of security, the challenge of poverty and 
backwardness, and the challenge of the global environmental crisis. 
Ladies and gentlemen, 
During the fifteen years of its existence, the World Water Forum has 
helped to put water problems on the international political agenda. 
Unfortunately, however, it has still not gone beyond general discussion between 
representatives of governments and the business community, nor has it produced 
breakthrough solutions to the water crisis. That is why, parallel to the forum, 
alternative discussion platforms are emerging as a result of civil society 
initiatives. 
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The voice of the public must be heard at this Forum. Therefore, let me 
convey to you the position formulated by our civil society partners: 
“We believe that good governance of water and sanitation will only be 
brought about through human rights-based approaches and adequate investment in 
informed and effective civil society participation. We greatly welcomed the 2010 
UN recognition of the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation and now 
urge all actors to support national governments to implement these rights for all 
people in accordance with human rights law and to recognize and effectively 
support local knowledge and community management as important to implement 
this right.” 
Ladies and gentlemen, let us unite our efforts! Let us think and act on the 
basis of common principles: Peace for all. Water for all. Dignity and the life 
worthy of a human being, for all. We should not settle for less. 
 
Gorbachev’s appeal for a change in political architecture stops short of 
denouncing the pressures and interferences of international giants such as the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as other critics of the neo-liberal approaches 
to development do (Budds and McGranaham 2003; Falkner 2003; Ford 2003; Jimenez 
and Perez-Foguet 2010).  My research strongly suggests that the difference between 
Ugandan and Tanzanian governance is centered on the right to water and the right of a 
nation to determine its own path.  Tanzania is one of the countries that abstained from 
voting on the UN resolution about a right to water, as its water policy is incompatible 
with the right to water.  By requiring full-cost recovery and making it difficult for 
districts to obtain rehabilitation funds, the Tanzanian policy reinforces the idea that water 
is a right only in the sense that no paying customer is discriminated against; but micro-
economics prevents the creation of a market-based development that stems from this 
idea. 
In debating the implications of a right to water in their current policy, Tanzanian 
legislators should not ignore the excellent compromise reached in Ugandan policy: an 
  186 
institutional arrangement that guarantees basic water services to all while allowing the 
development of privately owned or managed improved water services as economic 
development creates a market for it.  
A market-based model of development cannot ignore the basis of all markets, the 
existence of paying customers interested in the product.  To make an analogy, it is like a 
division of a company manufacturing a product that nobody wants, using loans to sustain 
the cost of production, and selling below cost in an attempt to stimulate interest in the 
market.  Eventually, such an unbalanced model leads to capital depletion of the whole 
company, which is forced to declare bankruptcy with the potential sale of valuable assets.  
Taking this analogy to the next level, such a mechanism is beneficial only to the lenders, 
who profit from the interest covered by other more successful divisions of the company, 
and to the suppliers of the components required to make the product.    
It is hard to believe international finance institutions fail to see this major issue.  It 
is easier to believe their goal lies elsewhere: as the World Bank had explained to their 
funding partners as early as the 1950s, development creates markets for foreign goods 
and services.  The most expensive parts of the Ngelenge water distribution system, the 
BP solar panels and electronics, the Australian made MONO pump, the British and 
Italian valves, are not made in Tanzania – they are part of the flow of imported goods 
which can tip a developing country’s macro-economy into debt.  This work substantiates 
Goldman’s (2007) accusation that the World Bank has created a neo-colonial empire. 
As a volunteer in an international NGO, I find it very disturbing to realize that we 
are just pawns in an undemocratic and illegitimate exploitation scheme; we talk about 
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empowering communities with a bottom-up development, when legislation is imposed 
upon them without any consideration for the democratic processes of these countries.  
This contradiction and its consequences are evident in the Tanzanian National Water 
Development Sector program (The United Republic of Tanzania 2006, Annex 4), which 
produced a large volume of documents about participation and training guides for district 
government officials to facilitate community participatory approaches, only to force onto 
districts, that already had comprehensive multi-year development plans, new insular (see 
figure 23) “quick win” projects, prepared by overpaid external consultants.   
 
Figure 23. Illegal water source in a mountain community of Tanzania. 
A pipe planted in the gravity water distribution line traversing a village without 
appropriate water supply en route toward a village downhill.   
  
The Water Sector Development Program has published an incredible number of 
pages of guidelines; reading them and attempting to follow them in the implementation of 
the Engineers Without Borders project lead me to believe that whoever wrote the 
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documents had very limited experience working directly with a Tanzanian rural 
community, and possibly was not even a Tanzanian national.   
A large portion of the documents are intended for district water and sanitation 
teams, which begs the question of why these documents are not written in Swahili since 
very few workers in a rural district town are fluent enough in English to understand it.  
The concepts embedded in most of these documents are beyond the average community-
level member’s grasp, yet they are meant to enable participation, and lead to community 
making decisions on their water services.  If I am correct, and these guidelines are written 
by external consultants, as hinted at also by the Tanzanian national stakeholders, we are 
in front of a development process dictated by international organization on the 
government of Tanzania, ironically, dictating methods to empower communities in 
making choices and enhancing ownership of the development process.   
The disenfranchement of the Tanzanian national stakeholders with the $1.2 billion 
WSDP is not hard to understand, and it is not surprising that it led to large 
misappropriations of funds at the local government level.  It certainly is true that the 
World Bank control over the Tanzanian development programs is pervasive and as 
illegitimate as president Museveni’s presumed election rigging and refusal to step down 
as the Ugandan president.  It is worrisome considering a sizeable portion of aid money 
administered by the World Bank comes from U.S. taxpayer contributions, yet, unlike 
government programa in the U.S., there is no political process in place whereby taxpayers 
have a voice in how the funds are utilized. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This researcher, through this study, hoped to help donors and NGO grasp the 
complexity of pursuing the water Millennium Development Goal.  Donors and volunteers 
are motivated by the desire to be a part of achieving the Millennium Development Goals 
target of bringing sustainable access to clean water to the poor.  Everybody working or 
supporting NGOs who works on water projects talks about the sustainability of their 
projects, that most of them qualify due to the need of creating capacity in the community 
to support their own water system.  This capacity is envisioned as technical capacity for 
repair, knowledge of how to procure the needed spare parts, and paying tariffs to cover 
the cost.  NGO funds are, therefore, invested in materials for construction, sending 
volunteers provide technical training to the communities, or constructing and creating 
capacity development to manage the systems mainly focused on tariff collection and 
transparent accounting.  By taking this approach, volunteers adopt and disseminate the 
neo-liberal model without questioning its validity.  More than twenty well meaning 
volunteers worked with the community of Ngelenge over the four years I was actively 
involved with the project.  Yet, it took about the same time for us to realize we were on 
the wrong path.  Along the way, we realized that unless we committed to the 
responsibility of indefinitely raising funds for the repair of the system, we had failed at 
creating sustainable water services.  Ironically, our project will be awarded the 2012 
EWB-USA Premier Project, an award recognizing “outstanding EWB-USA Projects that 
epitomize EWB-USA’s Mission and Vision by fostering sustainable solutions, strong 
community partnerships and carefully following the EWB-USA project process.” 
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The neo-liberal model has two advantages that are very appealing to NGOs and 
donors.  Firstly, assuming that once construction is over, the community takes ownership 
of their water services provides a great exit strategy for an NGO.  Nobody can afford a 
long-term commitment to fund operation and maintenance.  Secondly, it allows NGO to 
allocate most of the donated funds to materials, which are easy to trace and document, 
satisfying the donor desire to hear that the money is not wasted.  Yet, as many Tanzanian 
stakeholders complained, if you want to protect your investment, funds need to go into 
working with communities to find viable solutions.   
Based on my research, I recommend all donors and volunteers familiarize 
themselves with the water policies of the country in which they are working and begin a 
project at the district government level, gathering information about the support offered 
by the local government and about the technology that can provide basic services at the 
lowest cost of ownership.  If they are working in a country where the government takes 
responsibility for basic water services, such as Uganda, NGOs need to work through the 
government, even if it can be slow and at times frustrating.  If they are working in a 
country where the government does not fill this role, then before embarking on a 
construction project, one should consider simple ways to treat drinking water, which are 
viable options if a water source is relatively close to households.  An example of a simple 
method is the three buckets settling method, which eliminates particulates from the water, 
or Solar Disinfection (SODIS) that can be managed for the small quantities used for 
drinking water.  While these methods are not 100% effective, they still have the ability to 
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improve the water quality by more than 90%, which is already a large improvement in 
many situations. 
If construction of a water source is necessary, the required budget for O&M needs 
to be created first.  Village-based self-starting revolving funds have been very successful 
when appropriate support to create the administrative and leadership capacity is available.  
A small NGO in Tanzania, SHIPO, has been very successful at implementing water and 
sanitation improvement projects with a combination of low-cost and low-technology 
solutions using the creation of community-based revolving funds.  The revolving funds 
are created by pooling contributions, which are loaned out to community members to do 
small business and returned with a small interest, typically set to 5-10%, and much less 
than that charged by larger microfinance institutions.  The revenue of these villages’ 
banking operations can be used to support water services as long as the technology 
chosen has a low cost of ownership.  Donors need to understand that creating such 
revolving funds require investments in capacity development programs, which are best 
administered by local NGOs, and should be contracted out; by contracting local NGOs, 
local employment is also created, which is good.  But as long as the concept that bringing 
a pipeline to a village is not the same as establishing sustainable water services sinks into 
donors’ minds, there will be no equitable and sustainable development.   
The 1988 book by Olaf Therkildsen (1988), Watering White Elephants? Lessons 
from Donor Funded Planning and Implementation of Rural Water Supplies in Tanzania, 
that analyzes the Regional Integrated Development Programs (RIDEP) in the Tanzanian 
water sector has a telling title.  It is unfortunate to conclude that more than twenty years 
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after its assessment, water development projects are still the same white elephants, only 
bigger in size. 
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